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ABSTRACT
The way passenger traffic is distributed at multiple airport systems continues to intrigue
air transportation planners, urban planners, and policy-makers as researchers attempt
to unravel how airlines, air travelers and airports relate to each other. While previous
research efforts have typically concentrated on the air travelers' choice of airports, the
current thesis addresses how the competitive behavior of airlines operating in a
deregulated environment influences the air traveler's choice of airports and the resulting
distribution of passenger traffic in the multiple airport system.
The methodology of the research first involves identifying four scenarios under which
airlines compete in multiple airport environments, after which an anecdotal analysis of
a select number of city-pair markets for each scenario was performed to solicit
supporting evidence of competitive behavior of airlines. To keep the preliminary
investigation simple, the author has chosen to study the dual-airport systems at Chicago
and Houston. Owing to limitations of the data from O&DPlus and ONBOARD, the
author used a strict set of criteria to identify 14 city-pair markets to analyze the
response of passengers and airlines to challengers entering the city-pair markets between
1984 and 1993. The six quantitative indicators used in the anecdotal analyses include:
average fares, average number of nonstop departures per day each way, quarterly origin-
destination traffic, quarterly non-origin-destination traffic, average quarterly load
factors, and the quarterly total airport-to-airport origin-destination traffic.
The results of the research indicate that while competition is evident, a general trend of
competitive behavior of the airlines in the multiple airport environment is not discernible.
The entry of a challenger typically elicits a variety of responses. Significant stimulation
of the origin-destination traffic was observed in cases where low-fare carriers entered
the market. The fact that the number of non-origin-destination passengers usually
exceeds the number of origin-destination passengers may indicate that justification for
the service in the airport-pairs examined goes beyond simply satisfying the demand for
travel in the origin-destination market. Although quantitative modeling techniques were
not used in this study, the author believes that future researchers should contend with
the complex, multi-dimensional nature of airline competition before attempting to
accurately model the competitive behavior of airlines at multiple airport systems.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Large metropolitan areas that have more than one commercial airport within
proximity of each other have intrigued air transportation planners, urban planners, and
policy-makers for over two decades because problems pertaining to such multiple
airport systems, as they can been aptly christened, are truly multidisciplinary in nature.
A naive observer may well be tempted to ask, "Isn't one airport per city good enough?".
Yet, as one moves one's fingers across a globe, one readily encounters examples of such
multiple airport systems, notably those of Montreal, New York, Washington, Chicago,
San Francisco, Los Angeles, Tokyo, Milan, Berlin, Paris, and London -just to name a
few. Before the year 2000, new multiple airport systems at Osaka (Itami and New
Kansai), Seoul and Hong Kong (Chep Lap Kok, Macau, Shenzhen) would be added to
the already long list. However, the underlying feature that is of interest is the way
passenger traffic is distributed amongst the airports in the system. In particular, if the
distribution is unequal, one might well wonder what invisible forces could possibly bring
about such an observation, and what could then be done to enhance the commercial
viability of the under-used airports within the system.
At the onset, one may suspect that the airports are competitive with each other,
especially if government intervention or entry barriers are absent. However, a common
perception is that the air traveler is the user of the airport, in which case it then follows
that the airports are merely providing a service that air travelers require. Accordingly,
ground accessibility would be cited as an important determinant of the distribution of
passenger traffic at multiple airport systems. In other words, depending on the quality
of ground access, which can be quantified by travel time and cost, each airport has its
defined catchment area if they all provide services to a common destination. Yet, this
perception may be wholly inadequate because it implies that once an airport is built and
the supporting roads and infrastructure are in-place, the distribution of the traffic is
easily defined. While the notion that passengers do choose amongst airports is valid,
one may note that the fundamental flaw is that the conventional model has left out the
airlines as the other significant users of airports. In particular, by examining how
airports compete with each other, it is imperative that one understands how airlines
choose amongst the airports, and how they respond to competitors operating at the
same or other airports within the multiple airport system. Indeed, if airlines are
motivated by profitability concerns, the justification for serving one or more airports
within the system should be commercial viability as opposed to public convenience or
necessity. Although this idea paints a mercenary picture of airlines, the airlines do aim
to provide a service that passengers prefer but wish to do so profitably - if they can.
Thus, the above discussion leads to the proposal of a relationship linking the
three entities of air travelers, airlines and airports as shown below:
AIRPORTS
AIRLINES AIR TRAVELERS
In essence, the pictorial relationship states that the decisions of both air travelers
and airlines determine the distribution of traffic in a multiple airport system; air
travelers are the customers of airlines, while airlines are, in turn, the customers of the
airports. If the above hypothetical relationship is true on the grounds of basic logic and
rationality, then one should closely examine the frequently ignored component in the
equation: airlines. Indeed, while previous research efforts have usually focused on the
way air travelers choose between airports and airlines, few have really ventured to
unravel the mystery behind how airlines choose - to the extent that they can - amongst a
given set of multiple airports in a large urban region. Although de Neufville [1] claims
that capturing the competitive dynamics of airlines can be "quixotic", and that a
"detailed model" is unnecessary because the results of the competitive fray are
predictable, the author sees the need to address the nature of competition amongst the
airlines because understanding the interdependency between air travelers, airlines, and
airports in multiple airport systems may help airport planners and airline managers
better cope with the inherent uncertainties of traffic forecasting, and the subsequent use
of airport facilities.
This thesis is conveniently divided into seven chapters, with the first four
expounding on previous research efforts, a functional definition of the multiple airport
system, the nature of competition, and how airline competition in the United States has
changed since the advent of deregulation in 1979. Chapter 5 discusses the methodology
of the research while Chapter 6 provides an anecdotal analysis of the competitive
behavior of airlines in several selected cases of interest. Lastly, Chapters 7 comments on
the results of the research, and discusses the possible implications of the results.
CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF PREVIOUS LITERATURE
A survey of previous literature on the subject of multiple airport systems
revealed that few have attempted to understand the competitive behavior of airlines
operating in multiple airport environments. Instead, previous research efforts have
typically focused on aspects such as the differential ground accessibility to and from
airports, the modeling of air travelers' choice of airports, and the economic feasibility of
building secondary airports in the vicinity of an already established primary airport.
Yet, the interdisciplinary nature of the subject is amplified by the fact that research is
usually undertaken by those in the disciplines of engineering, economics, public policy,
and urban planning. This chapter aims to highlight some of the more notable studies in
multiple airport systems.
2.1 Modeling The Way Air Travelers Choose Between Airports
Recognizing the notion that airport utilization is the result of the interaction of
choices made by both airlines and air travelers, Greig Harvey of Stanford University [2]
investigated the way passengers choose among departure airports in the San Francisco
Bay Area (the airports of San Francisco International, Oakland, and San Jose), drawing
on a 1980 air passenger survey conducted by the Metropolitan Transportation
Commission of Oakland, California. Applying the multinomial logit model, developed
by Professor Moshe Emanuel Ben-Akiva at Massachusetts Institute of Technology [3], to
both business and non-business travelers, Harvey demonstrated that ground access time
and frequency of direct air service to a chosen destination can account for a large
portion of the variation in airport use in a multiple airport city. The results further
suggest that multiple-stop flights are "strongly preferred" to connecting flights when a
traveler is choosing between a departure airport that is further but offers nonstop
services to the final destination, and a nearer airport that offers multi-stop services to
the same final destination. He concludes by emphasizing the importance of ground
accessibility in the planning of multiple airport systems and the need to incorporate
airline schedules in effectively predicting the air traveler's use of airports within a large
urban area.
During the same period, Professor Norman Ashford of Loughborough University
of Technology (United Kingdom) [4] conducted a similar research on multiple airports in
the British Midlands, whereby the choice of airports was examined for air trips
originating at the airports of Birmingham, East Midlands, Luton, and London-
Heathrow. The study, which was based on verified data tapes provided by the British
Civil Aviation Authority for two surveys conducted in 1975 and 1978, included
comparatively more detailed questions about the type of trip, mode of access, and
social economic status of the traveler. The results of the finding indicate that the model
used in the Stanford study is "reasonably transferable", and that a traveler's choice of
airports can be successfully predicted, given access times, flight frequency and fares.
More specifically, the study revealed that access time and flight frequency are
important, in that order, for business and inclusive-tour trips, while the ranking for short
haul domestic and leisure travelers is: fares, access times, then flight frequency. In other
words, business passengers are more time conscious while leisure passengers are
sensitive to fares.
With the "successful" [4] calibration of the model for choice of airports in both
the United States and the United Kingdom, researchers went a step further to examine
the applicability of the model to the developing country of Nigeria, a country where the
standard of surface transport infrastructure is lower and the socio-economic conditions
different from that of the United States and the United Kingdom [4]. The airports of
interest were the two regional airports at Benin and Enugu. In an attempt to model the
passenger's choice of airports for flights to the main hub at Lagos, researchers conducted
an on-aircraft survey in the summer of 1987. The Nigerian model is unusual in two
respects. First, stratification was not significant as passengers were overwhelmingly
engaged in private or governmental business; few were leisure passengers. Second, fares
and flight frequency were non-significant because strong governmental control over
aviation meant that competition between airlines on the basis of fares did not exist, and
that since Lagos is the main hub, flight frequency to the hub was abundant from both
Benin and Enugu.
On the other side of the globe, Professor Frank S. Koppelman of Northwestern
University and Masahiko Furuichi of the Japanese Ministry of Transport [5] analyzed
air traveler's choice of departure airports in Japan for international travel by applying a
nested logit model. A survey was conducted in 1989 on passengers departing from the
four main Japanese international airports of Tokyo (Narita), Osaka (Itami), Nagoya,
and Fukuoka, all of which offered more than 70 international flights per week1 . The
results of the study lend more support for the nested logit model than the multinomial
logit model, and that both business and pleasure travelers place a high priority on
airport access time, total trip time, and flight frequency.
1Many of the 12 international airports in Japan offered fewer than 10 flights per week in 1989.
One salient observation with regard to the four studies mentioned above is that
while the Stanford study considered three airports within the same large metropolitan
area, the studies in the United Kingdom, Nigeria and Japan, however, sampled airports
which are in distinctly different cities and do not bear the same relationship as the three
adjacent cities of, say, Oakland, San Jose, and San Francisco. Thus, the Bay area may
be a multiple airport city, but United Kingdom, Nigeria and Japan should more aptly be
classified as multiple airport countries. Yet, with the exception of Nigeria, the three
studies conducted in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan display some
similarities in that airport access, trip cost, and flight frequency do play a vital role in an
air traveler's choice of departure airports, whether one speaks of a multiple airport city
or a multiple airport country.
Although the Multiple Airport Demand Allocation Model (MADAM) has been
used between 1973 and 1983 [6], the Joint Metropolitan Washington Council of
Governments and Maryland Department of Transportation, in 1985, calibrated the
model to perform extensive sensitivity analysis on the traffic distribution of passengers
in the three Washington area airports (Baltimore, Dulles, National) for the purpose of
using the quantitative results to support five policy alternatives regarding the
commercial use of airports. The model aimed to replicate the expected behavior of
passengers and airlines in the demand, provision, and distribution of air services for a
given operational environment, as encapsulated by the following four factors: the spatial
and temporal pattern of passenger movements, the access time to airports, the airport's
physical characteristics, and the airline's scheduling patterns. The Authorities were
aware that the model could neither account for macroeconomic disturbances nor
generate "economically optimum" [6] solutions for airlines; they readily recognized that
the model was meant to be descriptive instead of prescriptive. However, an interesting
feature of the model is its use of an iterative process to allocate passengers and flights at
the airports within the system, whereby if one of the airports is full, the remaining pool
of passengers is re-distributed to the other airports until none of the airports exceeds its
designed capacity. Strange as it may sound, the Authorities claim that MADAM has
been accurately calibrated to replicate the base year conditions and that it is flexible and
responsive to incremental changes in airport access improvements, regional
developments, and airline scheduling practices. They further conclude that MADAM is
"reasonably accurate for intra-regional passenger assignment to the airports, somewhat
less accurate for the extra-regional distributions, and least accurate for the aircraft flight
pattern distribution per airport." [6] Perhaps the most critical comment brought forth is
that the model needs to incorporate the current deregulated airline operating
environment, if nothing else.
The last of the studies on airport choice that will be discussed is the work of a
then doctoral student, Mahmoud Sulaiman Abbas, at the University of California at
Berkeley [7]. Abbas' study narrowly focused on the factors that affect the choice of
airports.of business travelers amongst a set of local airports in small communities that
were located "within the sphere of influence" [7] of a large air transport hub. Using a
statistical technique, with frequency of direct flights, fares, access cost and time,
industry type, firm function and size, and traveler's age and income as key variables,
Abbas found that the choice of airports in small communities is largely driven by the
level of air service, with frequency of direct flights, available fares, and access cost and
time appearing to be the most significant. Specifically, for a local airport that is close to
a nearby large hub, parking cost appears to be the significant access cost variable, while
for a local airport that is far from a nearby large hub, travel time appears to be the
significant access cost variable. Nevertheless, Abbas did recognize that in order for the
study to be of more general use, the study should be extended to non-business travelers
under similar conditions, particularly because leisure travelers are now a sizable
proportion of the total air travelers in the United States.
2.2 Other Approaches To The Problem
A different twist to the methodology of research on multiple airports is seen in
three studies pertaining to the dual-airport cities of Dallas/Fort Worth, Detroit, and
Houston. Specifically, these studies examine the changes in the behavior of air travelers
when there is a transfer of most operations from an old airport that is nearer the city to
a new but more remote one. Indeed, de Neufville and King stressed that such "quasi
experimental" [8] methods are recommended because the changes, if any, take place so
quickly that few external factors would have little time to vary. This, in turn, reduces the
chances of the investigator making misleading conclusions about relationships between
the variables under scrutiny.
Specifically, in their study of the Texas intra-state services between Dallas/Ft
Worth and San Antonio and Houston - provided by Braniff, Southwest Airlines and
Texas International between 1971 and 1975 2 - de Neufville and King concluded that:
2Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport opened in the first quarter of 1974.
e Airport access is significant in short haul markets when travelers have a choice of
airports and when the only available airport is made more remote. In fact, an overall
decrease in demand is observed.
* Relative frequency is a vital determinant of market share, conforming to the usual S-
shaped curve that relates market share and frequency share, when other factors do
not intervene. However, when price and locational attributes enter the picture,
relative frequency seems to have only secondary effects.
In a separate study, Linda E. Bower [9] had set forth with the hypothesis that
air travel demand is elastic with respect to airport access costs, and that the distance of
the airport from the city has an impact on the volume of passenger traffic at the airport.
She defined elasticity as the percentage change in air passenger trips divided by the
percentage change in airport access costs. Although "airport access costs" [9] had
several components and Bower justified the way she estimated the individual
components, de Neufville and King unveiled two main shortcomings of her study. First,
they disagree with the way Bower calculated some of the cost components. For example,
she should not have assumed that access time is equivalent to the time it takes to travel
between the center of the city to the airport since less than a quarter of the passengers
actually travel between these two points. They argue that given the high quality of
circumferential highways, access time between suburban areas, where many travelers
originate, decreases as airports move away from the center of cities. Second, they
express qualms about Bower's use of only one city (Houston) in the study because she
would then not be able to control for other interfering factors (such as changes in air
fares and the 1970 recession in air travel), and thus fully isolate the effect of the change
in airport access. In any case, after gathering data from 50 city pairs for the period prior
to the closing of the more accessible Hobby Airport and the period after the opening of
Intercontinental Airport, she found that short haul traffic (under 300 miles) fell
dramatically after the relocation of the airport.
On the whole, de Neufville and King feel that most researchers seem unaware
that people who frequently travel by air may choose to live near the airport.
Consequently, the assumption that people are stimulated to travel more when they are
closer to the airport is suspect. Yet, a causal relationship of this kind should be made
clear if the study is to be valid. To this end, de Neufville and King believe the best way
to measure the effect of changes in airport access seems to be that suggested by R. E.
Park [10] in his study of the relocation of Detroit's airport in 1947. Here, he avoided
many of Bower's difficulties with various estimates of access by simply not even
attempting to relate traffic loss to any measure of accessibility. Instead, he compared the
evolution of Detroit's traffic with that of a control group. In particular, Park compared,
for a time frame of 10 years, traffic between Detroit and cities within 300 miles, to that
between other Midwestern cities and destinations of the same distance, a procedure
which effectively removes interference from changes in technology, recessions, and any
other influential factors that might affect all similar airports. In short, the focus of the
study then reduces to the disparity observed that can be safely attributed to the
relocation of the airport. Park concluded that the change in airport access did not affect
the rate of growth, but did seem to have reduced the level of traffic by over 28% for a
25-mile move [10].
Nevertheless, credit must be given to Richard de Neufville for advocating the
need to incorporate airline competition in studies of multiple airport systems. In
particular, he emphasized that both airlines and passengers are users of airports, and
that the conventional thinking that only passengers are the users is distinctly "myopic,
slanted" [1]. Perhaps the reason that few have attempted to saunter through this avenue
of thinking is that capturing the competitive behavior of airlines at multiple airports is
"quixotic" [1], as de Neufville so believes. Yet, de Neufville's contribution to the study of
multiple airport systems thus far is worth noting. In particular, he has extensively
elucidated the planning and policy aspects of building secondary airports. He firmly
believes that the size (dominant or subsidiary) and function (special character or
undifferentiated) of a secondary airport should be carefully addressed as an insurance
against possible serious future financial disasters, especially when planners casually
assume that passenger traffic distributes itself according to "its own logic". [1] In short,
de Neufville stresses that traffic cannot be forced to a specific airport within a system
because the distribution is largely determined by the users - both passengers and airlines
- the result of which is usually an unequal distribution of the traffic at the airports
considered. However, the existence of distinct markets may limit the effects of
concentration at any one airport, thereby permitting the co-existence of several airports
within a metropolitan area, each of which can prosper in its own way. In the final policy
recommendation for the United States Federal Aviation Administration [11], de
Neufville puts forth a "threshold of viability" [11] of secondary airports of between 10
to 12 million originating passengers per year, a figure which he obtained after examining
37 multiple airports systems around the world. The final word is that in planning
secondary airports, de Neufville advocates the application of strategic dynamic
planning since flexibility in long-term planning counteracts the inherent uncertainties of
passenger traffic.
Perhaps the work of Francois Cohas can be seen as an attempt to unravel the
competitive behavior of airlines at multiple airport cities from a specific facet. In his
master's thesis [12], Cohas captured, in a limited way, the dynamics of airline
competition in multiple airports by developing a market share-frequency-share model.
Based on a case study of the multiple airport systems of the San Francisco Bay Area,
New York, and Washington, Cohas' main conclusion is that an S-shaped airport market
share model can well be approximated by using just a few explanatory variables,
namely, frequency of service, average fare at the designated airport, and average fare at
competing airports.
2.3 Attempts At Modeling The Competitive Behavior of Airlines
As far back as 1973, Walter Gelerman [13] hinted an approach to modeling the
competitive behavior of airlines by applying classical game theory. Building upon the
familiar mathematical formula describing the S-shaped curve that relates market share
and frequency share, Gelerman further recognized the interactive, interdependent nature
of the competitive process whereby the market share of an airline depends not only on
its own strategy but also upon that of its competitors. As such, he postulated that the
actual market share of an airline is determined in a competitive game with symmetric
properties in which each airline attempts to maximize its share but is opposed by other
airlines sharing the same objectives. Accordingly, the solution to the game is then defined
by equilibrium states in which each competitor is content that it cannot improve its
position under existing market and regulatory constraints. Given that each strategy
prescribes the number of flights an airline should offer at each of the airports in the
multiple airport system, Gelerman believed that knowledge of the minimax strategy
would then indicate how airlines use satellite airports. To execute several simulations of
the game that he proposed, Gelerman constructed payoff matrices that showed all
possible outcomes of different choices made by two airlines under various situations.
The results of the simulations point in the direction that it is in the interest of an airline
to concentrate all services at a particular airport of the multiple airport system because
of geographic advantages associated with one of the airports. In addition, the second
order effects are that an airline would offer a minimum number of flights at the satellite
airports, in which case absolute matching of schedules is unlikely. Although the study
was conducted during the pre-deregulation years, for which applicability may be
severely limited today, the study is, nevertheless, insightful in that it may give future
researchers some hope of modeling competitive behavior - if at all possible.
A more general model of the competitive behavior of airlines under regulation
was conceived by John C. Panzar [14] in his 1974 doctoral dissertation at Stanford
University, whereby he attempted to show the importance of quality variation in
competition under price regulation. In his analysis of price and schedule quality in a
stylized airline market, Panzar concluded that "social welfare maximization may require
that the industry be subsidized" [14], but this subsidy will be quite small for the "heavily
scheduled" [14] markets. As the airline industry stands today, subsidization is virtually
non-existent except for service to small communities which were guaranteed under the
Essential Air Service Act. However, upon moving beyond a regulated market to
characterize equilibrium in an unregulated market (with free entry and the absence of
price regulation), Panzar discovered that although the equilibrium is "suboptimal" [14],
the unregulated market performs optimally if, at equilibrium, the number of scheduled
flights is so large that any further increase would not affect the demand for air travel.
While Panzar's economic treatise seems less relevant in the present deregulated
environment, he correctly identified that schedule rivalry is one aspect of airline
competition. In fact, as one shall see in Chapter 4,'airline competition encompasses a
large array of variables beyond flight frequency. However, Panzar's basic notions were,
after all, correct.
The current chapter does not attempt to provide an exhaustive discussion of
everyone's contribution in the area of multiple airport systems, but it should suffice to
say that extensive studies have been undertaken to cover various issues and problems
surrounding multiple airport systems, and that interest in multiple airport systems has
not waned after more than two decades. In preparing the following thesis, the author
hopes to add to the already extensive collection of studies by exploring an area which is
relatively untouched for now. However, before addressing the competitive behavior of
airlines in multiple airport systems, it would be prudent to review the general nature of
airline competition in a deregulated environment, such as that in the United States since
1979.
CHAPTER 3
DEFINING THE MULTIPLE AIRPORT SYSTEM
3.1 A Functional Definition
Arriving at a functional definition of a "multiple airport system" is necessary in
that it lays the basic reference unit for analysis of the behavior of air travelers and
airlines within such a special environment. Very often, the words "multiple airports"
inevitably conjure images of the airports such as those of the New York area, the
Washington area, the San Francisco Bay Area, Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston, London,
and Paris. Indeed, a common feature of all such airport systems is the relative proximity
of the airports within each respective metropolitan area, however large the area is.
Therefore, a simple definition of a multiple airport system is: a set of airports serving an
urban area [11]. Accordingly, a multiple airport system should include all the airports
that air travelers and airlines both perceive as serving the populous urban region,
regardless of which jurisdiction the airports falls under. For example, Oakland
International Airport is a member of the multiple-airport system of the Bay Area while
Baltimore/Washington International, though located in Maryland, is a member of the
Washington D. C. area airports. However, to accommodate rapid changes in urban
structure over time, de Neufville recommends the use of a "functional, geographic
definition" [11] of a multiple airport system, for which an airport should satisfy two
important criteria before membership within the system is permitted:
e The airports are close to the existing major airport so as to capture a significant
share of the traffic of the metropolitan region, and
e The airports are officially designated and operated as part of the multiple airport
system by the local authorities.
By far, the first of the two conditions is the more important membership criteria; the
second condition applies only to special cases [11].
With the first basic definition in mind, one may now consider Figure 3.11 on the
next page, which serves to illustrate the essential features of a generic multiple airport
system. The diagram shows a simple dual-airport system, but one should realize that a
multiple airport system can consist of more than just two airports.
Most Accessible Airport Next Best Airport
()e(2)
eService Area 2
Service Area
Service Area 1 > Service Area 2
Identical Air Service From Both Airports
Figure 3.11 A generic multiple airport system.
Given two airports, say, Airport 1 and Airport 2, within an urban area, one may
readily put forth the idea that each airport will have its own well-demarcated natural
service area, the size of which depends on ground accessibility (trip cost, convenience,
mode of transportation) and quality of air service variables (flight frequency,
departure/arrival time, nonstop/multiple-stop/connecting flights to and from
destination). The service area may be defined based on a study of a set of minimal cost
paths between the airport and the air traveler's origin or destination. Therefore, if
Airport 1 were the more accessible airport and that the quality of air service were
identical at both airports, one may reason that Airport l's service area will be larger
than that of the next best Airport 2. On the other hand, if the quality of air service were
not identical, which usually is the case, one would expect overlapping service areas
because some air travelers in either service area may 'defect' to the other airport for
reasons such as the availability of lower fares or a significantly better choice of flight
times. In fact, the two airport-city pairs would then constitute what are known as
"parallel markets" [15], a term which indicates the potential substitutability of one
airport-city pair for the other in the eyes of the air traveler. Hence, one may postulate
that the disparity in the quality of air service is the main signal of competitive behavior
of the airlines serving a given multiple airport system. Specifically, an airline operating to
and from some or all the airports in the system is usually seeking to enlarge its service
area so as to capture as large a share of the total origin-destination traffic as possible in
order to justify the economics of the operation to and from the huge metropolitan area.
In a deregulated environment, where airlines are given significant amount of freedom -
albeit subject to constraints such as gate availability and landing/take-off slots - to alter
fares and flight frequency at will, the intensity of the rivalry, however measured, would
certainly be of interest to both airlines managers, airport planners, and even the
consumers (passengers). In short, the very seat of this thesis research has been identified.
de Neufville [11] reasons that the competitive environment clearly contributes to
problems of concentration at the primary airport since the more accessible and typically
bigger airport attracts more flights and passengers, thereby resulting in both a positive
feedback loop which enhances the quality of air service to that airport, and a negative
feedback loop which leads to undesirable levels of congestion at the same airport. Figure
3.12 below illustrates the dynamics of traffic concentration at the primary airport of a
given multiple airport system.
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Figure 3.12 Concentration at the primary airport [11].
Using this line of reasoning, de Neufville argues that secondary airports usually
become niche players serving their respective adjacent communities and host carriers
with rather unique operations. An example is United Airlines and its commuter
affiliate's operations at Washington-Dulles International Airport, whereby one may
expect United Airlines to attract travelers in the Washington area who may be loyal to
its frequent flyer program, travelers whose origin or destination is in the vicinity of
Dulles Airport, or those who wish to fly internationally directly from Washington-
Dulles. However, the notion that niche-carriers and airports may exist within the
multiple airport system does not imply that such airports and airlines do not participate
in the competitive fray. For example, Southwest Airlines has been highly successful with
its operations in less congested alternative airports in multiple airport cities such as
those at Dallas-Love Field, Houston-Hobby, Chicago-Midway, Detroit-City, Oakland,
San Jose, Burbank, Orange County, Ontario, and more recently, Baltimore. Then, the now
defunct Midway Airlines once operated out of its hub at Chicago's less congested
Midway Airport. Thus, given that airlines do maintain operations at such secondary
airports, it should be revealing to understand the competitive pressures that keep such
air services in place.
3.2 The Issue of Ground Accessibility
While this thesis focuses on the competitive behavior of airlines, one should not
ignore the importance of ground accessibility as a contributing factor that determines the
distribution of passenger traffic within the multiple airport system. It is thus
appropriate to provide a brief discussion of ground accessibility prior to expounding on
the nature of airline competition in the next chapter. .
Indeed, convenient accessibility can perhaps make a more distant airport within
the system more attractive, thereby broadening the definition of multiple airport systems
to include even small outlying communities that are near larger air hubs. In particular,
multiple airports cities such as London (Heathrow and Gatwick Airports), Paris
(Charles de Gaulle), Frankfurt (Main), and Baltimore are linked to outlying towns by
frequent intercity trains, which in turn potentially enlarges the catchment area for the
airport concerned - even if there is a smaller airport in the outlying town. By 1995,
London's Heathrow Airport will have a direct British Rail link to London's Paddington
Station from which air travelers can reach other cities in England or Scotland. Paris'
Charles de Gaulle Airport will be linked to the city of Paris by way of an extension of
one of the local transit lines. Access to other cities in France and Europe will be possible
by means of the new Trains a Grande Vitesse (TGV) [16]. Similarly, a train service
between Baltimore Airport and downtown Washington D.C. attempts to draw
passengers from the already well-served D.C. area to use the less congested Baltimore
airport, an airport which now offers low fares to many cities since the arrival of
Southwest Airlines, Continental Lite and USAir. At the extreme end of ground
accessibility and convenience is Virgin Atlantic Airway's offer of a free door-to-door
limousine service between the airport and some point within a certain radius from the
airport for its Upper and Mid-Class passengers. While such a service is considered a
luxury, numerous door-to-door airport service operators have sprung-up to enhance
accessibility.
To stretch the definition of accessibility and multiple airport system a little
further, one may consider how residents of small outlying communities choose between
several distant major airports even though there is a small airport near the community.
Connin and Leggett's [17] study on the demand for rural airport business travel at
Altoona-Blair County Airport (Pennsylvania) revealed that even though flights operated
by USAir's commuter affiliate are available between the County Airport and Pittsburgh
(USAir's hub), the small airport is less attractive for business travelers than a 2-hour
drive to Pittsburgh or Harrisburg, a 3-hour drive to Washington-National Airport, a 3.5-
hour drive to Baltimore Airport, or a 5-hour drive to Philadelphia International Airport,
from where convenient direct and nonstop air services are available to an air traveler's
final destination. The researchers highlighted that rural airports lack control over many
important quality of service variables such as flight frequency. Nevertheless, the
researchers believe that the difference between a "moribund rural airport" [17] and a
prosperous one may lie in the skill, talent and ingenuity of airport managers, local
business groups, and the clout of elected officeholders in delivering the necessary
funding for the development of such regional airports so that a more competitive travel
network may be created.
With diminished air service to smaller outlying communities, a multiple airport
system would, in reality, encompass a larger set of airports within a larger region. As in
the above example, the multiple airport region could, in principle, consist of six airports
that effectively serve the extended region. However, to limit the scope of the thesis, the
author will consider only multiple airport systems within a large urban area, as opposed
to a multiple airport system consisting of a collection of populous urban areas.
To offset the problem of the lower quality of ground accessibility in small rural
towns, Mary Kihl [18] proposes coordinated intermodal linkages rather than mode-
specific linkages between small communities and distant major airports. While KihI
laments that deregulation has brought about adverse changes in the quality of air service
to small communities, especially with respect to scheduling, carrier service, and fares,
she points out that dedicated airport bus services from single small cities to airports
may not generate sufficient ridership Although Kihi did not arrive at very concrete
solutions, she maintained that there is a need to reassess the role of public transit,
private interstate carriers, and commuter carriers in providing transportation services to
small communities, and that the possibilities for a linkage and coordination must be
explored to "maximize both efficiency and effectiveness in operation." [18] Nevertheless,
she believes that a system cannot be successful without a firm local commitment to
continued transportation in rural communities.
On the contrary, a collection of communities that are quite near each other do
have problems of their own. de Neufville points out that some Bostonian residents may
actually be living in a multiple airport region because of the way the highways in the
Boston area are designed [11]. Specifically, he believes that as a large number of
business centers and suburbs are located in the vicinity of the ring highway of US Route
128 and Interstate 95, a Bostonian may, at any one time, be closer to one of the three
airports of Providence (Rhode Island), Worcester (Massachusetts), or Manchester (New
Hampshire), each of which is within 50 miles of the ring road around Boston. However,
the wider choice of direct flights to more destinations out of the main airport of Logan
International seems to make Boston the major gateway to the New England area as a
whole.
More recently, a research fellow at Loughborough University (United Kingdom),
N. N. Ndoh [19], proposed the application of the familiar "level of service" (LOS)
concept for monitoring the quality of airport access. Although Ndoh recognized that
access plays a key role in the distribution of passengers between airports in a multiple
airport system, he laments over the "lack of standards" for measuring the quality of
access. He attributes this, in part, to the fact that access services are usually externally
provided, and that each mode has many attributes of which cost, comfort, and
convenience most significantly influence air travelers' perception of access LOS.
However, two techniques may be used to evaluate the service level of access: a formal
scaling technique such as psychometric (successive category) scaling, or the Stated
Preference (SP) method, which is a subset of conjoint analysis. Though research is this
area is not extensive, Ndoh firmly believes that monitoring the Level of Service of access
services should provide airport managers with a tool to influence the access services at
the airport concerned, and at the same time, enhance the air traveler's awareness of
options of ground access.
Although issues pertaining to accessibility will not be explicitly addressed
elsewhere in this thesis, the reader should just bear in mind that ground accessibility
continues to be an important contributing factor that determines the distribution of
passenger traffic at multiple airport systems. Indeed, accessibility ties in nicely with the
definition of the "service area" for an airport within the multiple airport system, a
definition that was mentioned in the first section of this chapter. However, this thesis
will focus on the way airlines operating in a multiple airport environment compete for
passengers.
CHAPTER 4
A WORD ABOUT COMPETITION
Before identifying the elements of competition in the airline industry since
deregulation, one could first examine the definition of "competition". Such a momentary
diversion would perhaps allow one to gain some useful insights into how competition
may be analyzed.
4.1 Defining Competition
Though used often in everyday speech, the word "competition" seems to carry an
extended definition in the minds of economists. The New Webster's Expanded
Dictionary defines "competition" as a "contest for the same object; rivalry", and to "rival"
is "to strive to excel; to compete with". As a first approximation, Donald Armstrong
[20] at the Fraser Institute defines "competition" as simply "the performance of rivalrous
acts."
However, Armstrong points out that Webster's definition limits competition to
acts which are "under or as if under fair or equitable rules and circumstances" [20], while
"rivalry" may include situations ranging from "benign to murderous" [20] moves.
Therefore, the implication is that "competition" seems to carry a pleasant connotation
while "rivalry", a pejorative one. To reconcile the two bi-polar connotations, Armstrong
conveniently conceives of competition and its desirability as entities lying on an x-y
plane whereby the relationship between competition and its desirability can be
described as an inverted U as shown in Figure 4.11 on the next page.
Nevertheless, economists tend to take different stands when they have to define
"competition". In particular, one group of economists - the Behaviorists - places much
emphasis on what the competitors actually do, while the other group, namely the
Structuralists, stresses the structure of the market, especially the number of competing
firms. In short, the Behaviorists believe that a competitor:
e strives for improvement by innovation or imitation,
e chooses and offers choice (to the consumer),
e is independent and assertive (does not collude),
e plays and works hard in the competitive game,
e is knowledgeable of what others are doing,
e plays fair, and
e acquires and uses power to accomplish the above.
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Figure 4.11 The Graphical Relationship Between Competition And Desirability [20].
The Structuralists simply adhere to the competition-number relationship, positing that
competition amongst firms increases with the number of firms.
Despite the divergence in thinking, both groups tend to agree that choice is an
important dimension of competition because they believe that competition and consumer
welfare is a simple function of the number of competitors; the more competitors, the
more competition, with infinity being seen by the Structuralists as the "perfect" [20]
number of competitors.
With the basic economic definition of "competition" in mind, it is now
appropriate to proceed with a fuller discussion of some of the characteristics of a
competitor as put forth by the Behaviorists. Specifically, the first (improvement) and the
third (independence) characteristics should be elucidated with some care.
Indeed, the impetus to improve by way of innovation or imitation is perhaps the
central feature of competition. In fact, Armstrong believes that any change, be it grand or
trivial, should be considered an innovation. In other words, contrary to popular belief,
"innovation" should not be reserved for changes that work. Instead, dynamic
competition does not consists only of one change, innovation or imitation but a
continuous, undulating series of actions and reactions of the participants in the
competitive game. An interesting point to note is that the matching of offers, a reaction
of an incumbent to a new challenger, would typically result in restoring some level of
homogeneity of the product as the incumbent attempts to protect its previous market
share, this being the case when the challenge appears successful as measured by the
ensuing healthy sales and profits. Conversely, if some other dimension of the product is
altered and this change is not matched by competitors, then heterogeneity sets in.
Nevertheless, in either case, one can still say that all offers have improved in some way
or another by nature of the fact that some change has occurred and that there is some
demand for the altered services. Armstrong illustrates the characteristic offer-
improvement or action-reaction process arising from the progressive leapfrogging by
means of a set of perpendicular and parallel movements on a graph as shown in Figure
4.12 below:
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Figure 4.12 Action And Reaction Movements [201.
Indeed, the advantage of encapsulating the process as a series of parallel and
perpendicular steps is that the benefit of competition may, in part, be judged by the
gradient of the 'staircase', whereby one may readily see that the steeper the slope, the
better the competitive performance. However, Armstrong was quick to point out that the
innovative-imitative process must involve all price and non-price dimensions without
distinction, and that every change is not necessarily an improvement for every
participant in the competitive game. Accordingly, Armstrong believes that the
management of a firm should ensure that the changes also satisfy the needs of those
other than the consumers; that is, the needs of employees, shareholders, suppliers and
other participants should not be neglected. All in all, improvement should be offered to
at least one of the participants in order for the change to be considered beneficial.
So far, "competition" conjures images of some distinct form of rivalry with others.
However, one should realize that rivalrous behavior need not begin only with the arrival
of a second firm or party. In fact, Armstrong argues that competition begins with the
arrival of the first because the monopolist must continue to struggle with the alternative
of zero. For example, cars must compete with horse-drawn carriages, typewriters with
manuscript pens. In short, "...the present one must compete with past ones, potential
ones, other ones, one's own past, one's dreams, and with zero." [20]
As mentioned earlier, one of the characteristics of a competitor is independent
assertiveness. This translates to the idea that each competitor should strive to out-
perform its rivals in the absence of any form of collusion (in accordance to The Sherman
Act [21]). Although one would expect all participants in a race to aim for the coveted
top position, one must also recognize that some will merely be striving to improve their
relative position, while others will consider staying in the race as an overwhelming
victory. Therefore, independent assertiveness can be defined as behavior that is
consistent with the struggle to be "...relatively better, whether better than everyone else,
better than some others, better than one's own past performance, or better than those
who fail." [20]
Although the philosophical exposition on "competition" may seem rather
abstract, the economic theory behind competition could later be useful in assessing the
ills and benefits of airline competition. However, it is now appropriate to identify the
elements of competition in the deregulated U.S. airline industry.
4.2 Airline Competition In The United States Since Deregulation
Prior to identifying the competitive variables for analyzing airline competition, it
would be instructive to appreciate the competitive, deregulated environment for
domestic U.S. airlines. While the following sections merely serve to highlight the main
competitive strategies used by the U.S. carriers, the reader is encouraged to refer to the
cited references for more detailed discussions on specific topics of interest.
The passing of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 essentially brought an end
to federal control of air fares and routes, thereby allowing U.S. airlines to rapidly
expand into new markets and abandon old ones which were deemed unprofitable.
Based on economic theory, economists had predicted that deregulation would, in the
long run, lead to greater competition, lower fares, an enhanced level of air service, a
reduction of operating costs, the elimination of monopoly on certain routes, and an
improved overall efficiency of the airline industry [22]. Indeed, while the number of
certificated carriers did increase from 44 to 114 between 1978 and 1984 [22], the airline
industry as a whole was financially unsound during the early years of deregulation,
largely owing to macroeconomic factors and the new deregulated economic environment
itself. Specifically, the economic recession in 1980 and 1981-82; the air traffic controllers
strike of 1981, which led to a reduction in air operations; a 90 percent constant-dollar
increase in costs between 1978 and 1981 due to the hike in fuel prices, which in-turn
forced airlines to raise fares; and the very intense competition in the early post-
deregulation years were identified as the main factors that contributed to the dampened
profits. Further, although deregulation stimulated productivity, operating costs outgrew
growth in productivity during these early years.
Nevertheless, the progressive introduction of new marketing and operating
practices since 1984 has taken the airline industry to new heights. Specifically, the three
major developments that emerged over the past 10 years include:
" the reconfiguration of major carriers' route networks into hub-and-spoke systems;
e the adoption of several marketing practices which, to some extent, function as
barriers of entry for rival airlines; and lastly
e the proliferation of new entrant carriers, including those that operate at a lower unit-
cost and offer Spartan service at a low fare.
4.21 The Hub-And-Spoke System
Given the freedom to enter and leave a city-pair market, many of the major U.S.
carriers recognized that route structure is a vital competitive strategy in itself [23].
Accordingly, the hub-and-spoke system evolved as the airlines, especially the U.S.
majors, attempted to capture a larger overall market share by offering numerous one-
stop connecting services - through hubs - to many city-pairs that would otherwise be
served under a strictly linear route network at lower frequency. Indeed, airline managers
believed that an efficient hub operation would gather sufficient traffic volume for the
airline to offer more flights between a larger number of cities each day, thereby better
matching air travelers' desired departure and arrival times. Additionally, a hub-carrier
typically secures a large number of gates at the airport and handles sizable enplanement
at that airport, as shown in Table 4.211 on the next page. One logical reason for such an
observation, as suggested by Michael E. Levine [24], is that the hub-carrier would
Table 4.211 Percent Of EnDanement By Carriers At Mijor Hub-Airports 1251.
HUB Airline 1977 Airline 1984 Airline 1990
Atlanta Delta 50% Delta 52% Delta 57%
Boston Eastern 24% Eastern 22% USAir 18%
Charlotte Piedmont 74% USAir 93%
Chicago(O'Hare) United 30% United 46% United 49%
Dallas/Ft. Worth Braniff 34% American 61% American 63%
Denver United 32% United 40% United 49%
Detroit Delta 21% Republic 29% Northwest 69%
Houston (Int.) Continental 37% Continental 45% Continental 77%
JFK (New York) American 18% TWA 21% TWA 31%
LaGuardia Eastern 31% Eastern 32% USAir 16%
(New York)
Las Vegas Western 27% United 16% America 39%
West
Los Angeles United 28% United 22% United 18%
Miami Eastern 38% Eastern 47% American 20%
Minneapolis Northwest 46% Northwest 47% Northwest 80%
Newark Eastern 30% People's 50% Continental 48%
Express
Orlando Eastern 27% Delta 31%
Philadelphia USAir 22% USAir 24% USAir 46%
Phoenix American 27% Republic 19% America 46%
West
Pittsburgh USAir 46% USAir 77% USAir 87%
St. Louis TWA 40% TWA 58% TWA 79%
Salt Lake City Western 71% Delta 84%
San Diego PSA 26% USAir 19%
San Francisco United 42% United 37% United 39%
Seattle United 32% United 28% United 23%
Tampa Eastern 31% Delta 23% USAir 28%
Washington Eastern 28% Eastern 24% USAir 21%
(National)
normally offer the largest number of nonstop services to the widest range of cities so
much so that the name of the airline comes to mind first when an air traveler from that
city is considering a trip somewhere. In short, the airline which has a hub in a particular
city typically gains recognition as that city's airline, which therefore gives the airline a
distinct marketing advantage over its competitors.
From an operational standpoint though, Atef Ghobrial has shown that there are
both advantages and disadvantages of adopting the hub-and-spoke strategy [26].
Unlike the U.S. majors, Southwest Airlines has clearly avoided adopting the hub-and-
spoke system for its fast-expanding network. Instead, it has tenaciously clung to the
idea of offering high-frequency point-to-point short and medium-haul services, knowing
that it has continually reaped sizable profits in the past by targeting the high-density
short-haul markets. While Southwest does not go out of its way to create the well-
coordinated arrival and departure banks that is so typical of any of the U.S. majors'
hub-and-spoke operations, one may guess that with the large number of flights
Southwest offers each day at certain airports, passengers may actually have the
opportunity to create their own convenient connections to reach their final destinations,
regardless of the number of transfer points they have to pass through.
4.22 Developments In Airline Marketing Practices
The four marketing practices responsible for altering the competitive scene of the
U.S. airline industry include:
" the creation of innovative frequent flyer programs (FFPs),
e the advent of powerful Computerized Reservations Systems (CRSs),
e the implementation of revenue management, and
" the widespread practice of paying travel agent commission overrides.
4.221 Frequent Flyer Programs
First introduced in 1982 by American Airlines, frequent flyer programs are
intended to increase brand loyalty based on the idea that the more flights a passenger
takes with an airline, the greater the future rewards. Although nothing prevents a
passenger from participating in more than one program, the awards are usually
constructed in such a way that exclusivity is encouraged. A passenger who resides at an
airline's hub-city would clearly see the benefits of flying the hub-airline because the
airline has the most impressive route network emanating from that airport. Thus, a hub-
airline's attractive FFP can deter entry by a challenger as the offer of lower fares and
skimpy mileage credits by the challenger may be a relatively weak pull for the already
loyal customer of the incumbent airline. In an era where the airline of the future is
possibly one that has significant "global reach" [27], one could readily envision that the
linking of FFPs, arising from marketing alliances and/or code-sharing agreements
between U.S. and foreign carriers, could potentially offer the air traveler an even wider
range of business and vacation destinations, thereby reducing the air traveler's need to
switch brands. The fact that airlines, to some extent, attempt to match FFP privileges
adds yet another dimension to competition.
Steven Mitsuo Nako's [28] recent empirical study on the effects of frequent flyer
programs on business travel revealed that such programs do have a significant effect on
the choice of airlines, and that the "hub effect" is significant as well. Quantitatively
speaking, Nako discovered that an increase of 10% in a carrier's airport market share
enhanced the effectiveness of that carrier's frequent flyer program by about $4.80 [28].
Although Nako does not advocate public policy options against such programs, he
recommends further research in areas such as the cost of travel awards and the degree to
which these programs actually generate trips.
An example of a detour from the norm is, once again, Southwest Airlines. Even
though Southwest does not have a vast global network - it does not operate
internationally - or a well-defined hub-and-spoke operation within continental U.S., it
too offers a unique FFP, called The Company Club, which entitles passengers to earn one
round trip ticket after having flown 16 one-way flight segments with them [29]. While
little is mentioned about the popularity of Southwest's FFP, Table 4.2221 below
indicates that, in 1991, American Airlines led the U.S. majors in FFP enrollment.
Table 4.2221 Frequent Flyer Program Membership In 1991 [251.
Airline Frequent Flyer Program Membership
American 14.2 million
United 13.3 million
Delta 10.1 million
Continental 9.1 million
Northwest 8.6 million
USAir 7.8 million
All in all, airlines, over the years, have become highly innovative in inducing their
customers to earn frequent flyer points. In fact, given that airlines have struck
agreements with such organizations as long-distance telephone companies, hotels, car-
rental agencies, and credit-card companies, one does not really have to physically fly
with the airline in order to accumulate the necessary qualifying points for the coveted
awards.
4.222 Computer Reservations Systems (CRSs)
Before deregulation, about two thirds of airline bookings in the United States
were made directly with airlines, but by the mid-1980s, some 80% of the bookings were
made via travel agencies [25]. As shown in Table 4.2221 below, the percentage of CRS
equipage has increased tremendously since 1977- from a low of 5% in 1977 to 95% in
1987 - even though there was an in tandem increase in the number of travel agencies.
Table 4.2221 Percentage Of Agents Using CRSs [251.
Year Number of Agents % With CRS
1977 13,454 5
1979 16,112 24
1981 19,203 59
1983 23,059 85
1985 27,193 90
1987 29,370 95
However, Williams [25] believes that the impact of CRSs on the airline industry
would not have been so noticeable had more carriers developed their own systems
because Williams is convinced that the CRS market has been dominated by just two
companies - American Airlines and United Airlines, as Table 4.2222 shows:
Table 4.2222 CRS Market Shares ati19825ML
System Vendor(s) % of Location % of Agency Generated Revenue
Sabre American 35 46
Apollo United 24 28
Pars TWA/Northwest 13 10
System One Texas Air 17 10
Datas II Delta 10 5
Additionally, despite a declining share of agency locations, these two carriers, until
recently, have accounted for over 70% of the revenues generated by agency CRSs,
because these two firms had targeted the larger firms long before other players
recognized the potential impact of the CRSs. The fact that by 1986, the five remaining
CRSs of Sabre, Apollo, Pars, System One, and Datas II, accounted for 88% of all airline
tickets sales in the U.S. is a clear indication of the power of the CRSs [25].
Perhaps the controversial issue of CRS screen-bias, whereby the airline that
owned the CRS would usually preferentially list its own flights, elevated the intensity of
competition on the screen. Another problem is that agents using a particular airline's
CRS have a propensity to favor the airline owning the CRS because such airlines
maintain supportive business relationships with their network of agents. With the CRS-
owning airlines making a conscious attempt to sign-up most of the agents in the area
served by hub airports, one is not surprised to discover that the hub-airlines receive a
disproportionate share of the reservations. Perhaps the most formidable barrier for a
potential challenger at the hub-airports is the insidious effect of the additional cost
incurred for each booking received. Finally, the rapid advancement in information
technology has more recently created the disputed practice of computer price-signaling,
which takes place when fares are sent to the Airline Tariff Publishing Company, the
airline industry's clearinghouse for fares [30].
4.223 Revenue Management
Revenue management, which Louis Busuttil at Cathay Pacific Airways defines as
"the integrated control of price and capacity to maximize revenue" [31], has been one of
the most potent instruments used for fare competition by U.S. airlines. In particular, a
powerful revenue management system has been known to grant the larger incumbents
some flexibility in the event that it is threatened with lower fares offered by hostile
challengers. With selective fare-matching being a distinct option, the incumbent can
reduce serious traffic diversion (and revenues) to the new entrant. While research
documents revenue gain with effective price and capacity controls, revenue management
on its own should not be seen as an omnipotent panacea for an airline's financial woes.
Far from it, Busuttil believes that the key to successful implementation of revenue
management lies in the availability of quality past traffic data as well as the integration
of marketing, advertising, flight scheduling, and aircraft utilization. Indeed, revenue
management has gone beyond just the control of price and seat capacity alone, as was
originally intended.
George Steams and Michael Westervelt [32], bent on dispelling the common
notion that airline pricing is of "secondary importance" to revenue management, firmly
believe that revenue management techniques are effective only when pricing strategies
and tactics are "smartly designed and effectively executed." The article, which explains
the dynamics of airline pricing and the varying tactical pricing strategies that airlines
exploit to gain a competitive advantage, does however, highlight the four major goals of
the revenue management analyst: to minimize (1) low yield revenue spill, (2) high
revenue spill, (3) the cost of spoiled seats, and (4) the cost of denied boardings. The
two-fold responsibility of the pricing staff, on the other hand, is: to monitor, analyze,
and respond to the thousands of daily fare changes implemented by competitor airlines;
and to routinely develop pricing initiatives to strengthen the airline's position in the
marketplace. One point to note, though, is the airlines' ironical practice of offering "off
tariff' (unpublished) fares, because the Air Traffic Publishing Company fare
clearinghouse is so efficient in communicating fare changes that this denies any airline
the ability to exert a "meaningful" price advantage. Steams and Westerfelt believe that
airlines will continue to practice this not only because airlines continue to seek a fare
advantage, but because "chronic overcapacity" [32] in the industry will induce airline
managers to fill surplus seats. They conclude with a comment that with pricing becoming
more complex and challenging as the years pass, pricing, though "part science, part art"
[32], will be recognized as the "equal" of revenue management in terms of its impact on
the airline's overall revenue performance. Regardless, their main message is that with
whatever sophisticated technology an airline can use to deal with pricing on a daily
basis, the ultimate goal of the airline is still to maximize the airline's overall profitability,
and that in the current deregulated environment, fare competition is something that
airlines must contend with.
4.224 Travel Agent Commission Overrides
As commission overrides raise the marketing costs of the airlines paying them,
one readily recognizes that the same payment is a larger proportion of the new entrant's
total cost compared to that of an established incumbent. Hence, one may infer that the
airline that is most able to pay the handsome overrides is likely able to capture the
revenues and hence stay ahead in the race. Thus, the established incumbent, with its
existing huge sales volume, can effectively ward-off potential challengers by justifying
such an outlay to protect its market share.
4.23 New-Entrants
In recent years, the proliferation of low-cost entrants which offer reduced
amenities has received significant attention primarily because the major airlines fear that
these low-cost entrants may become just as successful as perennially profitable
Southwest Airlines, a well-established low-cost carrier that has been offering low fares
since the 1970s. With its strategy of tapping short-haul, high origin-destination traffic
niche markets at less-congested airports by offering high frequency services, Southwest
has proven the traditional majors wrong in upholding their prevalent thinking that bigger
is better, and that hub-and-spoke systems are a must to stay competitive in the airline
industry. With Southwest fast becoming a major player in an increasing number of high-
density markets, some of the traditional full-service airlines have resorted to cloning
Southwest, notably Continental Airlines, USAir and United Airlines, with United
leading the pack in fighting head-on with Southwest in selected West Coast markets
[33]. Indeed, both Southwest and Midway Airlines are fine examples of carriers that
have sizable operations at multiple airport systems, and evidently believe that less-
congested airports (e.g. Hobby, Love Field, Midway) should not be ignored even though
the majors continue to maintain a strong presence at the primary airport of the urban
area.
Nevertheless, the rapid entry of new entrants is a phenomenon which should not
be taken too lightly. Specifically, since 1992, the Department of Transportation has
authorized 28 airlines - many of them low-fare carriers - and 11 more applications are
pending [34]. This is a record number of new entrants within a two year period since the
industry was deregulated in 1978. Some claim that with the demise of three major
carriers in 1991, coupled with the downsizing of the surviving majors, the current climate
is perhaps conducive for launching new carriers [34]. Even with the Air Transport
Association's estimates that new entrants carry less than 2% of the total scheduled
passengers in the U.S., the majors view new entrants as "a credible threat" [34] because
the majors usually have to match the low fares. Newark-based Kiwi International, for
example, claims that even though it has only captured 5% of the Newark-Chicago
market, it has saved passengers more than $200 million to date based on its prevailing
fares [34].
However, consumers must reconcile with certain advantages and disadvantages
of using the services of these start-ups. On one hand, new entrants offer low fares with
few restrictions on nonstop point-to-point services, and often to convenient downtown
airports, but these new entrants typically fail to match flight frequency, may not have a
frequent flyer program, and usually offer limited amenities and services. Some new
entrants have even opted against participating in CRS network, and most do not offer
commission overrides. Optimistic that start-up carriers are here to stay, Robert Harrell,
vice president of American Express' airfare management unit [34], claims that there are
probably "other 2,000, to 3,000 city-pairs just in the East" that can still be exploited by
new start-ups.
4.3 Other Barriers To Competition
Aside from the several marketing practices that have shaped airline competition,
technological barriers also dictate whether an airline can or cannot enter the competitive
game. For example, since the passing of the Airport Noise and Capacity Act of 1990
[35], airlines are expected to phase-out Stage II aircraft and replace them with quieter
Stage III or retrofitted Stage II aircraft by 2000, which ultimately induces airlines to
renew their fleets accordingly in order to remain in the industry. To this end, one may
add that the airlines that have the financial resources are able to afford newer, more
fuel-efficient Stage III aircraft while new entrants, which usually pick-up older aircraft
for cost-saving reasons may have to re-examine their fleet acquisition alternatives should
they wish to continue operations. Then, slot restrictions at J. F. Kennedy, LaGuardia,
Washington-National, and Chicago O'Hare Airports could potentially curb an airline's
expansions plans and possibly bar new entrants fiom even starting operations at such
congested airports.
All in all, while pro-and anti-Deregulationists continue to disagree with the
benefits and evils of deregulation [36], it is clear that deregulation has in more ways
than one, revolutionized the nature of competition of the domestic U.S. airline industry.
While few countries outside the U.S. have completely embraced the economic ideology,
the U.S. airline industry remains an excellent test-bed that offers a plethora of
opportunities for analyzing competitive behavior of airlines at multiple airports systems.
As one can see, competition between airlines is now multi-dimensional, going beyond
just price and capacity. Yet, to capture competition at a rudimentary level, it may be
instructive to select the more quantifiable variables of competition, notably fares, and
frequency.
CHAPTER 5
METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH
In conducting a very preliminary, exploratory study of the competitive behavior
of airlines at multiple airport systems, the author would like to point out that the
immediate use of sophisticated econometric methods should be avoided as it may be
more revealing to first firmly grasp the qualitative aspects of the competitive dynamics.
Even at the onset, one might suspect by now, based on the discussion in the previous
chapter, that the multi-dimensional nature of competition does not allow one to hastily
throw the isolated variables into a magical mathematical 'black-box' from which some
predictive quantitative relationship may be derived. Thus, while a good model of airline
competition is valuable, the author will defer the pursuit of such lofty ambitions until the
fundamentals of airline competition are well understood. Accordingly, the primary
research methodology consists of an anecdotal analysis of the competition between
airlines operating between selected airport-pairs, the aim of which is to expose the
variety of ways airlines operating at multiple airport systems deal with the entry and
exit of challengers. If consistent trends are observed, the study may be considered
'positive'; if not, the study could be classified as 'neutral', in which case one could
tentatively conclude that the competitive behavior is indeed very complex.
The current chapter identifies the competitive variables which will be used for the
study, provides brief background information of the candidate multiple airport systems,
describes the four generic competitive scenarios, discusses the data sources and how the
city-pairs are chosen, then concludes by explaining the method of analysis.
5.1 Identifying The Competitive Variables
The extended discussion in the previous chapter has highlighted the multi-
dimensional nature of airline competition in a deregulated environment - such as that in
the United States. Consistent with the ideas described in section 4.2, Charles F. Banfe
[37] identifies three major competitive variables: (1) schedule, (2) routes, and (3) pricing;
and six minor competitive variables: (1) frequency, (2) equipment, (3) service, (4)
accessibility, (5) loyalty, and (6) perception.
Scheduling is an important competitive variable in so far as airlines aim to
maintain a delicate balance between operational and marketing objectives. The former
objective refers to an airline's goal of increasing aircraft and crew utilization as a way of
reducing unit operating costs [38], while marketing objectives refer to the need to satisfy
passenger demand and, at the same time, achieve some reasonable load factor.
The importance of route strategy has already been discussed in section 4.21. However,
Banfe goes as far as explaining the impact of the hub-and-spoke, in-line (linear), and
grid networks on factors such as marketing, aircraft utilization, weather-related delays,
load factor, and station density. Yet, of all the three major competitive variables
mentioned, Banfe considers pricing the most "intriguing", with the justification that
airline managers now have to grapple with the huge array of fare classes and how
competitively priced one fare-type is with respect to competitors.
As a minor competitive variable, frequency actually refers to more than just the
physical number of trips an airline offers each day or each week because air travelers
also consider the time of departure and arrival of flights. As early as 1968, N. K. Taneja,
who had closely studied the S-shaped market-share-frequency-share curves [39], quoted
Scharlach's (of Deutsche Lufthansa) work on the time-of-day preference of both
business and leisure travelers for same-day return trips between German cities. Starting
off with the hypothesis that different times of a day have different "distinct values" for
a person, Scharlach discovered that, in accordance with psychological and professional
imperatives, mornings are preferred departure times to a destination while evenings for
the return trips for both business and non-business travelers [39]. Taneja incorporated
this time preference in the model by introducing a time value coefficient, with a highest
coefficient of 4 assigned to the unfavorable times of 6-7am and 10-11pm, and a
coefficient of 2 for other "marginal categories" [39]. The optimal time zones of 8-9am
and 6-8pm are assigned a coefficient of 1 since a penalty is not incurred. Although such
a factor was incorporated into established models, it did not unseat the notion that an
airline's market share of origin-destination traffic between two points is largely
determined by the relative frequency share.
The quality and type of equipment used is seen as a competitive variable if one
accepts the assumption that air travelers prefer the newest, most comfortable aircraft
available - if given a choice. An airline's use of older equipment has implications for
passengers' perception of safety. In recent weeks, the safety of commuter air travel has
come under attack by the media, bringing forth the issue that small airplanes, typically
turboprops with fewer than 30 seats, abide by lower standards of safety than larger
jets, in part due to the differential pilot experiences [40].
Banfe's definition of "service", the third non-major variable, is limited to the
quality of ground and on-board service, which in-turn, encompasses an entire arena of
less tractable variables. However, airlines have tended to be highly innovative in their
desperate attempts at attaining fine gradations of product differentiation. In recent
months, Adam Bryant writes, in The New York Times, that airlines have been
"experimenting as never before" with new kinds of frills that may help fill otherwise
empty seats [41]. For example, Northwest Airlines is serving a moving buffet on most
flights instead of the traditional standard meal on trays. Thus, for a hearty breakfast,
passengers are given the liberty to devour unlimited portions of bananas, bagels and
sandwiches. A more unusual innovation is Midway Airlines' designation of certain
toilets for women, while United Airlines, for its high-frequency Shuttle services in the
West Coast, boards passengers beginning with those with window seats so as to ease
congestion along the aisle during the boarding process. Then, Continental Airlines
decided to describe all its inflight meals - less those on the transcontinental services - as
"snack" so that passenger would be pleasantly surprised if they were served a full meal
but would not be disgruntled if served peanuts and pretzels. Delta Air Lines and
Southwest Airlines are testing the "ticketless" system whereby the fare is charged directly
to the passenger's credit card once he or she inserts the card through an electronic reader.
On the whole, despite what surveys have to say about passenger preferences for inflight
amenities and service, it seems that airlines cannot completely ignore the swaying
opinions of air travelers because the slight competitive edge could well mean the
difference between profitability and otherwise.
Convenience of airport access is particularly important when considering
multiple airport systems, as Banfe points out. He does see airlines choosing more
conveniently accessible airports as a means of gaining a competitive edge. Loyalty,
which an air traveler may develop for many reasons, enters the overall competitive
picture in the way air travelers choose between airlines. Lastly, Banfe defines
"perception", the sixth minor variable, as the sum of all the variables as perceived by the
air traveler; that is, the air traveler will usually identify a carrier as one that has the most
desirable schedules, the highest frequency, the lowest prices, the best ground and on-
board service, the newest equipment, and the most able to instill loyalty. Whether this
perception is real or imagined, Banfe believes the air traveler's perception is still a strong
motivating force behind which airline the traveler will ultimately fly.
Despite the detailed enumeration of all these competitive variables, only a few
competitive variables are easily quantifiable in practice: average fares, frequency, and
capacity (total seats offered). Detailed fare information is usually stored in the airline's
reservations systems, but if the specific fare stratification is not available, one would
have to be content with average fares, which in itself, is not a poor indicator of the
actual fares for a given market because fare matching is a common practice. Frequency
and the number of seats offered are, in essence, what an airline produces and is usually
published in flight schedules or in the Official Airline Guides. However, given that
airlines may exploit a myriad of competitive variables to achieve some level of product
differentiation, Banfe believes that optimal use of such variables is critical for an airline's
overall success. In short, to keep the analysis of competitive behavior of airlines simple
for this preliminary study, it is adequate to just consider fares and frequency as directly
quantifiable and obtainable competitive variables. In addition, the author will take the
distance between the airport and the center of the city as a simple guide to 'measure'
accessibility. With reference to the definition of the multiple airport system mentioned in
Chapter 3, the most preferred airport will be the airport that is nearest the center of the
city.
5.2 Selecting The Multiple Airports For The Study
To keep the study as simple as possible for this preliminary study, the author is
considering only dual-airport systems within the United States. Dual-airport systems
outside the United States will not be considered because the current study aims at
understanding the competitive behavior of airlines that operate within a deregulated
environment. Accordingly, the candidate dual-airport systems considered are those at
Detroit, Chicago, Dallas, and Houston. Of these four, two will be selected for the study.
A brief history and the main features of each of the four airports will be provided in the
following paragraphs.
In 1947, the City of Detroit forced all commercial traffic to move from the smaller
Detroit City Airport to Wayne County International, which is 25 miles further away
from the city center. Indeed, until the late 80s, almost all commercial traffic was
concentrated at the bigger airport, which has become one of Northwest Airlines' major
hubs. The advent of Southwest Airlines into the smaller Detroit City Airport in 1989,
which subsequently revived activity at the airport, essentially made Detroit a multiple
airport city, with Southwest offering nonstop services to Chicago-Midway, Indianapolis,
and St. Louis. However, despite increased service to the smaller airport, service here
remains limited and is restricted to short haul flights because of the short runway and
neighborhood opposition to elevated noise-levels. As the competitive behavior of airlines
at both the airports is highly biased towards the entry of essentially just one carrier -
Southwest - at Detroit City Airport, the dual-airport system of Detroit is perhaps not
the most ideal example to use for the current study.
The two airports of Dallas/Fort Worth International (DFW) and Love Field have
had an estranged relationship since the opening of DFW in 1974. Specifically, in
response to the 1964 Civil Aeronautics Board order that the cities of Fort Worth and
Dallas build a joint airport, the two cities agreed to close both Love Field and Greater
Southwest Airport when DFW opened. However, then upstart Southwest Airlines
waged and won the battle to remain at Love Field, for which it now enjoys a monopoly
as a result of the passing of the Wright Amendment of 1979 [42], an Amendment that
was passed at the behest of then House Speaker Jim Wright of Texas to protect the
revenue stream that was paying-off the bonded-indebtedness that built DFW. Although
the law bans nonstop or direct flights between Love Field and any city outside Texas
and the four contiguous States of New Mexico, Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Louisiana,
many savvy air travelers have cleverly circumvented the law to take full advantage of
Southwest's low fares by purchasing separate tickets to go to destinations beyond
Texas' four contiguous States. Southwest remains "totally neutral" with regard to the
repeal of the Wright Amendment, although a 1991 academic study christened the
Amendment "an outdated legislature relic that restricts competition, consumer choice,
hinders economic development and imposes undue costs on the flying public." [42]
Indeed, Southwest welcomes competition at Love Field - which it did have when Muse
Air and Texas International were still around in the early 80s. More recently, the
importance of Love Field as Southwest's sanctuary is overrated because Southwest has
seen more growth at Chicago-Midway and the California Corridor than at Love Field. In
any case, Southwest does not have an interest in serving neighboring DFW because it
would have to charge higher fares in order to cover the cost of congestion for its
characteristic quick-turnaround operations. While some advocate that Love Field's land
area of 1,300 acres is a prime alternative for alleviating congested DFW's overflow
problems, others fear that as the two airports are only 6.5 miles apart, airspace capacity
and safety concerns can only impose constraints on Love Field's expansion. Even with
Southwest's presence and commitment to Love Field, DFW has launched a $3.5 billion
expansion plan to anticipate the predicted doubling of passengers to 104 million by
2010 [43]. Nevertheless, as competition at the dual-airport system at Dallas/Fort
Worth is somewhat restricted due to Southwest's monopoly at Love Field, the dual
airport system at Dallas/Fort Worth will not be chosen for the study.
Another multiple airport city of interest is that of Houston. The change-over from
Houston-Hobby to Houston-Intercontinental took place in June 1969. As shown in Figure
5.21 on the next page, Hobby Airport, which is off Interstate 75, or 3 miles off the
circumferential Interstate 610, is only 12 miles southeast of downtown Houston, while
Intercontinental Airport, which is 23 miles north of downtown, is located between
Interstate 75 and 59, and off the North Belt (which connects two highways). Other than
the fact that it may take longer to reach Intercontinental from the city-center,
Intercontinental is easily accessible from both downtown and the area in which most
travelers reside.
Houston Intercontinental Airport (IAH)
(23 miles from Downtown)
it
Interstate
59
Downtown Houston
Houston Hobby Airport (HOU)
(12 miles from Downtown)
Figure 5.21 The Location of Houston's Hobby and Intercontinental Airports [91.
Although Hobby was closed immediately after Intercontinental opened in the
summer of 1969, both Hobby and Intercontinental are used by airlines today. In fact, a
check with the Official Airline Guides of October 1994 revealed that five airlines -
American Airlines, Delta Air Lines, Northwest Airlines, Southwest Airlines, and Trans
World Airlines, had operations at Hobby Airport, with Southwest Airlines offering the
most departures. Continental Airlines, on the other hand, established a sizable hub at
Intercontinental. As several airlines other than Southwest have had a presence at Hobby
over the years since deregulation, Houston's dual-airport system will be chosen for use in
this study.
Lastly, much may be said about the two airports at Chicago: O'Hare and
Midway. For being decidedly the busiest airport in the United States, O'Hare is not liked
for its noise, but politicians, business parties, many citizens, United Airlines, and
American Airlines "love its economic payoff and flight frequencies." [44] Unfortunately,
O'Hare's reputation is tainted by its problems with ground access. Specifically, the
airport has one exit and one entrance for the 100,000 vehicles per day that serve the
airport, and the train that serves the airport makes numerous stops at sparsely
populated areas on the way from downtown. The slot problem is less of a headache
than most think as there are ways around it by exceeding the high-density rule during
good weather. To increase its operations at O'Hare, American, which loses to United's
share of departures by about 7% [44], had considered converting some of its jet-slots to
commuter-slots. However, so serious is the congestion in the airspace around Chicago
that carriers that operate at O'Hare consider Midway "an awful disease" [44] because
many southbound flights mesh with Midway's traffic. American, in particular, is waging
a war against operators at Midway. Yet, traffic at Midway has not diminished,
particularly when Southwest is planning to increase operations to 100 daily flights by
1995, and that TWA is moving its operations there [44]. The solution to some of
O'Hare's problems is linked to a politically controversial idea of building a new 9,400
acre airport at Lake Calumet [44]. With this new airport in-place, Midway may be
closed to commercial traffic but continue to serve general-aviation traffic, replacing the
current downtown Meig's Field, which would close. While Lake Calumet does not signal
the death of O'Hare, American will continue to fight for more slots to catch-up with
United. Indeed, even though both United and American combined already have the
majority of the slots at O'Hare, both are determined to take more if they can. Therefore,
with Midway Airlines competing with the two giants at O'Hare during the 1980's -until
it folded in late 1991 - the dual-airport system at Chicago is a prime candidate for case
studies.
Thus, with the dual-airport systems of Chicago and Houston selected for the
study, it is now appropriate to define the scenarios under which the competitive
behavior amongst the airlines takes place.
5.3 The Four Competitive Scenarios
Based on a comprehensive quarterly tracking of the services into and out of
Chicago's O'Hare and Midway Airports, as well as those at Houston's Hobby and
Intercontinental Airports over the 14 years (1979 to 1993), the author observed that the
airlines' services exhibited discernible pattems of routing, thereby indicating that the
airlines compete under a fairly well-defined structured environment. Analogous to plant
and animal taxonomy, one can identify a total of four competitive scenarios, each of
which is described with the help of a diagram in the following sub-sections. After
describing the four competitive scenarios, details about the choice of airport-pairs for
analysis will be given. Although the scenarios described below consider only dual-
airport multiple airport systems, the reader should bear in mind that this classification
may be extended to multiple airport systems with more than two airports. As a matter
of terminology, each airport is a host to some airline (labeled as Airline A, B, C...), and
an airline that has maintained service since the first quarter of 1984 is considered an
"incumbent", while a "challenger" is one that introduced a service in the same or the
parallel market at any time after the first quarter of 1984 but before the second quarter
of 1993.
5.31 Scenario 1: MAS<->Non-Hub Destination
Spokes Multiple Airport System
Airline A
Non-hub destination
(2)
Airline B
Figure 5.311 Scenario 1: MAS<->Non-Hub Destination.
As shown in Figure 5.311 above, airlines in Scenario 1 offer parallel services
between the multiple airport system (MAS) and some non-hub destination that is
common to both airlines. Typically the airline is based or has a sizable hub at one of the
airports within the multiple airport system, and is able to capitalize on the huge feed
from the rest of its network that emanates from the multiple airport system to support
the existing origin-destination traffic between the multiple airport and the non-hub
destination. Thus, in this very simple case, the airlines are competing for origin-
destination traffic and connecting traffic.
5.32 Scenario 2: MAS<->Hub Of Challenger
Spokes Multiple Airport System
Figure 5.321 Scenario 2: MAS<->Hub Of Challenger.
Scenario 2 provides an example of hub-to-hub competition, a scenario which has
become significant since the reorganization of many airlines' route structures into
efficient hub-and-spoke systems. Here, Airlines A and B, which are based at the
multiple airport system, view Airline C's hub as an end-point, while Airline C, a
challenger, views the MAS as part of its extensive spoke system. One reasonable
conjecture is that Airline C is tapping both the connecting traffic through its hub and the
origin-destination traffic between its hub and the MAS.
5.33 Scenario 3: MAS<->Hub Of Incumbent
Spokes
Multiple Airport System
Airline A
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Arie A
Hub Of Airline A
(2)
Airline B
Figure 5.331 Scenario 3: MAS<->Hub Of Incumbent.
This is a variation of the previous scenario whereby either Airline A or B
operates a dual hub system, with one hub located at the multiple airport system. Thus,
the MAS may be seen as a spoke for the airline's hub-operations at the hub outside the
MAS, while the hub outside the MAS is seen as a spoke for the airline's hub-operations
at the MAS. With such a route network, one may postulate that such an airline will most
probably capture a sizable share of the origin-destination and non-origin-destination
traffic between the two hubs, thereby posing a serious threat to any challenger.
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5.34 Scenario 4: MAS<->MAS
Spokes Spokes
Multiple Airport System 1
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Figure 5.341 Scenario 4: MAS<->MAS.
In the last of the four scenarios, one may examine the competitive behavior of
airlines operating between multiple airport cities. Specifically, airlines that offer flights
to and from more than one airport in either of the multiple airport cities would be of
interest. It is likely that the origin-destination traffic between the two multiple airport
cities is huge enough for an airline to justify offering service from more than one airport
in the same urban area.
While the four scenarios described may not be an exhaustive list of scenarios, the
reader should be aware that the four scenarios are simple classification 'templates' under
which one may analyze the competitive behavior of the airlines serving the multiple
airport system. The scenarios, contrived on the basis of observations, are merely meant
to describe the general pattern of air service at multiple airport systems; exceptions do
abound.
5.4 Data Sources And Selection Of Airport-Pairs
The primary sources of data are: the Official Airline Guides - North American
Edition [45], and O&DPLUS [46] and ONBOARD [47] database products. Statistics
found in both O&DPLUS and ONBOARD are derived from information regularly
submitted to the U.S. Department of Transportation by airlines on Form 41 and C298.
While Database Products, Inc., the company that produces the software, does warn
users of the reliability of the data it provides, the data is sufficiently accurate for such a
preliminary study of airline competition. O&DPLUS, as the name implies, provides
average fares and total traffic for a specified origin-destination airport-pair, while
ONBOARD, the total frequency of nonstop services between two specified airports, the
total number of passengers on the aircraft that flew nonstop between two specified
airports, and the total number of seats offered on these nonstop services.
Selected editions of the Official Airline Guides were consulted for the initial part
of the research which involved just tracking the pattern of air services at Chicago
(O'Hare and Midway Airports) and Houston (Hobby and Intercontinental Airports)
from 1979 to 1993. Although the Flight Transportation Laboratory at MIT stocks only
the March, June, September and December editions of the Official Airline Guides to best
represent the four quarters of each year, the initial tracking of the pattern of air service
was quite complete despite the missing months. To ensure consistency in the quality of
service offered by the participants in any one market, only cities that were served
nonstop from both airports in the multiple airport system were included. For example,
the city of Omaha in Nebraska was linked to both Chicago-O'Hare and Chicago-
Midway during the mid-80's by way of several nonstop services each day. With this
criteria, a large number of the city-pair markets found were either short-haul or medium-
haul. Subsequently, the airport-pairs could then be classified, in accordance with the
specific features of each of the four competitive scenarios, after which the appropriate
airport-pairs could later be selected using a different set of criteria.
The set of criteria used to select the airport-pairs for study was dictated largely
by the serious limitations of the data sources. Specifically, data from O&DPLUS spans
from 1979 to the second quarter of 1993, while that from ONBOARD, 1984 to first
quarter of 1994. As such, the period of interest for this study is limited by the window
between the first quarter of 1984 and the second quarter of 1993. Ideally, airport-pairs
for which the challenger enters in the mid-80s would be prime candidates. For having
selected a time window of just over nine years, one should also be aware of elusive
exogenous variables such as the many salient macroeconomic disturbances, be it
economic recessions, the Gulf War, and other changes in the local economy of the cities
concerned.
The second limitation pertains to the differential reporting of traffic for
commuter and non-commuter carriers, which in-turn resulted in O&DPLUS giving 100%
sample traffic figures for a specified number of commuter carriers, but the usual 10%
sample for the non-commuter carriers. In order not to mix the two sets of data,
especially for markets which have a mixture of both commuter and non-commuter
services, the following study will focus only on markets that are served entirely by jet
flights provided by non-commuter carriers.
Then, in order to keep the study of competition simple, the markets selected
should not, if possible, be ones that are severely cluttered with a large number of
competitors. While a market consisting of one incumbent and one challenger would seem
ideal for study because of its simplicity, it may be revealing to examine markets where
competition is intense. On the other hand, even though the number of competitors may
be large, one may usually eliminate the minor players with the application of a
reasonable minimum market-share criteria whereby any carrier that has consistently
secured less than 5% of the total origin-destination traffic of the market should not be
considered a significant player.
Although the data used for both O&DPLUS and ONBOARD share the same
source (DOT Form 41 reports), the exact correspondence is questionable in that
ONBOARD provides information only for nonstop services whereas O&DPLUS does
not segregate the traffic so finely. For example, O&DPL US' traffic data between two
specified cites includes all passengers who flew on nonstop, multi-stop, and connecting
flights to reach their final destination. An indicator of routings of the origin-destination
passengers (nonstop, multistop, connecting) is the "Average Coupons" reported in
O&DPLUS, whereby a number of 1.00 indicates that all passenger flew on nonstop or
direct flights (requiring only one ticket coupon), while any number larger than 1.00
indicates that a certain proportion of the passengers flew on connecting services
(requiring at least two ticket coupons). Since one cannot isolate the true nonstop origin-
destination passenger from the given data, one may circumvent the problem by selecting
markets which are served exclusively by nonstop flights. In reality, except for the very
short-haul markets with a flight-time of less than 1.5 hours or so, many markets would
not satisfy this condition. As such, the author systematically relaxed the criteria by
choosing markets for which at least 90% of the flights are nonstop services; roughly
speaking, if only one line out of every 10-15 lines in the Official Airline Guides' schedule
listing is a multistop flight, then the 90% criteria is satisfied.
In summary, the selection criteria for airport-pairs includes:
" The market should consist almost exclusively of nonstop services (90%), and that
the "Average Coupon" reading should not exceed 1.10;
* The market is not served by commuter carriers, and
e Only airlines which consistently secure more than a 5% share of the total origin-
destination market in each quarter are of interest.
With the selection criteria in mind, four airport-pairs were chosen for each of the first
three scenarios and two for the last scenario, as summarized in Table 5.41 below.
Table 5.41 The 16 Airport-Pairs Selected For The Study.
Scenario Chicago Markets Houston Markets
Scenario 1: Chicago-Des Moines Houston-New Orleans
MAS<->Non-Hub Destination Chicago-Omaha Houston-San Antonio
Scenario 2: Chicago-Atlanta Houston-Memphis
MAS<->Hub Of Challenger Chicago-Pittsburgh Houston-St. Louis
Scenario 3: Chicago-Denver Houston-Denver
MAS<->Hub Of Incumbent Chicago-Nashville Houston-Newark
Scenario 4: Chicago-Detroit Houston-Dallas
MAS<->MAS I II
5.5 Method Of Analysis
The analysis essentially consists of anecdotal descriptions of the competitive
behavior of airlines in the fourteen airport-pairs selected. The hypothesis is that the
competitive dynamics, as reflected in changes in the quarterly average fare, the frequency
profile, the load factor, and the total origin-destination traffic between a given airport-
pair, determine, to a large extent, the market share shift characteristics for both the
airlines' and the airports' total origin-destination traffic, thereby providing some
evidence of the viability of air service between specific airport-pairs within a given
market. Additionally, the number of non-origin-destination passengers, when jointly
assessed with the load factor, is also an important element to consider since one may
postulate that non-origin-destination traffic does, in part, provide economic justification
for the service, especially for markets where the origin-destination traffic volume is
relatively small. In short, one hopes to find some supporting evidence that service into
several airports within a large urban area is perhaps perpetuated by the presence of
competition between the airlines as opposed to accessibility concerns alone. Contrary to
previous research efforts, the author suspects that airport choice is brought about by the
quality of airline service, with passengers responding accordingly to the competitive
'offers' airlines present to potential air travelers.
Before plunging into the analysis, it may be worth mentioning that as early as
1972, William Fruhan Jr. [48] of the Graduate School of Business Administration at
Harvard University suggested a methodology of analysis of the competitive behavior of
airlines. In particular, Fruhan advocated the use of marginal analysis, whereby variables
such as seats, share of seats, market share, passengers flown, passenger load factor, and
overall load factor in the "later competitive position" are compared with those in the
"initial competitive position". Acknowledging the S-shaped curve relating market share
and frequency share, Fruhan put forth the idea that airlines, during the regulated era,
had two basic strategies for success: to maintain the route's overall load factor, or to
maintain market share at any cost.
Based on the economic presumption that capacity share will be translated into
market share, which in turn translates into profit share, Fruhan believed that there was a
strong propensity for airlines to compete along the dimension of capacity. However, he
cautioned that there was a limit to the game since airlines would eventually realize that
it was "no longer economic" [48] to play the game. By means of a similar marginal
analysis, Fruhan further demonstrated the value of a one-point increase in market share
now versus later, thereby prescribing that market share duels should occur during the
"robust stages" of market growth in the industry. As the industry matures and growth
slows, Fruhan expected the intensity of the battle to subside. One interesting point
mentioned by Fruhan is the significance of the advantage an airline can have because of
the aircraft chosen. In other words, Fruhan believed that the airline which orders a new
type of aircraft first will usually secure earlier delivery positions, and that, should the
aircraft prove to be superior in performance and consumer preference, the airline
ultimately gains an edge over its competitors. Perhaps as this aspect of competition is
less quantifiable, equipment advantage will not be specifically addressed in this thesis.
While Fruhan had tried to show if airlines were maintaining market shares or
load factors over time, the rest of the chapter presents a detailed case-by-case
description of the competitive behavior of airlines in multiple airport systems by
emphasizing the effects of changes in the competitive variables on the traffic size for
both the challengers and the incumbents in a given market, and how the competitive
dynamics sustain or remove service in an airport-pair within a given market. More
specifically, the discussion for each case will be in-line with the notion that passengers
are the customers of airlines, and airlines are, in-turn the customers of airports, a notion
that is embodied in the pictorial equation presented in Chapter 1 of this thesis.
To elucidate the competitive dynamics graphically, the following plots were
generated for each of the 14 selected airport-pairs:
* Quarterly average one-way fare,
* Average number of nonstop departures per day each way,
* Smoothed quarterly origin-destination traffic,
* Smoothed quarterly non-origin-destination traffic,
e Average quarterly load factor, and
e Smoothed quarterly total airport-to-airport origin-destination traffic.
Given that most airlines have revenue management systems and generally match
fares in order to be competitive, the average fare for a given quarter for an airline, as
given by O&DPLUS, is a sufficient indicator of the level of fare competition in the
market. The specific value of the fare is not too critical; one should focus on the trends,
particularly when an challenger enters the market. The average fares during the quarter
of entry and exit of an airline may be unusually high or low because the average fare
calculated may be distorted by the smaller number of tickets sold during such quarters.
ONBOARD provided the total number of nonstop flights in both directions for
the entire quarter. However, to calculate the number of nonstop flights per day in each
direction with reasonable accuracy, certain assumptions were made. Although each
quarter, as defined by ONBOARD, corresponds to the respective three months of the
calendar year, and that certain quarters have a few more days than others, the author
has decided, for consistency and simplicity's sake, to assume that each quarter consists
of 90 days. Further, assuming a perfect symmetry of flights in either direction, the
number of flights per day in each direction is then given by:
Quarterly Total Number Of Departures In Both Directions
(90 x 2)
The reader should bear in mind that figures for the first and last quarter of operations
can be misleading because the airline may not have initiated a service on the first day of
that quarter, and ended the service on the last day of the quarter. Consequently,
attention should be given to the first full quarter of operations and the last full quarter of
operations instead of the first and last data point on the graph.
To remove the highly cyclical nature of the traffic, the given quarterly origin-
destination and non-origin-destination data were first smoothed using a simple
conventional 4-quarter moving average technique [49] where:
XT =0.25[xt+x t- +xt-2 +xt-31
for T=1,2,...n-3, and t=4,5,6...n. However, in order to include the first three data points
so that the resulting curve does not have a four-quarter lag, the moving average method
will be slightly modified; that is, three 'artificial' data points, each of which has the same
value as the first data point of the original data set, will be added to the original data.
This should ensure that the smoothed data will always begin with the first data point of
the original set. By using smoothed data that does not suffer from a time-lag of four
quarters, one would then not encounter complications when analyzing the traffic data in
tandem with the non-smoothed average fares, frequency, and load factors.
Unfortunately, the data is not always perfect; cases of missing data for one or two
quarters as well as those where the origin-destination traffic exceeds the total number of
onboard passengers are the more startling faults. In the latter case, the number of non-
origin-destination passengers is not calculated at all. Further, care was taken when
interpreting data for the first quarter and last quarter of operations as the airline may
not have had a full quarter of operations during such quarters.
All in all, the methodology is fairly straightforward but the analysis and
interpretation of the data can be a genuine challenge due to the multi-dimensional nature
of competition, not all of which may be explained by what has been quantified.
However, the author will still attempt to use the collected data to find some support for
showing the link between passengers' choice, competitive behavior of the airlines, and
the distribution of passenger traffic at the multiple airport systems of interest.
CHAPTER 6
DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION
The following chapter presents the anecdotal analysis of the 14 selected cases
mentioned in Table 5.41 in the previous chapter. The discussion will primarily focus on
the way passengers and airlines react to new services offered by challengers in a given
market and how this in-turn affects the distribution of origin-destination (OD) traffic
amongst the airport pairs examined. Passengers respond to fares and frequency of
service offered by challengers and incumbents, while airlines may respond to challengers
by altering frequency or fares. Also, one may examine the mix of OD and non-OD
passengers as well as the average load factors as a means of assessing the viability of a
service initiated by challengers. The six supporting graphs for each of the 14 cases, all of
which are included at the end of the analysis of each case, appear in the following order:
e Smoothed Quarterly OD Traffic
* Average One-Way Fare ($)
e Average Number Of Nonstop Departures Per Day Each Way
e Smoothed Quarterly Non-OD Traffic
* Average Quarterly Load Factor (%), and lastly,
e Smoothed Quarterly Total Airport-To-Airport OD Traffic.
6.11 Scenario 1: Chicago-Des Moines (MDW/ORD-DSM, Distance = 312 miles)
Preliminary Remarks
An immediate observation is that the Chicago-Des Moines market is not
characterized by significant growth over the 10 years (Figure 6.111). Competition was
not very fierce since each of the three participants seemed quite content with its own
market share, as the three separate horizontal lines in Figure 6.111 indicate.
Nevertheless, the most unusual observation is that Midway Airlines, by initiating
services from MDW to DSM, had apparently stimulated OD traffic between the two
cities while United and American, carrying a preponderance of non-OD traffic, were
virtually unaffected by Midway's entry.
Passengers' Response To Challengers
American was the first airline to challenge United at O'Hare. Both airlines have
established hubs at ORD, and passengers responded very favorably to American's entry
in the third quarter of 1984 since American seemed to have immediately captured its
own sizable share of OD passengers by offering about half the number of flights as
United. Accessibility was not an issue since both challenger and incumbent operated to
and from the same airport. However, due to its lower load factors, which created a
greater availability of lower average fares, American consistently captured about half
the number of passengers while offering three flights per day compared to United's five
(Figure 6.113). One can conjecture that the passengers were responding to the
availability of lower fares since the entry of American did bring about an immediate
increase of about 20% in total OD traffic between the two cities. However, the OD
traffic level then stabilized over the next 10 quarters.
When Midway Airlines, the second challenger in the Chicago-Des Moines market
inaugurated services from MDW, another new group of passengers seemed to have
appeared because there is, once again, an immediate increase in the total OD traffic in
the MDW-DSM market (Figure 6.111). In fact, by offering a frequency that is comparable
to American's, and a fare which was initially the lowest of the three carriers (Figure
6.112), Midway, operating out of Chicago's most accessible airport, captured slightly
more OD traffic than American at ORD. However, over the succeeding years, when
service at MDW was available, passengers overwhelmingly preferred ORD even though
fares were similar, perhaps because of the wider choice of departure times. With
Midway's exit in the fourth quarter of 1991, the once faithful air travelers at Midway
seemed to have disappeared. In fact, only American recorded a slight increase in OD
traffic between the second quarter of 1991 and second quarter of 1992. However, with
Midway offering low introductory fares in the first quarter of 1987, average fares of
United and American in the ORD-DSM market plummeted from a high of about $150 in
the first quarter of 1987 to a low of about $100 by the second quarter of 1988 as both
American and United matched Midway's low fares. Midway did not maintain its low
introductory fare of $70 throughout the years; instead, Midway's average fares gradually
climbed to about $175 by the fourth quarter of 1990, with American and United's
average fares moving in tandem with Midway's. The higher average fares did not seem to
elicit an adverse response from the OD passengers in either the ORD-DSM or MDW-
DSM markets since sharp decreases in traffic were not observed.
Airlines' Response To Challengers
United and American, though direct competitors at ORD, made rather
independent decisions on frequency as can be seen by the consistent frequency gap over
the 10 years. In the first quarter of 1985, United may have offered fewer flights than
American, but the circumstances leading to such an apparent anomaly were not clear.
However, the sudden withdrawal of flights did not adversely affect United's share of
OD traffic since only a slight decrease in OD traffic was recorded for that particular
quarter. A look at the load factor data revealed that United, despite offering the most
flights, struck a good balance between supply and demand because it secured the
highest load factors which typically exceeded 50% (Figure 6.115). These figures are
attributed to United's carriage of a large number of non-OD traffic - about three times
that of the OD traffic (Figure 6.114) - which it could well-accomplish by nature of its
extensive network emanating from ORD.
American, with fewer flights than United, did secure a significant share of non-
OD traffic as well - about four times the magnitude of its OD traffic - but load factors
were much lower, hovering around 30% in most quarters. Midway, despite its smaller
network, was also able to capture a large number of non-OD traffic. Load factors were
intermediate between that of United's and American's, averaging about 40%. However,
the most interesting observation is that shortly after Midway's exit, United achieved
growth in the non-OD traffic while American had already started achieving gains three
quarters before Midway's exit.
Concluding Remarks
A glance at the airport-to-airport total OD traffic curves in Figure 6.116
indicates very clearly that each challenger brought additional traffic into the market.
Airport competition was present since there was a slight decrease in OD traffic in the
larger ORD-DSM market when services between MDW and DSM were available. While
stimulation of OD traffic was observed, one may conclude that the majority of
passengers still selected an airport on the basis of frequency; OD traffic in the ORD-
DSM market exceeded that of MDW-DSM by about three times because there were
clearly more flights at ORD than at MDW. Average fares were brought down because of
Midway's entry, but the low fares were not permanent. In fact, compared to that in
1984, average fares had increased by about $50 by 1993. Thus, the passengers may only
have reaped benefits for about a year (between 1987 and 1988 ) - the year immediately
after Midway's entry. However, given that the two cities are only 312 miles apart,
passengers did not discontinue traveling by air even though fares had increased. Indeed,
new services created new opportunities and options for those considering travel between
the two cities of Chicago and Des Moines.
Figure 6.111 Chicago-Des Moines: Smoothed Quarterly OD Traffic
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Figure 6.113 Chicago-Des Moines: Average Number Of Departures Per Day Each Way
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Figure 6.114 Chicago-Des Moines: Smoothed Quarterly Non-OD Traffic
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Figure 6.115 Chicago-Des Moines: Average Quarterly Load Factor (%)
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Figure 6.116 Chicago-Des Moines: Smoothed Quarterly Total Airport-To-Airport OD
Traffic
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6.12 Scenario 1: Chicago-Omaha (MDW/ORD-OMA, Distance = 430 miles)
Preliminary Remarks
By examining the OD traffic curves in Figure 6.121, one can say that, much like
the Chicago-Des Moines market analyzed earlier, the Chicago-Omaha market is not
characterized by very intense rivalry between the airlines since each airline seemed
content with its own share of OD traffic. Nevertheless, unlike the previous case,
Midway Airlines secured a significantly larger number of OD passengers than American
for the first six quarters following the introduction of its services in the MDW-OMA
market, thereby indicating that its entry in the new MDW-OMA market was quite
successful.
Passengers' Response To Challengers
The entry of the first challenger, American Airlines, at ORD in the third quarter
of 1984 seemed to have stimulated travel between the two cities because American
immediately captured about 5,000 passengers in the quarter it entered the ORD-OMA
market (Figure 6.121). In other words, air travelers, even though aware of United's
existing service between OMA and the same airport of ORD, responded to the new
service. Despite offering fewer flights per day than United, American's service was
attractive to air travelers perhaps because it offered slightly different departure times.
However, some carrier-switching may have occurred shortly after American's entry
because United saw a gentle decline in OD traffic in the two quarters after American's
entry. Then, in 1985 alone, American may have recorded a slight increase in OD traffic
as passengers responded to its offer of lower fares.
However, stimulation of OD traffic was observed once again when Midway
Airlines introduced a new service between the more accessible Midway Airport and
Omaha. Indeed, Figure 6.121 shows that some passengers continued to fly United and
American, while a new group of air travelers gave staunch support to Midway,
particularly between the first quarter of 1987 and the fourth quarter of 1987, when
Midway captured a larger number of OD passengers than American for roughly the
same frequency. A closer examination of the OD traffic curves in Figure 6.121 does
indicate that American was not affected by Midway's entry, but United was affected
since it experienced a slight decline in OD traffic during Midway's first year of
operations. One could also infer that passengers were keen on flying Midway because of
the lure of the low introductory fare of about $70 as compared to the $130 fare offered
by its rivals at ORD in the first quarter of 1987 (Figure 6.122). Although Midway raised
its fares in the quarters after its entry while American and United lowered their fares in
an attempt to match Midway's low fares, all three airlines only achieved a similar
average fare in the first quarter of 1988, exactly one year after Midway's entry. With
fare-matching in place, Midway reduced the number of departures because it began
losing OD passengers very rapidly over the four quarters of 1988, while United, on the
other hand, saw a corresponding increase in OD traffic in the same year.
Between the second quarter of 1989 and the second quarter of 1990, when
Midway offered fewer flights per day at MDW than American at ORD, passengers
seemed to have shown only a marginally higher preference for the flights into and out of
MDW despite the lower fares that Midway offered. Indeed, Midway's OD traffic had
noticeably halved just two years after it inaugurated service in the new market of MDW-
OMA; this loss was permanent even though it tried to boost frequency in the third
quarter of 1990 and maintain the lower fare. Amidst all these changes in the MDW-
OMA market, passengers in the ORD-OMA market were apparently oblivious to what
was happening at MDW since the OD traffic level for United and American remained
fairly stable in the quarters after the fourth quarter of 1988 and after Midway's exit in
the fourth quarter of 1991. In fact, one may conclude that the 'fans' of Midway
disappeared together with the exit of Midway because these passengers did not choose
to fly United or American in the quarters after Midway's exit since sudden jumps in OD
traffic were not observed for United and American.
Airlines' Response To Challengers
A glance at the frequency curves in Figure 6.123 indicate that American and
Midway, the two challengers, were not attempting to match United's frequency.
However, with United's six flights per day in each direction and its extensive network
emanating from its hub at ORD, it was well able to secure a sizable number of non-OD
passengers that was typically three times the number of OD passengers. United was
then able to boast of its relatively high load factors that usually exceeded 50%.
American, the close rival of United at ORD, faired worse in capacity-demand
management because with its three or four flights a day in each direction and its hub
operations at ORD, it captured four times more non-OD traffic than OD traffic, but had
to contend with ailing load factors that ranged between the upper 20s and 40s. By
eliminating one flight a day in each direction in the third quarter of 1990, American
subsequently, achieved a slight improvement in its load factors.
Midway's operations between MDW and OMA were unusual in that for the first
four quarters, it attracted more OD than non-OD passengers. This may be explained by
the fact that it had not fully developed its extensive hub-and-spoke network at MDW
until the late 80s. By 1989, non-OD traffic had exceeded OD traffic by a factor of two,
resulting in load factors that were intermediate between that of United and American
(around 40% most of the time). However, Midway seemed content with just matching
American, if it could, for its services between MDW and OMA. Fare matching was
prevalent, with Midway, typically offering the lowest fares. Indeed, it was Midway
which brought the average fares of all three carriers to a low of just over $80 in the
second quarter of 1988. The low average fare was short lived since Midway raised its
fares until the original average fare of about $140 was attained by the fourth quarter of
1990, by which time United's average fare had risen to a maximum of close to $190. In
spite of the higher fares toward the late 80s, OD traffic between the two cities did not
decline, thereby indicating that demand for air services between Chicago and Omaha is
perhaps inelastic.
Concluding Remarks
In summary, one may say that the Chicago-Omaha market was clearly
stimulated by both challengers, one at ORD, and the other, at MDW. A closer look at
Figure 6.121 does reveal that Midway was more successful in stimulating traffic by
offering services at the more accessible airport, as seen by the sudden jump in total OD
traffic in the first quarter of 1987. Perhaps such an observation is encouraging in that it
lends support to the notion that attractive air services at the more accessible secondary
airport can be viable. Like the Chicago-Des Moines market, air travelers did not really
benefit from Midway's low introductory fares for too long, but since total OD traffic
merely declined by about 5,000 per quarter during the period of the hike in average
fares, one may conclude that the demand for air travel between these two cities,
separated by a distance of 430 miles, is relatively inelastic.
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Figure 6.121 Chicago-Omaha: Smoothed Quarterly OD Traffic
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Figure 6.122 Chicago-Omaha: Average One-Way Fare ($)
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Figure 6.123 Chicago-Omaha: Average Number Of Departures Per Day Each Way
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Figure 6.124 Chicago-Omaha: Smoothed Quarterly Non-OD Traffic
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Figure 6.125 Chicago-Omaha: Average Quarterly Load Factor (%)
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Figure 6.126 Chicago-Omaha: Smoothed Quarterly Total Airport-To-Airport OD Traffic
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6.13 Scenario 1: Houston-New Orleans (HOU/IAH-MSY, Distance = 315
miles)
Preliminary Remarks
A quick glance at the graph of the total OD traffic between Houston and New
Orleans (Figure 6.136) indicates that the Houston-New Orleans market may not be
classified as a high growth market because an overall increase in OD traffic was not
observed over the period between 1984 and 1993. However, after the exit of Eastern
and Delta, Continental initiated a challenge with its service between HOU and MSY, in
direct competition with its own parallel service between IAH and MSY. Also of interest
in this market is the unusual V-shaped curve in Figure 6.131, which demonstrates how
Southwest lost and regained its OD traffic share within a short time.
Passengers' Response To Challengers
Prior to the first quarter of 1987, the quarter when Continental initiated a
challenge, Southwest was the clear leader in terms of OD traffic (Figure 6.131). Indeed,
with its unrivaled 13 flights per day in each direction, most air travelers in the Houston-
New Orleans market probably chose to fly Southwest because of the better choice of
departure times and the more convenient access of Hobby Airport to downtown
Houston, even though Southwest's fares were not necessarily the lowest (Figure 6.132).
However, Southwest's rapid reduction of frequency of service from 13 to seven flights
per day each way between the second quarter of 1985 and the first quarter of 1986
resulted in air travelers turning away from Southwest, which perhaps explains the left
branch of the 'V' in Figure 6.131. Indeed, by boosting its frequency of service from four
flights per day in each direction in the second quarter of 1985 to 10 flights per day in
each direction by the third quarter of 1986, Muse Air achieved a sharp increase in OD
traffic despite its offer of fares that were higher than Southwest's. In fact, between the
third quarter of 1986 and Muse Air's last quarter of operations in the third quarter of
1987, Muse Air captured more passengers in the Houston-New Orleans market than any
of its rivals. So successful was Muse Air that even Continental's service to and from IAH
was less attractive the moment Muse Air offered more flights than Continental beginning
the second quarter of 1986.
Nevertheless, the challenger, Continental, seemed to have chosen an appropriate
time to enter the HOU-MSY market in that it entered the quarter when Southwest had
already reduced frequency to a low of seven departures per day each way (Figure
6.133). Yet, considering the low introductory fares, passengers did respond very well to
the new service between HOU and MSY since one can see, from Figure 6.131, that
Continental immediately captured close to 40,000 passengers in the first quarter it
inaugurated the service. In the ensuing quarters, Continental saw a sharp increase in OD
traffic on its flights even though it raised fares slightly and reduced frequency by two
flights per day in each direction. The most unusual observation is that by competing
with itself, Continental soon realized that its service between HOU and MSY was more
popular than that between IAH and MSY despite the wider choice of flights available at
IAH. Unfortunately, Continental's success was short-lived because air travelers were
flocking to Southwest again as Southwest rapidly boosted frequency between HOU and
MSY beginning in the third quarter of 1987. The success of this change explains the right-
half of the 'V' in Figure 6.131. Then, an increase in OD traffic was also observed for
Continental's service between IAH and MSY even though frequency remained virtually
unchanged, thereby hinting that perhaps there was some general increase in demand in
air services in the late 80s. With the discontinuation of Continental's service between
HOU and MSY at the end of the third quarter of 1988, the Houston-New Orleans
market was only served by two airlines, one in each of the parallel markets: Southwest
in the HOU-MSY market, Continental in the IAH-MSY market. While each airline did
not have to contend with competition within the same market, competition between the
airports was evident in that passengers were still primarily attracted to the significantly
higher frequency of services available at HOU.
Airlines' Response To Challengers
The incumbent airlines' response to the challenger's entry in the HOU-MSY
market ranged from a reduction in frequency in preparation for an exit to a dramatic
boost in frequency. With reference to airlines operating between HOU and MSY, one
sees, from Figure 6.133, that Muse Air had reduced its frequency just as it was about to
leave the market, while Southwest boldly responded to the potential threat from
Continental by increasing frequency from seven flights per day each way in the second
quarter of 1987 to 16 by the second quarter of 1989. Its aggressive efforts seemed to
have paid-off in that it may have driven Continental out of the HOU-MSY market. Since
Continental did not match Southwest's frequency, it carried significantly fewer
passengers than Southwest, and finally abandoned operations in the HOU-MSY market
at the end of just seven quarters. As though an independent entity, Continental
maintained its frequency in the IAH-MSY market and noticed that doing so did not
adversely affect the size of the OD traffic in that market.
However, Southwest was not unreasonable in boosting frequency after
Continental's entry in the HOU-MSY market because non-OD traffic grew so
significantly that Southwest was able to achieve load factors that were in excess of 60%
after the first quarter of 1987, with a roughly even split between OD and non-OD
traffic. Continental faired poorly in the HOU-MSY market in that, without hub-
operations at HOU, it captured fewer non-OD passenger than OD passengers. Perhaps
it made a decision to withdraw services in this market when it looked at the dismal load
factors that ranged between the mid-50s and the mid-30s. On the other hand,
Continental was most likely content with its IAH-MSY services because the large and
growing number of non-OD passengers had helped it achieve impressive load factors
that ranged from the upper 50s to the 60s.
Concluding Remarks
All in all, one can confidently say that the entry of the challenger did stimulate
travel between the two cities since there is a visible jump in total OD traffic in the first
quarter of 1987 (Figure 6.136). However growth was not readily evident as the total OD
traffic had not increased significantly over the 10 years. Regardless, one may conclude
that HOU, the more accessible airport, is preferred for travel between Houston ad New
Orleans because of the higher frequency of service and the lower fares offered by
Southwest. OD traffic between IAH and MSY is substantial and cannot be ignored. The
anomaly - the 'V' shaped profile - could be explained if one knew something about the
economic situation at that time. Otherwise, it is worth noting how Southwest could react
so quickly and effectively to a challenger who saunters onto its turf. Unlike the Chicago-
Des Moines and Chicago-Omaha markets, the air travelers did benefit from the
consistently low fares offered by Southwest. Continental's entry into the HOU-MSY
market with lower fares did not lower Southwest's average fares; instead, Continental's
average fares had crept up to match Southwest's by the second quarter of 1988, the
quarter before Continental withdrew services between HOU and MSY.
Figure 6.131 Houston-New Orleans: Smoothed Quarterly OD Traffic
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Figure 6.132 Houston-New Orleans: Average One-Way Fare ($)
90
80
7 0
60
50
40
30
20
1 0
0 -
CI) - Cf) ~- Cf) '- cn) 1 CI) M- CI - MI i CV) '- CI)
9 t LO) LO WCD W 0- -O M M 0 0 T_ N CI)
o 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0) 0) m m CD 0) C)
Figure 6.133 Houston-New Orleans: Average Number Of Departures Per Day Each Way
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Figure 6.134 Houston-New Orleans: Smoothed Quarterly Non-OD Traffic
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Figure 6.135 Houston-New Orleans: Average Quarterly Load Factor (%)
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Figure 6.136 Houston-New Orleans: Smoothed Quarterly Total Airport-To-Airport OD
Traffic
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6.14 Scenario 1: Houston-San Antonio (HOU/IAH-SAT, Distance = 191 miles)
Preliminary Remarks
The OD traffic profile for the airlines in the Houston-San Antonio market is
reminiscent of that in the Chicago-Des Moines and Chicago-Omaha markets in that each
carrier occupies its own niche, with few intersections between the curves (Figure 6.141).
In addition, Figure 6.146 reveals that the total OD traffic did not grow significantly
between 1984 and 1993. However, the Houston-San Antonio market is of interest as
there is just one challenger in each of the parallel markets: Continental challenged
Southwest in the HOU-SAT market while USAir challenged Continental in the IAH-SAT
market. Eastern, which was not a big player in the IAH-SAT market, had already
displayed signs of retreat, particularly when it secured ailing load factors that plunged
from the 30s to just over 10% (Figure 6.145).
Passengers' Response To Challengers
The first challenger, USAir, did not attract many OD passengers in the Houston-
San Antonio market when it entered the market in 1985 because OD air travelers did
not consider the limited twice-a-day service alluring (Figure 6.141) despite the initial
offer of fares that were slightly lower than Southwest's (Figure 6.142). Even Eastern,
which offered lower fares than USAir in the first and second quarters of 1985, secured
more passengers than USAir because of the higher frequency. However, as Eastern
reduced frequency and raised fares in the first quarter of 1986, it lost passengers,
particularly when USAir's lowest fares in the market had been put in place to lure
passengers away from Eastern. However, one may speculate that the noticeable decline
in Southwest's OD traffic could be attributed to Southwest's reduction in frequency in
the third quarter of 1985 (Figure 6.143) and Continental's corresponding increase in
frequency in the parallel market of IAH-SAT. Otherwise, as a minor player, USAir,
which was operating between IAH and SAT as an extension of a service between
Philadelphia and IAH, could easily undercut all its competitors' fares because it knew
that it could not offer a high frequency of service between the two cities. In other words,
USAir was not attempting to attract a huge pool of OD traffic between IAH and SAT,
but would be happy to accommodate OD air travelers who were not sensitive to
frequency and time of departure. Yet, the fact that some OD air travelers did respond to
its marketing efforts implies that USAir's entry was not completely futile.
On the other hand, Continental's entry in the HOU-SAT market in the fourth
quarter of 1986 did not result in a sudden increase in OD traffic between HOU and
SAT. Instead, OD traffic built-up over the next four quarters as though Continental had
to nurture the market. Despite offering a very low introductory fare of just below $20,
passengers did not all immediately flock to Continental since it offered about one-third
the frequency of its rival (Southwest). However, Continental's new service between HOU
and SAT seems to have diverted some OD traffic from its own IAH-SAT market as
Figure 6.141 shows. In the subsequent four quarters, Continental was able to capture
more OD passengers in the HOU-SAT market even though it raised fares while
maintaining the frequency of about three flights per day each way - perhaps because the
fare was still lower than Southwest's or its own fare in the IAH-SAT market. However,
between the fourth quarter of 1988 and the fourth quarter of 1989, Continental's OD
traffic in the HOU-SAT market then declined since it raised its fares above that of
Southwest and did not simultaneously increase frequency significantly. It achieved a
moderate recovery in OD traffic in the HOU-SAT market between the first and third
quarters of 1990 - when frequency was increased marginally and fares reduced to below
that of Southwest's. However, with a sharp reduction in frequency in the first quarter of
1991 and the loss of OD traffic in the subsequent two quarters, Continental finally
discontinued service between HOU and SAT. Compared to its service between IAH and
SAT, the HOU-SAT services were lagging behind in terms of traffic; air travelers, by far,
preferred its seven or eight flights per day at IAH, as opposed to its smaller presence in
the HOU-SAT market. Continental's only rival in the HOU-SAT market, namely
Southwest, did not suffer from a diversion of OD traffic since it recorded a healthy
increase in OD traffic in the quarters after the fourth quarter of 1986. If Continental's
entry in the HOU-SAT market did stimulate travel, then the stimulative effect of the
new service was delayed as can be seen by the gradual build-up in the OD traffic during
the first four quarters after its entry (Figure 6.141).
Airlines' Response To Challengers
The entry of USAir did seem to instigate both Continental (IAH-SAT) and
Southwest (HOU-SAT) to boost frequency quite significantly in the two quarters
immediately after USAir's entry. While USAir achieved a moderate increase in OD
traffic in the six quarters after the first quarter of 1985, Southwest saw a sharp decline
in OD traffic and Continental (IAH-SAT), a marginal decrease within the same period.
USAir maintained its frequency for four years, unperturbed by the entry of Continental
in the HOU-SAT market in the fourth quarter of 1986. On the other hand, both
Southwest (HOU-SAT) and Continental (IAH-SAT) had gradually increased frequency
over the years perhaps more in tandem with market demand than because of the entry
of the two challengers. It is clear from Figure 6.143 that since the two challengers were
not attempting to match the high frequency offered by Southwest and Continental (IAH-
SAT), they were not a genuine threat to the strong incumbents.
Justification for the increase in frequency for Southwest and Continental (IAH-
SAT) seems to lie in the fact that non-OD traffic is sizable for these two carriers. For
Southwest, an airline that has a presence at Hobby but not a strong interstate network
emanating from Hobby, the size of the non-OD traffic was typically only half that of the
OD traffic. Continental, with its extensive hub-operations at IAH, achieved an
impressive growth in non-OD traffic from a low of 40,000 in the first quarter of 1984 to
a high of 130,000 in the second quarter of 1993. In fact, non-OD traffic was usually
more than twice the size of the OD traffic, thereby accentuating the importance of
connecting traffic in helping Continental sustain its service between IAH and SAT.
Nevertheless, in spite of the difference in passengers mix, both Southwest and
Continental (IAH-SAT) secured high load factors that hovered around 60% most of the
time. USAir, on the other hand, which captured a relatively small number of non-OD
and OD traffic, had to contend with appalling load factors that fluctuated between the
upper teens and early 40s. Continental's service between HOU and SAT did attract
more non-OD passengers than OD passengers, but this did not really boost load factors
beyond 50%. It was probably prudent of Continental to abandon the service between
HOU and SAT once load factors plummeted to about 20% in the first two quarters of
1991, particularly when Continental could see that the services between IAH and SAT
were yielding better load factors for the frequency of service that it offered. Passengers
who had chosen to fly Continental were still responding to the higher frequency offered
at IAH, not the lower fares at HOU.
Concluding Remarks
While the Houston-San Antonio market may not be characterized by significant
growth or traffic stimulation, one may infer, from Figure 6.146, that Continental's new
service between HOU and SAT may have diverted some OD traffic away from the IAH-
SAT market, particularly between the first quarter of 1987 and first quarter of 1989.
However, like the Houston-New Orleans market, Continental realized that it was not
feasible to maintain both HOU-SAT and IAH-SAT services because Continental could
only well sustain high frequency services between its sizable hub at IAH and SAT.
Unless the HOU-SAT market were also served with a high frequency of service that was
comparable to that at IAH, passengers are likely to choose to fly Southwest into and out
of HOU, or Continental into and out of IAH, depending on accessibility concerns. With
the slight frequency advantage of HOU and the larger proportion of OD traffic flying
between HOU and SAT, one may correctly infer that higher frequency, better
accessibility and lower fares do give HOU an advantage over IAH when it comes to
travel between Houston and San Antonio.
Figure 6.141 Houston-San Antonio: Smoothed Quarterly OD Traffic
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Figure 6.142 Houston-San Antonio: Average One-Way Fare ($)
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Figure 6.411 Chicago-Detroit: Smoothed Quarterly OD Traffic
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Figure 6.143 Houston-San Antonio: Average Number Of Departures Per Day Each Way
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Figure 6.144 Houston-San Antonio: Smoothed Quarterly Non-OD Traffic
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Figure 6.145 Houston-San Antonio: Average Quarterly Load Factor (%)
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Figure 6.146 Houston-San Antonio: Smoothed Quarterly Total Airport-To-Airport OD
Traffic
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6.21 Scenario 2: Chicago-Atlanta (ORD/MDW-ATL, Distance = 593 miles)
Preliminary Remarks
In the Chicago-Atlanta market, the two incumbents that are based in Atlanta,
Delta and Eastern, were challenged by three airlines that are based in Chicago: American
and United at O'Hare, and Midway Airlines at Midway. Figure 6.211 revealed that
significant stimulation of the OD traffic was present each time a challenger entered the
market, thereby bringing about robust growth in air travel between Chicago and Atlanta,
particularly between the second quarter of 1984 and the first quarter of 1991. While the
economic link between the two cities may be a contributing factor to the growth in the
travel market, the provision of frequent air services between the two cities had probably
fueled the growth as well.
Passengers' Response To Challengers
Prior to the entry of the first challenger in the second quarter of 1984, Delta and
Eastern were the only providers of nonstop services between ORD and ATL. Passengers
did not have a choice of airports to consider. However, more passengers flew Delta than
Eastern, for the same fare, because Delta offered eight departures per day each way
whereas Eastern, only five. Although United's entry in the ORD-ATL market with about
four departures per day each way did not offer passengers air service from a different
airport in the Chicago area, United was well able to stimulate travel since it captured its
own share of OD traffic without causing any diversion of traffic from the incumbents of
Delta and Eastern (Figure 6.211). Since its entry, United had achieved a continuous,
steady increase in OD traffic from a low of about 5,000 passengers in the second quarter
of 1984 to a high of 40,000 passengers in the second quarter of 1993, an eight-fold
increase in OD traffic. An interesting anomaly is that United captured as many
passengers as Eastern in 1985 and 1986 and more than Eastern after 1987 even though
it consistently offered fewer departures (four or five) than Eastern (six to seven). As
United's average fares (Figure 6.212) were not always lower than Eastern's, one may not
conclude that passengers chose United on the basis of fares either. Yet, Eastern did not
see much growth in OD traffic over the years, whereas United did.
American's entry was more successful than United's in that it managed to
immediately secure a huge OD traffic share of just over 15,000 passengers in the second
quarter of 1985, the quarter it initiated the challenge at ORD. With four airlines
operating between ORD and ATL, one can only be amazed at how each of the four
airlines was able to capture its own share of the OD traffic without hurting its rivals.
Indeed, American lost some of its OD traffic in the seven quarters after it initiated the
challenge but soon achieved an upturn in OD traffic after the first quarter of 1987. By
the end of the second quarter of 1993, it had carried as many as 30,000 passengers,
which is far from what it had started out with (around 16,000). Although American
closely matched United's frequency of service, it captured fewer passengers than United
throughout the years examined (Figure 6.211). Again, since average fares were quite
similar, it may be difficult to pin-down the exact reason for the observed discrepancy.
However, it is clear, by looking at Figure 6.211, that Delta, which could boast of its
frequency leadership, attracted the most number of passengers amongst the four carriers
operating between ORD and ATL.
The last challenge was initiated by Midway, an airline that pioneered the parallel
market of MDW-ATL. Accordingly, passengers now had a choice of flying into or out of
the more accessible airport of the Chicago area. By comparison, Midway alone brought
in close to 25,000 passengers in its first quarter of operations between MDW and ATL -
more than the number of passengers the other two challengers at ORD could capture in
their first quarter of operations. A check with Figure 6.211 revealed that Midway's entry
did not steal away passengers from United, American or Eastern, but Delta
momentarily lost some passengers in the three quarters after Midway's entry. Midway's
offer of a very low introductory fare and the lowest frequency of just three flights per
day did not put it at a disadvantage at all since passengers did respond favorably to its
new service. United had lowered its fares in 1988 to match Midway's but was not
successful in causing a diversion of OD traffic until the last quarter of 1984, when
Midway's OD traffic dipped below that of United's for the first time, and continued to
do so in the subsequent quarters. In the early 90s, when American matched Midway's
frequency for a short while, passengers were indifferent between American and Midway,
but by the time Midway was preparing for its exit and that Eastern had left, passengers
were choosing Delta, United or American, the three airlines that continued to offer
service between Chicago and Atlanta.
Airlines' Response To Challengers
Delta did not react to the entry of the three challengers by drastically altering the
frequency of service. United, the first challenger, almost matched Eastern's frequency
when it entered the ORD-ATL market (disregard first quarter of 1984). This
subsequently may have instigated Eastern to boost frequency from five departures in the
third quarter of 1984 to six departures per day each way in the fourth quarter of 1984
(Figure 6.213), which, unfortunately, did not result in any significant gain in OD traffic.
United, on the other hand, achieved an increase in OD traffic by maintaining frequency
over the same period. In American's first full quarter of operations between ORD and
ATL (disregard second quarter of 1985), American had attempted to match Delta's
frequency of eight departures per day each way and offer a lower fare, but since it did
not capture as large a number of OD passengers as Delta, it gradually reduced its
frequency from eight to three departures per day by the second quarter of 1986. To
counteract the decline in OD traffic and to match United's frequency of service at the
same airport, American had finally decided to settle with four departures per day
beginning the third quarter of 1986. Apparently, American had learnt that it would not
benefit from matching Delta or Eastern's frequency.
Midway dug a niche of its own right from the very beginning. It started out with
three departures a day each way and a low introductory fare, and did not seem to have
the intention of stirring the 'giants' at ORD. However, the fact that it captured more
passengers than United or American in its first five quarters of operations between
MDW and ATL may have raised some concern among its close rivals, United and
American, because these two carriers did, at certain times, match Midway's frequency
(Figure 6.213). However, Midway's success was short-lived because United captured
more passengers than Midway by the fourth quarter of 1988, while American caught-up
with Midway by the second quarter of 1990.
Delta's justification for offering eight to nine departures per day each way was
that it typically carried more than 100,000 non-OD passengers each quarter. With
Delta's strong hub at Atlanta, a hub that is well-positioned to tap the Chicago-
Southeast traffic, and the large number of OD passengers that it secured, Delta was able
to maintain load factors that were above 50%. Like Delta, Eastern, too, carried more
non-OD passengers than OD passengers, and was able to sustain load factors that were
above 50% despite offering six departures a day each way. Then, by capturing a sizable
number of non-OD traffic that was about twice that of the OD traffic, United, the first
challenger that has a strong hub at ORD, launched its service with dismal load factors
that climbed from the 20s to the 50s within five quarters. Since the second quarter of
1985, United was on its road to success with its load factors that quite often exceeded
60%. Like United, American carried a pool of non-OD passengers that was twice the
number of OD passengers, but by offering the same number of departures as United,
American achieved lower load factors that merely hovered around 40%, perhaps
because of the use of different aircraft type. Midway's new service to and from MDW
was less popular among the non-OD passengers; this may be explained by the fact that
it had a smaller network emanating from its hub at MDW. Even with the larger number
of OD passengers it carried, Midway failed to secure load factors above 50% despite
offering three departures per day each way.
Concluding Remarks
All in all, the Chicago-Atlanta market is definitely one that is characterized by
significant stimulation of OD traffic, as can be seen by the sudden increases in OD
traffic in the second quarter of 1984, 1985, and 1987, the quarters in which the three
challengers entered their respective markets (Figure 6.216). An observation worth noting
is that the exit of Eastern resulted in a more noticeable decline in the total OD traffic
than the exit of Midway, which perhaps highlights the idea that the demise of Eastern
had a more significant impact on air travel between the two cities. Yet, Figure 6.216
seems to indicate that the stimulative effects of the new services was short-lived in that
the size of the OD traffic returned to its original level (first quarter 1984) by the time
Midway left the market. Nevertheless, flights between ORD and ATL were still
preferred over those between MDW and ATL for the reason that more flights were
available between ORD and ATL. Frequency drew the majority of the air travelers to
ORD and the high frequency of service between the two cities is possible mainly because
United, American and Delta have hubs in either ORD or ATL, whereby more flights per
day would permit more possible connections for the non-OD passengers.
Figure 6.211 Chicago-Atlanta: Smoothed Quarterly OD Traffic
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Figure 6.212 Chicago-Atlanta: Average One-Way Fare ($)
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Figure 6.213 Chicago-Atlanta: Average Number Of Departures Per Day Each Way
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Figure 6.214 Chicago-Atlanta: Smoothed Quarterly Non-OD Traffic
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Figure 6.215 Chicago-Atlanta: Average Quarterly Load Factor (%)
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Figure 6.216 Chicago-Atlanta: Smoothed Quarterly Total Airport-To-Airport OD Traffic
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6.22 Scenario 2: Chicago-Pittsburgh (ORD/MDW-PIT, Distance = 411 miles)
Preliminary Remarks
Similar to Delta and Eastern in the Chicago-Atlanta market, the two incumbents
in the Chicago-Pittsburgh market, United and USAir, essentially captured a very large
number of OD passengers, while the challengers each occupied a niche of their own. The
challengers in the Chicago-Pittsburgh market are: American, which has a hub at ORD;
Midway, which has a small hub at MDW; and USAir, which later challenged itself by
offering service from its Pittsburgh hub to MDW.
Passengers' Response To Challengers
Prior to the entry of Midway, passengers did not have a choice of airports when
they wanted to fly nonstop between Chicago and Pittsburgh because services were only
available to and from ORD. The entry of American, the first challenger, in the second
quarter of 1984 in the ORD-PIT market could be considered a new service in so far as a
new airline was offering a service between ORD and PIT. The service still did not give
passengers a chance to fly into or out of the more accessible airport of MDW.
Nevertheless, the new service immediately attracted a large number of new OD
passengers - 10,000 of them - in the quarter American initiated the service, thereby
lending support to the idea that the new service literally ushers new passengers into the
market. Patronage of American's service, which amounts to four departures per day
each way, could not be explained by frequency alone since American, for the same fare,
offered fewer departures than incumbents, United (six) and USAir (nine). Yet, the fact
that an airline's entry into the already established ORD-PIT market could stimulate such
new air travel is more than miraculous.
A truly different situation occurred when Midway began offering service between
MDW and PIT in the first quarter of 1988. With just four departures per day each way
as compared to United's six and USAir's seven at ORD, Midway diverted a significant
share of passengers (8,000 in first quarter of service) from USAir and United at the more
accessible airport, particularly with its special low introductory fare. Perhaps so
successful was Midway that USAir responded by inaugurating service between MDW
and PIT. Unfortunately, perhaps because of the need for it to compete with its own
existing service between ORD and PIT, USAir, by offering a lower frequency of just three
departures per day each way at MDW (compared to seven at ORD), could not regain or
match the same level of demand for its service at MDW as Midway. Specifically, over
the subsequent quarters after the second quarter of 1988, USAir consistently carried
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about half as many OD passengers as Midway in the MDW-PIT market. It is also worth
noting that the introduction of both services between MDW and PIT may have, in part,
affected United adversely, as can be seen by the sharp decline in OD traffic after the
first quarter of 1988 (Figure 6.221), whereas USAir seemed to have recovered in the
ORD-PIT market. The other plausible cause is that passengers may have shied away
from United in favor of services at MDW because United had cut-back on frequency
from six to four flights per day each way after the first quarter of 1988. Passengers were,
however, loyal to USAir and American's services between ORD and PIT as Figure 6.221
indicates little fluctuation in OD traffic for these carriers after the entry of the
challengers at MDW. Thus, one suspects that the various air services appeal to different
travelers.
Airlines' Response To Challengers
Airline competition on the basis of frequency was observed when Midway and
USAir introduced services between MDW and PIT. Apparently, American's entry in the
ORD-PIT market with just three departures per day each way, which is fewer than the
number of departures the incumbents (United and USAir) offered, did not create a
frantic commotion amongst the incumbents. A check with the load factors (Figure 6.225)
for USAir and United revealed that both the incumbents were securing exceptionally
high average load factors of between 60% and 70% in the quarters prior to American's
entry, particularly because of the large number of non-OD traffic carried on the flights.
However, the wide cyclical fluctuations (Figure 6.225) in load factors (40s to 60s) on
USAir's services, and the visible decline in non-OD traffic (Figure 6.224) may have
prompted USAir to reduce frequency from nine to six per day each way in the first
quarter of 1987, after which the airline had decided to maintain seven departure per day
each way as OD traffic stabilized over the next few years. It seemed as though USAir
had deliberately wanted to have an edge over United in terms of frequency so that it
could be the leader in OD traffic share - which it finally attained by the late 80s. With
the continuous decline in its non-OD traffic as OD traffic remained relatively stable,
USAir did not hesitate to reduce frequency to just six departures per day each way in
the early 90s, knowing well that its main rival, United, had also reduced frequency to
four departures per day each way by the late 80s. Both United and USAir were then
content with achieving load factors that hovered around 60% after all the changes in
frequency they had both made.
The entry of Midway and USAir in the MDW-PIT market in early 1988
prompted a matching of frequency amongst American, Midway and USAir. Perhaps
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such an observation could be explained by the fact that American, which has a smaller
presence than United at ORD, was very concerned with the potential threat of the two
challengers at nearby MDW. As it turned out, there was little cause for alarm since
American did not lose OD passengers to Midway or USAir (MDW) throughout the
years in which service was available between MDW and PIT. In fact, even non-OD
traffic was not noticeably diverted from American to the two challengers at MDW
(Figure 6.224). Unfortunately, even though the ratio of non-OD is to OD traffic for
American was consistently in the vicinity of 2:1, American secured load factors that
were between 40% and 60%, which is marginally better than what its rivals at MDW
could achieve (30 % to 50%). In fact, USAir could have created a diversion of its own
non-OD traffic from ORD to MDW since the sharp increase in non-OD traffic in 1988
was accompanied by a corresponding decline in non-OD traffic in the ORD-PIT market.
USAir's non-OD traffic for both parallel markets only stabilized after the first quarter of
1990. Midway was least successful in filling its planes for it secured depressing average
load factors that were typically in the 30s. Given that it did not have an extensive route
network at MDW, it captured just as many non-GD passengers as OD passengers.
Concluding Remarks
While stimulation of total OD traffic was present each time a challenger entered
the Chicago-Pittsburgh market, the market as a whole only grew from 50,000 passengers
per quarter to 70,000 passengers per quarter in 10 years (Figure 6.226). In particular,
growth began to wane by the late 80s, with the exit of Midway being the signal for a
sharp decrease in OD traffic in the second quarter of 1991. However, it is clear that
USAir, with its hub at PIT, channeled much of its resources to developing viable services
at the two airports in Chicago. It could easily do so since ORD and MDW would simply
be considered two separate spokes emanating from its hub at Pittsburgh. By operating
to both airports in Chicago, USAir had clearly offered its passengers a choice, and was
subsequently able to capture more OD passengers than its rivals, all of which only
offered service between PIT and one of the airports in Chicago. In the final analysis,
although services were available at both MDW and ORD, the overwhelming majority
chose to fly to or from ORD, the airport which offered more flights per day to and from
Pittsburgh. This, however, does not displace the notion that the secondary airport does
not have a role at all; instead, one could speculate how much diversion there could be if
frequency of service between MDW and PIT were increased to the level of that between
ORD and PIT. In the absence of equal service at both airports, one could see that
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passengers would still have a propensity to go to the airport that offers more flights,
regardless of accessibility.
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Figure 6.221 Chicago-Pittsburgh: Smoothed Quarterly OD Traffic
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Figure 6.222 Chicago-Pittsburgh: Average One-Way Fare ($)
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Figure 6.223 Chicago-Pittsburgh: Average Number Of Departures Per Day Each Way
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Figure 6.224 Chicago-Pittsburgh: Smoothed Quarterly Non-OD Traffic
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Figure 6.225 Chicago-Pittsburgh: Average Quarterly Load Factor (%)
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Figure 6.226 Chicago-Pittsburgh: Smoothed Quarterly Total Airport-To-Airport OD Traffic
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6.23 Scenario 2: Houston-Memphis (HOU/IAH-MEM, Distance = 486 miles)
Preliminary Remarks
The competitive dynamics in the Houston-Memphis market seem lackluster for
the reason that with the exit of Delta from the nonstop market in the fourth quarter of
1986, Northwest was the only airline that served Memphis from both HOU and IAH for
a few years, after which it decided to abandon services between MEM and IAH
altogether. Thus, in the quarters after the third quarter of 1991, Northwest enjoyed a
distinct monopoly on services between HOU and its hub at Memphis. This case should
illustrate how air travelers respond to a transfer of air service from one airport to
another, and how Northwest challenged itself by inaugurating services at IAH despite
already establishing itself in the HOU-MEM market.
Passengers' Response To Challengers
Prior to the third quarter of 1985, services between Memphis and Houston were
available from both HOU and IAH, with Delta operating between IAH and MEM, and
Republic, between HOU and MEM. Delta secured the larger share of the OD traffic
between Houston and Memphis even though it offered services to and from the less
accessible airport at a lower frequency than Republic. Then, by boosting frequency from
three to four flights per day each way by the first quarter of 1985, Delta achieved further
gains in its already superior OD traffic share until the third quarter of 1985. In the
quarters before the third quarter of 1985, Republic's service between HOU and MEM
was clearly less popular whether it matched Delta's frequency of service at IAH or
otherwise. Since the average fares were similar (Figure 6.232), it is not immediately
obvious why OD passengers showed a very distinct preference for Delta's services to
and from the less accessible airport in Houston. However, by initiating a self-challenge
at IAH, Republic, in the third quarter of 1985, did not really stimulate demand
instantaneously. In fact, by offering one departure less than that at HOU, OD traffic
between IAH and MEM grew very quickly only after the first quarter of operations. Of
interest is the observation that passengers may have switched from Delta to Republic
because OD passenger boarding at Delta declined at the same time Republic achieved
increases in OD traffic for its services between HOU and IAH and MEM (Figure 6.231).
Nevertheless, the transfer of OD traffic was not complete because Figure 6.236 revealed
a sudden decrease in OD traffic in the quarter after Delta's exit, thereby indicating the
disappearance of a large number of air travelers with the loss of air service that was
once provided by Delta. Yet, OD traffic in the IAH-MEM market never did reach its
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former glory after Northwest 'took over' Delta's operations between IAH and MEM.
Specifically, the size of the OD traffic in the IAH-MEM market under the reign of
Northwest was only less than half of that when Delta was serving the same market.
Even with the equalizing of flight departures in both the HOU-MEM and IAH-MEM
markets in the first quarter of 1988, the huge disparity in OD traffic share between the
two markets was maintained (Figure 6.231) until Northwest discontinued services
between IAH and MEM in the third quarter of 1991. In short, given the choice of two
airports and a similar frequency offered by the same airline at both HOU and IAH,
passengers flocked to the more accessible airport in Houston (HOU). Left with little
choice after the disappearance of nonstop service between IAH and MEM after the third
quarter of 1991, passengers who would otherwise have gone to IAH may have gradually
switched to HOU, as can be seen by the sharp rise in OD traffic for the HOU-MEM
market in the 90s (Figure 6.231).
Airlines' Response To Challengers
Having "solidly anchored and buttressed" [50] itself in Memphis, Northwest was
clearly challenging itself with flights between IAH and MEM as a means of providing
more service between Houston and Memphis to suit the needs of air travelers who may
prefer IAH over HOU. It could easily justify duplicating the service at IAH because it
had a sizable hub operation at Memphis which could provide the necessary feed.
Indeed,. non-OD traffic far exceeded the OD traffic (Figure 6.234) in both HOU-MEM
and IAH-MEM markets; this in-turn allowed Northwest to attain load factors that were,
for the most part, in excess of 50%. However, it seemed odd that Northwest withdrew
service between IAH and MEM when load factors were still above 50% even though it
had reduced frequency by one departure in each direction. One plausible reason is the
declining number of non-OD passengers on flights between IAH and MEM, as can be
seen by the bow-shaped curve in Figure 6.236.
Concluding Remarks
Stimulation effects were not present in the Houston-Memphis market when
Northwest introduced service between IAH and MEM. In essence, Northwest's service
was a replacement for a service which would otherwise be lost because of Delta's exit.
Average fares remained stable since Northwest was not offering a different fare to those
flying between IAH and MEM. In this monopoly market, total OD traffic decreased from
18,000 per quarter to around 10,000 per quarter after the exit of Delta. However, since
the study only examined the nonstop market, one could not be certain if some of the
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passengers had decided to travel on other carriers that offered an alternative routing. If
one believes in the notion that more service stimulates traffic, as has been observed in
many of the previous cases, then one could postulate that the lack of service between
Houston and Memphis may be a contributing factor to the overall decline in OD traffic
observed. However, the Houston oil-based economy may have also caused the overall
decline in OD traffic between the two cities. Regardless, the Houston-Memphis market
highlights the behavior of passengers when faced with the introduction and the
subsequent withdrawal of service from one of the airports in the multiple airport system.
In this case, one may conclude that the loss of air service at one of the airports in the
dual-airport system resulted in a momentary loss of traffic.
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Figure 6.231 Houston-Memphis: Smoothed Quarterly OD Traffic
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Figure 6.233 Houston-Memphis: Average Number Of Departures Per Day Each Way
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Figure 6.234 Houston-Memphis: Smoothed Quarterly Non-OD Traffic
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Figure 6.235 Houston-Memphis: Average Quarterly Load Factor (%)
IV-, O LM CO C' N N CO 00O) M)00 -. M \ CMM C_ (M .
0M Co C D CO 00 00 CO 0 00 00 Co CMO 0 ) 0 N C00 M ,J
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Figure 6.236 Houston-Memphis: Smoothed Quarterly Total Airport-To-Airport OD Traffic
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6.24 Scenario 2: Houston-St. Louis (HOU/IAH-STL, Distance = 684 miles)
Preliminary Remarks
As one can see from the number of intersections in Figure 6.241, competition in
the Houston-St. Louis market was fierce, with Southwest clearly leading the way after
the second quarter of 1989. Despite the growth in the market as a whole, only two
challengers appeared: Southwest challenged TWA in the HOU-STL market while
Continental, which has a hub a IAH, challenged TWA in the IAH-STL market. The most
significant observation is the way Southwest 'grew' the market with its low fares and
high frequency of service between HOU and STL.
Passengers' Response To Challengers
Before the entry of Southwest, passengers preferred Ozark's service between
HOU and STL over TWA's between IAH and STL for the same number of departures
(three) and similar fares. While one may infer that passengers found HOU more
accessible than IAH, this inference could be confounded by the fact that Ozark did set
itself apart from TWA by offering a distinct inflight service. In particular, Ozark
pampered its passengers with its "Wine Cellar in the Sky" program whereby passengers
could sample a huge selection of domestic and imported wines, and choose meals from
an exotic menu [51]. The irony is that Ozark was offering the premium inflight service in
a densely packed one-class cabin. However, the entry of Southwest in the HOU-STL
market with its low fares did lower the average fare from $130 to $60, thereby
stimulating travel as Southwest captured a handsome 8,000 passengers in the first
quarter of 1985. Although passengers may have patronized Southwest for its low fares
and that the flights were available at the more accessible airport of HOU, it is unclear as
to whether passengers chose Southwest because of frequency since Southwest was not
aggressive in the early part of its reign. Prior to 1988, Southwest offered fewer
departures than Ozark or TWA at HOU although fares were kept low at less than $100.
Thus, Southwest was not the leader in market share of OD traffic until 1989, when it
switched gears to offer more departures than its rivals at HOU and IAH. Nevertheless,
the entry of Southwest may have affected Ozark since Southwest's gain in OD traffic in
the four quarters after the launch of its service was accompanied by a corresponding
loss in OD traffic for Ozark within the same period. Despite offering slightly higher
fares, TWA's service between IAH and STL had also became increasingly popular in
1985 and 1986. In fact, with the merger of Ozark and TWA in 1986, there was an
unusual 'cross-over' in the OD traffic curves for TWA's HOU and IAH operations in late
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1986, perhaps because of the addition of one departure in the IAH-STL market. At this
time, Southwest had lost the race because it offered fewer departures than TWA at
HOU.
However, the entry of the second challenger, Continental, at IAH did change the
competitive profile quite radically. With only two departures per day each way
compared to TWA's three, Continental's entry was successful because it did stimulate
5,000 passengers immediately (Figure 6.241), perhaps because it offered lower fares
(Figure 6.242) than other airlines in the Houston-St. Louis market. Even with its higher
frequency, TWA (IAH) might have been affected by Continental's entry since the
converging curves in Figure 6.241 might indicate that Continental may have gained some
OD passengers at the expense of TWA (IAH). However, another reason for TWA's
(IAH) loss is the increasing popularity of TWA and Southwest's services between HOU
and STL.
In particular, Continental's entry may have triggered Southwest to increase
frequency to capture a larger share of the OD traffic between the two cities. Indeed,
between the second quarter of 1987 and the second quarter of 1989, Southwest trebled
the number of departures from two to six, an aggressive effort that paid-off as OD
traffic climbed from just 12,000 per quarter to 25,000 per quarter within two years,
thereby making Southwest the leader in market share by the second quarter of 1989. In a
similar vein but on a smaller scale, TWA was able to attract more passengers to fly
between HOU and STL by adding one departure in each direction, a strategy that
brought TWA on par with Southwest in terms of OD traffic size by the second quarter
of 1989. With a minimal differential in average fares, one could speculate that
passengers were most probably choosing on the basis of frequency and accessibility.
The unusual thing about the Houston-St. Louis market is that with the
discontinuation of TWA's service between IAH and STL, passengers were not
scrambling for TWA's flights at HOU, as can be seen by the decrease in OD traffic in
TWA's HOU-STL market after TWA discontinued services between IAH and STL. On
the other hand, it is highly likely that some of the passengers who preferred IAH may
have switched to Continental since Continental was, by then, the only airline offering
service between IAH and STL. Otherwise, passengers in the HOU-STL pool may have
been lured away by Southwest's offer of six -then later, eight - departures per day as
compared to TWA's (HOU) four flights per day, and its lower fares. By the end of the
second quarter of 1993, it was clear that passengers were captivated by Southwest's
services between HOU and STL, while, surprisingly, Continental's service between IAH
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and STL attracted slightly more passengers than TWA's service between HOU and STL
even though it offered fewer departures.
Airlines' Response To Challengers
A glance at Figure 6.243 revealed that the two incumbents of Ozark and TWA
(IAH) did not respond to Southwest's entry in early 1985, while the entry of Continental
in the IAH-STL market may have instigated Southwest to boost frequency so that it
could be the overall leader in market share. Indeed, Ozark, TWA and Continental did
not have to alter their frequency of service drastically because the three airlines secured
average load factors that were above 50% regardless of the variation of the mix of OD
and non-OD passengers. In fact, Figure 6.244 shows that none of the airlines had
difficulty securing a sizable number of non-OD passengers to help fill-up the seats on
the aircraft. Besides, TWA had a strong hub at St. Louis that could bring passengers
from other destinations in its network to either IAH or HOU. Prior to 1988, non-OD
passengers flying TWA showed a distinct preference for service to and from IAH, but
with the termination of TWA's services between IAH and STL, non-OD traffic on
TWA's flights between HOU and STL soared, particularly after 1991. Continental, on
the other hand, had to nurture the non-OD traffic from virtually a trickle to as many as
40,000 passengers by the second quarter of 1993, perhaps because it could basically
only tap the feed to and from southern Texas. Even Ozark, which made the right
decision to move its base from congested O'Hare to Lambert in the late 70s, was able to
expand beyond Missouri's neighbors to the East Coast cities of New York, Philadelphia,
Baltimore, and Washington D.C. [51]. As for Southwest, its intra-Texas services to and
from HOU would help support the HOU-STL flights, while its increased presence in
STL since the early 90s would be responsible for the sharp increase in non-OD traffic in
the 90s.
Concluding Remarks
Figure 6.246 indicates that growth in the market is evident as can be seen by the
jump in total OD-traffic from just over 35,000 passengers per quarter in early 1984 to
70,000 per quarter by 1993, with Southwest being the largest contributor to the increase.
In short, the entry of the two challengers at the two different airports in the Houston
area have perhaps brought about a healthy growth in the market as a whole, with
stimulation of OD traffic being present during each challenger's entry. A sudden loss of
OD traffic was also observed in the fourth quarter of 1989, the quarter when TWA
discontinued service between IAH and STL. However, the fact that Southwest had been
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instrumental in defining the fare floor implies that passengers did benefit from the entry
of Southwest because average fares fell from a high of around $120 in 1984 to around
$90 by 1993. The final comment is that Southwest, which does not really have extensive
hub operations at HOU or STL, dominated the market, with TWA and Continental
taking the back-seat even though both have strong hubs at STL and IAH respectively.
Needless to say, with more flights at HOU, most of which were provided by Southwest,
more OD passengers chose to fly into and out of HOU.
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Figure 6.241 Houston-St. Louis: Smoothed Quarterly OD Traffic
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Figure 6.243 Houston-St. Louis: Average Number Of Departures Per Day Each Way
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Figure 6.244 Houston-St. Louis: Smoothed Quarterly Non-OD Traffic
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Figure 6.245 Houston-St. Louis: Average Quarterly Load Factor (%)
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Figure 6.246 Houston-St. Louis: Smoothed Quarterly Total Airport-To-Airport OD Traffic
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6.31 Scenario 3: Chicago-Denver (MDW/ORD-DEN, Distance = 914 miles)
Preliminary Remarks
With its hub operations at both Chicago O'Hare and Denver, its consistently
superior frequency share, and its relatively competitive fares, United was the leader in
the ORD-DEN OD market throughout the years examined. However, United was less
successful in the parallel MDW-DEN market because it did not channel muc of its
resources in developing the service, as can been seen by the disproportionately lower
frequency of service (Figure 6.313) in this market. However, despite its strength, United
had to contend with several competitors: Continental, which has a hub at Denver;
American, which has a hub at ORD as well; and Midway Airlines, which has a hub at
MDW. Frontier, which was later acquired by Continental, could be labeled as a minor
player in the ORD-DEN market (Figure 6.311) while Continental captured more OD
traffic than United in the smaller MDW-DEN market. The following discussion attempts
to give reasons for the failure of the four challengers -Frontier (ORD-DEN), Continental
(MDW-DEN), Midway (MDW-DEN), and United (MDW-DEN) - in maintaining their
presence when faced with strong rivals (American, United and Continental) at ORD.
Passengers' Response To Challengers
Before Frontier's entry in the ORD-DEN market in the first quarter of 1985, each
airline's share of OD traffic (Figure 6.311) was roughly in-line with its frequency share
(Figure 6.313): United, with eight departures a day, was the favorite, while Continental,
with six departures was runners-up. American was least popular since it only offered
five departures per day. The entry of Frontier with just three departures per day in early
1985, with its slightly lower fares, initially lured about 8,000 new OD passengers per
quarter (Figure 6.313). While Continental and American seemed to have ignored
Frontier's entry, United, beginning the third quarter of 1985, waged a frequency war
against Frontier by rapidly boosting frequency from eight to 11 departures per day
within just five quarters. However, United's aggressive efforts affected Continental
instead of Frontier because it was Continental which lost about 15,000 OD passengers
per quarter in that time, whereas Frontier achieved marginal gains in OD traffic by just
adding one departure per day each way. With average fares plunging to a record low of
$60 in the second quarter of 1986 (Figure 6.312) from a former high of $120 in 1984,
Continental was the unlucky loser amongst the four airlines. Even American was
successful in attracting more OD passengers without having to alter its frequency of
service.
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Although United did not end its frequency war until the second quarter of 1987,
the quarter it initiated service between MDW and DEN, its OD traffic share reached the
pinnacle in the same quarter that the second challenger, Continental, inaugurated service
between MDW and DEN. With only three flights per day, Continental's service between
MDW and DEN, the first of its kind, received a warm welcome as 8,000 new OD
passengers came forward instantaneously to patronize the new service, which was
priced below that of its competitors at ORD. The second stimulus in OD traffic between
MDW and DEN was observed when Midway seized the opportunity to offer service to
and from MDW in the quarter after Continental's entry. This time, by offering the same
frequency as Continental, Midway's similarly low introductory fares captivated the
hearts of even more passengers (17,000) in the first quarter of 1987. However, the
creation of the new MDW-DEN market, a genuine alternative for air travelers, might
have adversely affected United and American's operations at ORD since both carriers
suffered a significant loss of about 10,000 OD passengers per quarter in the few quarters
after Midway and Continental's entry at MDW. Convinced that the MDW-DEN market
could be a successful venture, United too entered the fray in the third quarter of 1987,
but failed to attract its pool of OD passengers because it offered a much higher fare
(Figure 6.312) than its rivals at MDW. An inexplicable anomaly is that passengers did
not respond to United's offer of exceptionally low fares of below $100 for its ORD-DEN
services during the quarter just after it had introduced the MDW-DEN services. Yet, as
soon as Continental abandoned the MDW-DEN service at the end of 1988, some
passengers flocked to United because United had, by then, matched Midway's fares,
though not the frequency.
With three airlines operating in full-force in the MDW-DEN market, passengers
were turning away from United's ORD-DEN services since United had decided to cut-
back on frequency from a high of 14 to 10 departures per day each way by early 1989.
OD passenger boardings on United's ORD-DEN flights decreased further once United's
MDW-DEN operations were perceived as a replacement for Continental's MDW-DEN
service, a service which Continental withdrew at the end of 1988. Then, the temporary
suspension of United's service in the MDW-DEN market allowed Midway to capture
more passengers until Midway left the market at the end of 1991, after which United re-
entered the MDW-DEN market, though for only two quarters. Some passengers were
still keen on United's service at MDW even though United only offered one flight per
day. However, when services between MDW and DEN came to an end in the third
quarter of 1992, American finally took second place in terms of OD traffic share in the
ORD-DEN market perhaps because it offered, beginning in 1990, one more departure
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than Continental. Otherwise, United, with its 10 flights per day, was still the air
traveler's all-time favorite even though the service was to and from a less accessible
airport in the Chicago area. Thus, while services between MDW and DEN were a
genuine alternative to that between ORD and DEN, most passengers still preferred
airlines that offered a larger number of departures to and from ORD.
Airlines' Response To Challengers
A cursory glance at the average load factor profile (Figure 6.315 ) indicates that
the airlines made rational decisions with respect to the provision of capacity in the
Chicago-Denver market. All airlines in the market achieved healthy load factors that
exceeded 50%, with United (ORD) and Continental (ORD) leading the way with load
factors that were usually between 60% and 80%. Even Frontier, a minor player which
carried as many non-OD passengers as OD passengers, was able to secure load factors
that were between 60% and 80%. Although Frontier's entry into the ORD-DEN market
did seem to incite United, United's double-hub operation at ORD and DEN gave it an
additional reason to boost frequency for it was well able to attract as many as 250,000
non-OD passengers per quarter, which is about two-and-a-half times the size of its
quarterly OD traffic. Although United's MDW-DEN service was unappealing to OD
passengers, the thrice daily service managed to lure as many as 40,000 non-OD
passengers per quarter, and thus helped United maintain average load factors of around
50% in this smaller market. However, United may have discontinued the service because
the service was not appealing to OD passengers even though it matched the frequency of
Continental (MDW) and Midway (MDW).
The entry of Continental, Midway and United at MDW seemed to have
prompted American to match the frequency of service of these airlines since American
eliminated one departure per day in the fourth quarter of 1987, much to its own
detriment because OD traffic plunged from a high of 25,000 per quarter to 10,000 per
quarter shortly after. Having realized its mistake, American gradually recaptured its
share of OD traffic by restoring the frequency of service to four departures per day.
With the fewer departures that it offered and with only a hub at ORD, American, unlike
United, secured almost as many non-OD passengers as OD passengers, thereby making
the ORD-DEN service viable with load factors that hovered around the 50s and 60s.
Continental, with its hub at DEN, was by far more successful with its ORD-DEN
operations than its MDW-DEN operation because it allocated more flights in this
market than in the parallel MDW-DEN market. Continental was able to secure a large
number of non-OD passengers in 1985, 1986, and 1987 on its ORD-DEN services, but
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the non-OD traffic began to dwindle as United picked-up more non-OD passengers.
Yet, to maintain a consistently high load factor of around 60% to 70% when it was
losing its share of OD and non-OD traffic towards the late 80s and early 90s,
Continental reduced frequency by one departure per day by the third quarter of 1988. Its
MDW-DEN service performed worse than the ORD-DEN services in terms of load
factors even though non-OD traffic outnumbered OD passengers by a factor of two.
Midway, very content with its offer of three flights a day, experienced huge
fluctuations of 20% in the average load factor, but maintained the service between
MDW-DEN because load factors were between 50% and 70%, and that it had secured
a stable pool of OD passengers and a slightly larger number of non-OD passengers. In
fact, as the most successful entrant in the MDW-DEN market, Midway may have
fended its turf so well that United and Continental had learnt that it was not viable for
them to operate to both ORD and MDW if there were a disparity in frequency in the two
parallel markets. The overall picture, though, is that airlines operating in the MDW-DEN
market were content with offering just four departures per day; an attempt was not
made to match the frequency offered by airlines in the parallel ORD-DEN market. As
such, flights to and from ORD were still more popular than those at the more accessible
airport of Midway.
Concluding Remarks
The Chicago-Denver market highlights the competitive behavior of airlines in a
scenario whereby one of the airlines has a hub at both ends. Here, United certainly had a
disproportionate share of the OD and non-OD traffic because it was willing to devote
its resources to establishing a large presence in the Chicago-Denver market by offering
the most number of departures between its two hubs of ORD and DEN. However, both
United and Continental may have learnt that since passengers do respond to frequency
more than accessibility, offering fewer flights in the parallel MDW-DEN did not
necessarily reap significant benefits. All in all, air travelers in the Chicago-Denver market
did not really benefit much from the entry of the challengers since fares, which did go
down in 1986, eventually rose again by the late 80s. Figure 6.316 indicates that the low
fares and United's boosting frequency between ORD and DEN may have stimulated OD
travel in the mid-80s, but overall growth in travel was dampened once services at MDW
were available even though Continental (MDW) and Midway (MDW) successfully
created the MDW-DEN market when they initiated services. Nevertheless, the increase
in total OD traffic from 90,000 in the first quarter of 1984 to 140,000 by the first quarter
of 1993 is quite impressive, regardless of how the increase was achieved.
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Figure 6.311 Chicago-Denver: Smoothed Quarterly OD Traffic
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Figure 6.313 Chicago-Denver: Average Number Of Departures Per Day Each Way
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Figure 6.314 Chicago-Denver: Smoothed Quarterly Non-OD Traffic
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Figure 6.315 Chicago-Denver: Average Quarterly Load Factor (%)
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Figure 6.316 Chicago-Denver: Smoothed Quarterly Total Airport-To-Airport OD Traffic
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6.32 Scenario 3: Chicago-Nashville (MDW/ORD-BNA, Distance = 399 miles)
Preliminary Remarks
The Chicago-Nashville market is very different from any of the markets analyzed
so far for the reason that the entry of Southwest in the MDW-BNA market essentially
stimulated travel between the two cities, as Figure 6.321 and 6.326 show. Even
American, which had hubs at both ORD and BNA, took second place in OD market
share despite its confrontation with Southwest beginning in late 1991, whereby it offered
more departures than Southwest. Unlike United in its operations in the ORD-DEN
market, American, with its dual-hub system at ORD and BNA, could not be the leader
in market share because it offered appreciably higher fares than Southwest after offering
more departures than Southwest after 1991. One could also postulate that United may
have been spared in the ORD-DEN market because Southwest did not enter that
market. The Chicago-Nashville market is also unusual in that the incumbents, Delta and
Republic, were on their way out shortly after 1984; the challengers - United, Southwest,
and American - were, in a sense, the replacements for Delta and Republic.
Passengers' Response To Challengers
In the first quarter of 1984, when Delta and Republic were the only carriers
offering nonstop services between ORD and BNA, passengers, faced with similar fares,
favored Republic over Delta because Republic offered one departure more than Delta.
United's entry in the ORD-BNA market in the second quarter of 1984 with the same
fares as Delta and Republic and the same number of departures as Republic
instantaneously attracted about 3,000 new passengers (Figure 6.321). Then, as United
lowered its fare and frequency in the subsequent four quarters, it gradually gained its
share of OD passengers. With the exit of Delta at the end of 1984, passengers were left
with a choice of either flying Republic or United, but Republic secured more OD
passengers than United because of its frequency advantage.
The entry of Southwest in the first quarter of 1986 in the new MDW-BNA
market, with a higher frequency and an average fare that was about $50 lower than the
incumbents, merely resulted in minor stimulation of travel - just 5,000 passengers (Figure
6.321). Southwest only captured an additional 3,000 OD passengers in the second
quarter of operations, while the last challenger, American, which offered service between
ORD and BNA, immediately captured 14,000 OD passengers - slightly more than
incumbent United in that same market. However, while the OD traffic in the ORD-BNA
market remained fairly stable over the next few years, Southwest began to nurture its
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monopoly market by boosting frequency from four to six departures a day and
maintaining the low fare of just $60. Passengers responded exceptionally
enthusiastically to Southwest's efforts since OD traffic soared from just 5,000 in the first
quarter of 1986 to a zenith of 39,000 by the end of 1990, the year just before American
decided to boost frequency between its two hubs. Between 1987 and 1991, passengers
did not show a specific preference for United or American even though American
offered higher fares and one more departure per day than United during several quarters
(Figure 6.323).
At last, in 1991, passengers began to make a visible choice between airports
when American progressively increased the number of departures from four to eight over
the course of 1991 as it strengthened its hub at Nashville. One can see, from the right
hand portion of Figure 6.321, that American's gain in OD traffic was Southwest's loss
because of the switch-over from Southwest to American. Unfortunately, the diversionary
effect was reversed when American raised its fares from a low of $70 in late 1991 to a
high of $190 by the first quarter of 1993, whereby passengers preferred to pay the usual
$70 for Southwest's seven departures than Americans' dearer eight or nine departures.
United was perhaps the most unresponsive competitor in the Chicago-Nashville
market because it maintained its three departures per day for the longest time. It seemed
complacent with its share of about 10,000 OD passengers each quarter. By offering the
lowest frequency of service (three departures per day) at significantly higher fares than
Southwest (Figure 6.322), some passengers did begin to shun United after 1991.
Airlines' Response To Challengers
As far as airline behavior is concerned, one can see that United's entry in the
ORD-BNA market with the same frequency and fares as Republic instigated Republic to
boost frequency to give itself an edge over United. Delta, which had to contend with
load factors that were in the vicinity of 30%, had apparently given up hope of
competing with United and Republic, and hence, left the market at the end of 1984.
Republic, which saw its OD traffic increase slightly but was fast losing non-OD traffic,
finally abandoned the fight with United since load factors declined to about 30% in the
quarter just before it abandoned the ORD-BNA market and merged with Northwest.
United did not respond to Southwest's entry since it did not match Southwest's
frequency or low fares. Further, United did not really perceive American as a threat even
though it shared the same hub as American at ORD. Yet, with its mix of OD and non-
OD passengers standing at a ratio of about 1:3, United's service was viable because it
achieved load factors that fluctuated between the 40s and early 60s, particularly after it
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established itself in the market in 1985. With its higher fares between 1989 and the first
quarter of 1991, American added one departure per day but passengers did not respond
until the second quarter of 1990, a time when American did attract more passengers
than United. However, between the second quarter of 1987 and the first quarter of 1991,
since Southwest's superior frequency was uncontested, Southwest became the
undisputed leader in market share. American was only successful in drawing passengers
away from Southwest when it boosted frequency quite suddenly beginning in 1991.
Despite the fact that Southwest did not have a strong hub at either MDW or BNA, it
was well able to progressively attract a sizable number of non-OD passengers (Figure
6.324) - starting from a negligible number to 80,000 per quarter by 1993 - thereby
allowing it to secure load factors that were typically in excess of 60%.
American, with its dual-hub operations, was the overall leader in non-OD
market share; this helped it achieve favorable average load factors that were in the
vicinity of 70%. In particular, American had an advantage over United and Southwest
since it could well use Nashville as a gateway to Florida and the Southeast. Indeed,
Southwest did plan a hub at Nashville, but immediately retreated when American
announced its intention to hub at Nashville [52].
Concluding Remarks
In summary, one may conclude that the exit of Republic and Delta did not mean
an end to direct air service between Chicago and Nashville. On the contrary, the entry of
all three challengers stimulated OD travel, with Southwest clearly leading the pack in
luring the OD travelers. Specifically, between the first quarter of 1987 and the second
quarter of 1991, and after the third quarter of 1992, OD traffic between MDW and BNA
exceeded that between ORD and BNA, thereby emphasizing the power of Southwest in
creating demand for air travel to and from the more accessible airport of MDW. It is also
in the Chicago-Nashville market that one sees how the low fare advantage, coupled with
high frequency, helps capture OD passengers. Indeed, by examining the fare profile
again, one notices that, except in the first and fourth quarters of 1991, American and
United were not really attempting to match Southwest's consistently low fares. After all,
Southwest considered the Southeast as an arena of untapped opportunity, upholding
the belief that the region is "underserved and overpriced" [52] if not for its entry. Figure
6.326 does provide evidence that air travelers have reaped benefits from Southwest's
service because OD traffic tripled very quickly with the entry of Southwest in the MDW-
BNA market.
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Figure 6.321 Chicago-Nashville: Smoothed Quarterly OD Traffic
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Figure 6.323 Chicago-Nashville: Average Number Of Departures Per Day Each Way
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Figure 6.324 Chicago-Nashville: Smoothed Quarterly Non-OD Traffic
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Figure 6.325 Chicago-Nashville: Average Quarterly Load Factor (%)
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Figure 6.326 Chicago-Nashville: Smoothed Quarterly Total Airport-To-Airport OD Traffic
70,000
60,000
50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
0
%rO LOCO CO C 00 P- N O -0 0 CN NCO
~---- TOTAL
-s-MDW-BNA
+- ORD-BNA
6.33 Scenario 3: Houston-Denver (HOU/IAH-DEN, Distance = 884 miles)
Preliminary Remarks
Figure 6.336 indicates that the Houston-Denver market did not grow even though
two challengers, United and Continental, entered the parallel HOU-DEN market after
Frontier was acquired by Continental in the middle of 1986. Like the Chicago-Denver
market, where United devoted the most number of flights in the ORD-DEN market,
Continental, with its hubs at IAH and DEN, was the undisputed leader in OD market
share in the IAH-DEN market. Continental entered the HOU-DEN market for a few
years before abandoning the market, much like the way United had entered the MDW-
DEN market but finally withdrew the service. Without Southwest in the picture, the
competitive dynamics in this market are in-line with what one expects: Continental, with
its dual-hub system, is the clear winner in terms of overall OD market share. Indeed, the
two challengers, United and Continental, were actually self-challengers who were
interested in offering parallel services between HOU and DEN.
Passengers' Response To Challengers
Right at the onset, even before Continental's entry in the HOU-DEN market in
1986, passengers were basically choosing Continental's service between IAH and DEN
because of the superior frequency (nine departures per day). However, with Frontier
offering three departures per day between HOU and DEN, and United, four between
IAH and DEN, fares and accessibility were the likely factors that swayed passengers to
prefer Frontier over United. Specifically, by offering a lower fare and better service to
and from the more accessible airport of HOU, Frontier's service attracted 20,000
passengers per quarter while United's between IAH and DEN, only 10,000 per quarter.
Continental may have lost some OD passengers to Frontier as well, as the precipitous
decline in OD traffic between the first quarter if 1984 and the first quarter of 1986
indicates (Figure 6.331).
The entry of Continental in the HOU-DEN market in the second quarter of 1986
was not well received initially even though Continental offered four departures per day.
However, OD passengers began to show a very promising response - even after the
elimination of one departure per day - almost a year later since OD traffic increased to a
high of almost 30,000 in the second quarter of 1988. The corresponding decline in OD
traffic in Continental's IAH-DEN market (Figure 6.331) perhaps indicates that
passengers did switch to the new service that was to and from the more accessible
airport of HOU. United, for being the minor player in the IAH-DEN market, suffered a
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further loss of its already small share of OD traffic because it reduced frequency by one
departure per day a year after Continental's entry in the HOU-DEN market. However,
prompted by Continental's success in the HOU-DEN market, United initiated a
challenge in the HOU-DEN market in the third quarter of 1988 with just two departures
per day, one less than rival, Continental. Surprisingly, by offering the same frequency in
both parallel markets, United attracted about the same number of OD passengers in
both markets. It is clear though, from Figure 6.331, that United's entry did stimulate
travel right from the first quarter, more so than Continental in its first quarter of entry in
the HOU-DEN market. United's entry in the HOU-DEN market may have adversely
affected Continental's competing service in the same market since OD traffic gradually
declined in the quarters after the third quarter of 1988 (Figure 6.331). Another plausible
reason for this decline is that passengers may have flocked to Continental's service at
IAH because Continental was offering 10 flights per day in the IAH-DEN market as
opposed to three (before the fourth quarter of 1991) in the HOU-DEN market.
Continental's offer of only two departures per day beginning in the fourth quarter of
1991 may have made its service between HOU and DEN even less popular. At the same
time, since United's two departures per day from IAH or HOU were just as
unappealing; a large number of passengers may indeed have chosen to fly between IAH
and DEN on Continental instead. In fact, the loss in OD traffic due to the self-challenge
in 1986 was restored by the end of 1990 as passengers showed a renewed interest in
Continental's high frequency service between IAH and DEN.
Airlines' Response To Challengers
By offering the highest frequency of service between IAH and DEN, and
maintaining a hub at both IAH and DEN, Continental secured the largest share of non-
OD passengers, thereby allowing it to achieve favorable average load factors that
fluctuated between 60% and 70%. Frontier, which had a hub at DEN, carried as many
non-OD passengers as OD passengers (around 20,000 per quarter) and was well able to
maintain average load factors that were in the 60s and early 70s, thereby indicating that
its service between HOU and DEN was viable. Continental, which essentially took over
Frontier's operations at HOU, was successful only in 1988, when OD traffic soared to
30,000 per quarter. However, when OD traffic tapered and non-OD traffic did not
increase after 1988, average load factors on Continental's service between HOU and
DEN had fallen to around 50%.
United, which offered four flights per day between its hub at DEN and IAH, was
able to fill its planes in the years prior to 1987 since it managed to secure four times as
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many non-GD passengers as OD passengers. However, its halving of the number of
departures in the second quarter of 1987 resulted in a loss of both OD and non-GD
passengers, and the subsequent deterioration of the average load factors to just below
50%, a figure which never improved in the ensuing quarters. Even by not matching
Continental's frequency in the HOU-DEN market, United's service between HOU and
DEN attained load factors that were averaging around 50% most of the time even
though non-OD traffic consistently outnumbered OD traffic by a factor of two. On the
whole, regardless of the decisions the airlines made, one may say that each airline's
service was viable since load factors did not fall below 40%. Continental may have
withdrawn its service between HOU and DEN because it learnt that the service was less
popular and that the average load factors were 10-15% lower than those in the IAH-
DEN market, particularly after 1987.
Concluding Remarks
By examining Figure 6.336, one will notice the visible dip in total OD traffic
between 1984 and 1986, which is attributed to the decline in OD traffic in the larger
IAH-DEN market. The entry of the two challengers in the HOU-DEN market did affect
the distribution of OD traffic at the two airports of HOU and IAH as the convergence of
the curves for the total OD traffic in each market indicates (Figure 6.336). A reversal of
fortune began to take place when United entered the HOU-DEN market because the
curves diverged very visibly after 1988, thereby indicating that passengers' preferences
had changed. Thus, while stimulation of OD traffic was not very noticeable in the
Houston-Denver market as a whole, one could conclude that passengers were mainly
choosing on the basis of frequency; IAH was preferred over HOU even though the former
is less accessible. Continental was responsible for affecting the OD passenger's choice of
airports since it was able to offer nine or 10 departures per day between its two hubs at
IAH and DEN. United, with only a hub at one end, was trailing far behind in terms of
OD and non-OD traffic, but it maintained the HOU-DEN service to at least give
passengers a choice of airports. Lastly, the demand for air travel between the two cities
may have been dampened since average fares had risen from around $100 in 1984 to
$150 by 1993. While it is likely that Frontier was responsible for setting the floor for low
fares, its exit brought an end to the low fares as Figure 6.332 shows.
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Figure 6.331 Houston-Denver: Smoothed Quarterly OD Traffic
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Figure 6.333 Houston-Denver: Average Number Of Departures Per Day Each Way
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Figure 6.334 Houston-Denver: Smoothed Quarterly Non-OD Traffic
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Figure 6.335 Houston-Denver: Average Quarterly Load Factor (%)
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Figure 6.336 Houston-Denver: Smoothed Quarterly Total Airport-To-Airport OD Traffic
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6.34 Houston-Newark (HOU/IAH-EWR, Distance = 1,422 miles)
Preliminary Remarks
The most salient observation for the Houston-Newark market is the sharp
decline in total OD traffic with the disappearance of low fares once Continental
acquired People's Express in 1987 (Figure 6.346). With increasing average fares over the
years after 1986, total OD traffic had only reached 60,000 passengers by the second
quarter of 1993 compared to the high of 140,000 in the third quarter of 1984.
Nevertheless, one can infer, from Figure 6.341, that People's Express, a low-fare airline,
was responsible for stimulating OD travel during the period before 1984. A word of
caution, though, is that the quality of the traffic data for People's Express may be
suspect because the total number of passengers People Express carried in each quarter
exceeded that of what is classified as OD traffic. Consequently, non-OD traffic figures
for People's Express are, at most, limited, if not, unfit for interpretation. Since the traffic
figures for the other carriers are acceptable, and that the Houston-Newark market is the
only other market that falls under Scenario 3 for the multiple airport city of Houston,
one should not discard the Houston-Newark market so hastily. Another cautionary note
is that EWR is one of the competing airports in the multiple airport system of New York
City because air travelers may perceive LaGuardia and J. F. Kennedy airports as
alternatives. Nevertheless, since the Houston-Newark example aims to expose the
nature of competition in an environment where one airline has a dual-hub system, one
could analyze the Houston-Newark market independently of the other parallel markets
of Houston-LaGuardia and Houston-J. F. Kennedy. In any case, the Houston-Newark
market is also of interest since Continental, the airline which had hubs at both IAH and
EWR, initiated the challenge in the IAH-EWR and HOU-EWR markets.
Passengers' Response To Challengers
Prior to Continental's entry in the IAH-EWR market in the third quarter of 1984,
passengers clearly favored People's Express' low fare ($80) and high frequency of service
(six departures per day) over Eastern's offer of a $140 fare with only two departures
per day to choose from. Accessibility may not have been a significant factor with such a
distinct disparity in fares and frequency. However, by underpricing Eastern in the IAH-
EWR market, Continental, which commenced challenging Eastern in the third quarter of
1984, gradually stimulated travel and attracted an increasing number of passengers as it
rapidly boost frequency from three to five departures while Eastern, within the same
period, reduced its frequency from two to just one departure per day, and eventually
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left the IAH-EWR market by the end of the first quarter of 1987. In fact, by the time
Eastern left, Continental had attracted three times the number of OD traffic as Eastern
in the IAH-EWR market. People's Express, the incumbent in the parallel HOU-EWR
market, suffered a serious decline in traffic shortly after Continental's entry in the IAH-
EWR market, particularly when it reduced frequency at the same time when Continental
was attempting to match People Express' frequency in mid-1985. Indeed, passengers
seemed pleased with Continental's service to and from IAH even though fares were
about $40 higher than People' Express and Eastern's. By the third quarter of 1986, when
Continental and People's Express offered the same number of departures per day, OD
traffic was equal; both carriers secured 60,000 passengers in that quarter (Figure 6.341).
However, with People's Express abandoning service between HOU and EWR at the end
of 1986 (Continental acquired People's Express), and Eastern leaving the IAH-EWR
market a quarter later, Continental's monopoly on nonstop air services between Houston
and Newark was a disappointment because it lost OD traffic despite increasing
frequency from five to six departures by the third quarter of 1987. Passenger response
increased marginally in 1988 as Continental continued to boost frequency by one
departure per day and increase fares.
However, Continental, already enjoying a monopoly, ventured in the HOU-EWR
market in the fourth quarter of 1988, with some signs of success since immediate
stimulation of OD traffic was observed even though it offered just two departures per
day (compared to six in the main IAH-EWR market) and a similar fare to that in the
IAH-EWR market. Nevertheless, despite a steady stream of patronage, Continental
discontinued the service after just over two years. The visible divergence of the OD
traffic curves (Figure 6.341) seemed to indicate that the new service did not take away
traffic from the larger IAH-EWR market, particularly when Continental added yet
another departure in this established market. The growth in OD traffic beyond the
second quarter of 1991 could perhaps be attributed to a normal increase in demand for
travel as opposed to a switch-over from the HOU-EWR market.
Airlines' Response To Challengers
Continental's aggressive entry in the IAH-EWR market may have prompted both
the Eastern and People's Expresses' departure from the respective markets of IAH-EWR
HOU-EWR. While it may be a coincidence that both incumbents left around the same
time, it was clear that Eastern, a decidedly small player in the IAH-EWR market,
retreated almost immediately after Continental's entry. OD passengers did not show a
strong preference for Eastern even though it offered a lower fare than Continental in the
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same market because Eastern could only offer one nonstop departure per day while
Continental, four or five. Yet, Eastern was saved by its ability to consistently attract
close to 30,000 non-OD passengers per quarter, thereby allowing it to attain load factors
that fluctuated between 50% and 80%. However, People's Express took its toil when it
reduced frequency at the same time Continental was building its presence, so much so
that by the time both carriers in the different parallel markets offered the same number
of departures, People's Express' service to and from HOU became less appealing to OD
passengers. With the questionable non-OD traffic data for People's Express, one may
only conclude, by examining the average load factors, that People's Express did fill its
planes reasonably well since load factors seemed to be averaging 60%.
In short, Continental's success in the IAH-EWR market is largely attributed to its
determination to be the major player in the IAH-EWR market, particularly when it had a
vested interest in its two hubs at IAH and EWR, and that with the exit of Eastern and
People's Express in the first quarter of 1987, it became the only airline offering frequent
nonstop service between the two airports until the third quarter of 1988. Indeed, despite
steadily increasing frequency over the years and contending with only a moderate
growth in OD traffic, Continental was consistently able to maintain average load factors
that were in the vicinity of 70% since it lured an increasingly large number of non-OD
traffic as well. In fact, non-OD traffic grew from a few thousands per quarter in 1984 to
just over 100,000 per quarter by 1993, a phenomenal growth which can only be possible
because of its strong hub network at both IAH and EWR. Clearly, as it devoted less
attention and resources to its service between HOU and EWR, and because it did not
have a strong hub at HOU, Continental could only attain average load factors between
40% and 60% in the smaller HOU-EWR market. Since non-OD traffic did not exceed the
OD traffic in the HOU-EWR market, Continental may have finally decided to abandon
the HOU-EWR market because both OD and non-OD passengers were not responding
as favorably to its offer of flights to and from a more accessible airport at a lower
frequency.
Concluding Remarks
A glance at Figure 6.346 reveals that total OD traffic in the Houston-Newark
market as a whole declined precipitously with the exit of People's Express' service
between HOU-EWR. While a cross-check with the average fare profile (Figure 6.342)
may lead one to infer that the stimulative effects of the low fare came to an abrupt end
with the exit of People's Express, one should also hesitate making any specific
conclusions because data for People's Express may be flawed. Nevertheless,
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Continental's self-challenge in the HOU-EWR market did, at least initially, stimulate
travel since Figure 6.346 indicates that there was a sudden jump in OD traffic in the
fourth quarter of 1988. However, one could postulate that the stagnant OD traffic
figures in the Houston-Newark market after 1988 could be explained by the more than
doubling of fares from $100 to $250 after the exit of low-fare carrier, People's Express,
at the end of 1986. With high fares, efforts to stimulate air travel between the two cities
that are 1,422 miles apart could well be thwarted.
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Figure 6.341 Houston-Newark: Smoothed Quarterly OD Traffic
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Figure 6.343 Houston-Newark: Average Number Of Departures Per Day Each Way
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Figure 6.344 Houston-Newark: Smoothed Quarterly Non-OD Traffic
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Figure 6.345 Houston-Newark: Average Quarterly Load Factor (%)
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Figure 6.346 Houston-Newark: Smoothed Quarterly Total Airport-To-Airport OD Traffic
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6.41 Chicago-Detroit (MDW/ORD-DET/DTW, Distance = 238 miles)
Preliminary Remarks
The Chicago-Detroit market is characterized by both a large volume of OD traffic
as well as intense rivalry. A total of seven airlines plied the three parallel markets of
MDW-DET, MDW-DTW, and ORD-DTW. Further, given that there were six challenges
and different market leaders within a span of just 10 years, one could use the busy
Chicago-Detroit market as an excellent example for analyzing the nature of competition
between airlines operating between two multiple airport cities. The erratic total OD
figures - the total OD traffic surged between 1987 and 1990 but declined thereafter -
provide some insight to the dynamic nature of the way air travelers respond to the
myriad of air services available between the two cities that are actually within driving
distance.
Passengers' Response To Challengers
Prior to Republic's entry in the already heavily contested ORD-DTW market in
the fourth quarter of 1984, passengers were already showing a distinct preference for
Midway's service between MDW and DTW over United, American and Northwest's
service between ORD and DTW. Although Midway offered only two departures per
day, American and United five and six respectively, and Northwest, only one or two,
Midway may have had a fare advantage over its rivals at ORD (Figure 6.412), on top of
offering a service to and from the more accessible airport of MDW. The entry of Republic
in the fourth quarter of 1984 did pose a threat to the incumbents in the ORD-DTW
market (United, American, and Northwest) because although Republic matched United
and American's higher fares, it was able to secure an increasing number of OD
passengers by boosting the number of departures from five to eleven per day by the
fourth quarter after its entry. With its superior, unmatched frequency of 11 departures a
day - United and American only offered six, and Northwest three - Republic did lure up
to 60,000 passengers during the last quarter of its operations in the ORD-DTW market,
this figure being twice of what American and United captured in that same quarter.
Patronage of Midway's service between MDW and DTW was not adversely affected
during Republic's reign, particularly when Midway increased the number of departures
to seven after Republic's entry.
The entry of Jet America in the ORD-DTW market the quarter after Republic's
entry was a successful venture in that by matching Northwest's frequency and offering
the lowest fare in the entire market, Jet America lured its sizable share of passengers
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once it established itself in the market (Figure 6.411) and announced to the traveling
public that it was a cheaper alternative to United, American and Northwest. As though
the markets were independent, OD traffic in the MDW-DTW market was barely
affected by the challenge initiated by Republic and Jet America. However, between the
second quarter of 1986 and the second quarter of 1987, Northwest, which had taken
over Republic's operations and offered 10 to 12 flights per day, achieved a huge increase
in OD traffic in its services between ORD and DTW at the expense of Midway's service
between MDW and DTW. Northwest's sudden act of aggression did not seem to greatly
affect United and American, both of which merely maintained their six and five
departures respectively during the year. However, Jet America, despite offering the
lowest fares, had become a less attractive alternative for passengers, particularly when
it continued to offer only two departures per day. Apart from boosting frequency in the
ORD-DTW market, Northwest, in the second quarter of 1986, also initiated service
between MDW and DTW, thereby breaking the monopoly that Midway enjoyed for a
few years. Yet, Northwest's half-hearted enroachment of Midway's territory with just
two or four flights per day was quite remarkable since the service attracted just as many
OD passengers as its other service between ORD and DTW. However, since the larger
number of departures to and from ORD lured the crowds, Northwest suspended service
between MDW and DTW at the end of 1986, after just three quarters of operations in
that market.
Captivated by Midway's success in the MDW-DTW market - Midway had been
the leader in OD market share since 1984 - Southwest challenged Midway in the second
quarter of 1987 by offering a fare that was $30 lower than Midway's and matching
Midway's frequency of 11 departures per day each way. Although Jet America left the
ORD-DTW market the quarter after Southwest's entry, all remaining carriers had,
without exception, achieved significant increases in OD traffic. A highly probable reason
for the incentive to fly is that Southwest led the way in determining the market's fare of
$40, a fare which all carriers matched by the first quarter of 1988. Thus, regardless of
frequency and accessibility concerns, every airline operating between Chicago and
Detroit benefited from Southwest's entry. Specifically, the sharpest gains in OD traffic
were found in the MDW-DTW market, whereby the OD traffic curves for Midway and
Southwest moved in tandem between the second quarter of 1987 and the fourth quarter
of 1988. United, even without having to boost frequency, attracted a large pool of
passengers as well (Figure 6.411).
Prompted by its success in the MDW-DTW market, Southwest created yet
another demand for travel by initiating service between the two downtown-airports of
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MDW and DET, a service which immediately attracted about 75,000 passengers in the
first quarter of operations (Figure 6.411). An almost immediate switch in preference was
observed as Southwest' s MDW-DTW service gradually lost its appeal because the
MDW-DET service continued to attract about 80,000 passengers per quarter even
though Southwest offered two departures fewer in the MDW-DET market than in the
MDW-DTW market. While Southwest's creation of the new market did not adversely
affect Northwest, United and American's service in the ORD-DTW market, Midway
might not have been spared because it lost just over 1,000 OD passengers the moment
Southwest inaugurated service between MDW and DET. In fact, Midway continued to
suffer slight losses over the ensuing quarters until its exit at the end of 1991.
Northwest's re-entry in the MDW-DTW market in the second quarter of 1989
with three departures per day was more successful than before; it secured a reasonable
share of OD passengers even though it had to contend with two other more aggressive
rivals in the same market - Southwest and Midway - both of which offered more
departures per day. A slight decline in OD traffic was observed when Northwest
reduced frequency in the ORD-DTW market by two departures in early 1990. However,
after Midway's exit at the end of 1991, all carriers, except American and United,
achieved significant gains in OD traffic. Specifically, Northwest's gain in OD traffic in
the MDW-DTW market could, in part, be attributed to its decision to increase frequency
to six departures per day to match Southwest. Given that United, American, Northwest
(MDW-DTW) and Southwest (MDW-DTW) were essentially offering the same number
of departures per day (five or six) and fares, and that United and American were losing
OD traffic while Southwest and Northwest were gaining OD traffic, one could speculate
that accessibility was a contributing reason for the disparity in OD traffic share.
Northwest's service between ORD and DTW was not affected since it was clearly saved
by the highest frequency in that market. Southwest's service between MDW and DET
was just as popular, not only because passengers could choose from seven departures
per day, but perhaps the MDW-DET service was a very enticing alternative for certain
residents of the Detroit metropolitan area. In short, passengers were choosing on the
basis of frequency and accessibility when considering air travel between Chicago and
Detroit.
Airlines' Response To Challengers
The cluttered chart showing the number of departures per day (Figure 6.413)
gives the impression that competition in the Chicago-Detroit market was intense. In
reality, some airlines did respond quickly to the changing environment while others did
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not. For example, American, United and Jet America were passive players since they
barely altered their frequency of service radically despite the entry of challengers in the
same or parallel markets. United and American, both of which had hubs at ORD, did
not have to worry too much about their share of OD traffic because they were both
leaders in non-OD traffic, which therefore allowed them to maintain relatively high load
factors that averaged around 60%. Then, for being a minor player who tried to survive
by offering the lowest fare, Jet America, which secured comparatively fewer non-OD
passengers than OD passengers, merely achieved average load factors that fluctuated
between the upper 30s and the 50s.
Of the remaining active participants in the market - Midway, Republic (later
Northwest), Northwest, and Southwest - Northwest, which had a hub at DTW,
followed by Southwest, were perhaps the most aggressive in fighting for their share in
the Chicago-Detroit market because these two carriers had offered service in two
parallel markets. Midway, which before 1989, secured the largest share of OD traffic in
the Chicago-Detroit market by offering service between MDW and DTW, captured a
pool of non-OD traffic that was only a quarter of the size of the OD traffic. Given the
small number of spokes emanating from its hub at MDW, Midway, with its mix of OD
and non-OD passengers, was still well able to achieve load factors that averaged
around the mid-50s prior to 1988 and just above 60% thereafter (despite the fact that it
had altered frequency on several occasions). Although Midway's success in the MDW-
DTW attracted the attention of Northwest and Southwest, Southwest posed a genuine
threat to Midway because Southwest entered the market with a lower fare and matched
Midway's frequency immediately. While Midway clung to its title as the champion of the
MDW-DTW market in terms of OD traffic throughout the years it offered the service,
one could say that Southwest and Northwest both had to divide their attention between
two markets since they both gave passengers a choice of airports at either Chicago or
Detroit. While Northwest's service between ORD and DTW was less successful before
1987 in that OD traffic was only just as large as the non-OD traffic, and that average
load factors were generally low (averaging 40%), the acquisition of Republic and the
significant boost in frequency in late 1986 did bring about sharp increases mi both OD
and non-OD traffic. In fact, in the post 1988 years, OD traffic continued to increase
while non-OD traffic stagnated, but Northwest's services became highly viable since
average load factors were then consistently in excess of 60%. By devoting fewer
resources to its service between MDW and DTW, Northwest realized that its first
challenge in 1986 was a failure because it had to contend with load factors that were
appallingly low (30%). This may have influenced Northwest's decision to withdraw
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service between MDW and DTW. However, the resumption of the service in 1989, with
the same number of departures, did attract more OD and non-GD passengers, and
average load factors were off with a moderately cheerful start (the mid-40s). With the
exit of Midway, which resulted in an increase in OD traffic for Northwest, Northwest
did not have to question the viability of the service between MDW and DTW since
average load factors jumped by 10% despite a doubling of the frequency from three to
six departures.
Southwest's service had rather mixed results in that, although it offered a fairly
large number of departures per day - typically eight or nine (Figure 6.413) - compared to
its rivals, it was never the leader in OD or non-OD market share. However, even though
it did not have as established a hub as United or Northwest at either Chicago or Detroit,
Southwest managed to capture more non-OD traffic than Northwest. Yet, with so many
flights per day, Southwest achieved a 'U'-shaped average load factor profile for the
MDW-DTW market (Figure 6.415) because of the sharp decline in OD traffic after it
challenged itself by offering service between MDW and DET. Indeed, average load
factors plunged from the 60s to as low as the 30s, but with the exit of Midway, the
service between MDW and DTW became viable again because load factors soared to
around 70% by mid-1993. Southwest's monopoly service between MDW and DET
attracted significantly more OD than non-OD traffic, but for the frequency it was
offering, average load factors were dismal (low 40s). Signs of improvement were later
seen when non-OD traffic gained momentum and that the service became quite popular
after Midway's exit; a jump of 20% in average load factors was perhaps most
encouraging for Southwest as it continued to offer services between MDW and DET.
Concluding Remarks
All in all, one could infer, from the huge hump in Figure 6.416, that stimulation in
OD traffic is associated with the entry of Southwest, the airline which brought low fares
into the Chicago-Detroit market. However, low fares aside, the cross-overs in the total
OD curves in Figure 6.416 provide evidence that competition between the airports was
evident, and that the way the airlines served the multiple airport cities did influence air
travelers' choice of airports. Clearly, passengers displayed a propensity to go to airports
that offered the most number of departures, particularly for flights of such a short
duration. The differences in frequency in each parallel market do reflect the way airlines
allocated their resources. In any case, in terms of the size of OD traffic, the ORD-DTW
market was the largest while MDW-DET, the smallest.
176
Figure 6.413 Chicago-Detroit: Average Number Of Departures Per Day Each Way
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Figure 6.414 Chicago-Detroit: Smoothed Quarterly Non-OD Traffic
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Figure 6.416 Chicago-Detroit: Smoothed Quarterly Total Airport-To-Airport OD Traffic
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6.42 Scenario 4: Houston-Dallas (HOU/IAH-DAL/DFW, Distance = 232 miles)
Preliminary Remarks
Compared to the Chicago-Detroit market, the Houston-Dallas market seems
lackluster in spite of the fact that there are actually four parallel markets and five
airlines offering services between Houston and Dallas. Continental was the only
challenger, but its entry did not provoke the incumbents, all of which seemed wholly
complacent with their own niche. However, in analyzing competition in the Houston-
Dallas market, one inevitably has to give much attention to Southwest because
Southwest was responsible for providing service in the most popular market: the HOU-
DAL market. Like the previous case, Houston and Dallas host airports that are hubs for
some carriers: DFW is American's hub, and to a lesser extent, Delta's (compare this with
United and American in ORD); IAH is Continental's hub (compare this with
Northwest's hub at DTW); and Southwest has a major presence in DAL and HOU.
However, one can see, from Figure 6.421, that, unlike the Chicago-Detroit market,
competition in the Houston-Dallas market may have already subsided.
Passengers' Response To Challengers
Prior to the entry of Continental in the IAH-DFW market in the third quarter of
1984, the majority of air travelers, faced with similar fares, were choosing to fly between
the two more accessible airports of HOU and DAL. The unusual observation is that
despite a difference of 10 departures per day, passengers were essentially indifferent
between Muse Air and Southwest when flying between HOU and DAL. Indeed, with the
exception of Muse Air, which was eventually acquired by Southwest in June 1985 [52],
none of the competitors in the other airport-pair markets came close to Southwest in
terms of volume of OD traffic. Even Southwest's offer of seven departures per day each
way between IAH and DAL was significantly less attractive (Figure 6.421).
Southwest's direct competitor in the well-guarded HOU-DAL market in the early
80s was Muse Air, an airline founded in 1981 by Lamar and his son, Michael Muse, both
of whom left Southwest in 1978. By setting up their own airline, they aimed to break
Southwest's monopoly on the HOU-DAL route, but was "never really successful in doing
so in the end." [52] Besides finally breaking the lucrative monopoly that Southwest
enjoyed, Muse Air reasoned that since the Houston-Dallas market was huge and fast-
growing, there should be room for two airlines with two different types of service and
fare structures, particularly because load factors on Southwest's flights were typically
high. Thus, Muse Air started by offering a "quality product" [53] to distinguish itself
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from Southwest. Specifically, Muse Air offered non-smoking flights and assigned
seating. In fact, since each flight must be 80% full before any one passenger must take the
center-seat, Muse Air's policy was that those passengers who were required to take the
center-seats were consoled with a free bottle of champagne [54]. Further, unlike
Southwest, which enforced a quick 10-minute turnaround for its planes, Muse Air
scheduled its planes for a longer turnaround so that passengers could settle in their seats
comfortably before the plane pushed-back. Yet, by the 90s, a time when Muse Air was
already fully absorbed by Southwest, Southwest did not really have to worry about
price retaliation from its competitors because of its distinctly superior frequency
advantage. Nevertheless, with the gradual reduction in frequency, Muse Air's service
became increasingly less appealing to OD passengers as Muse Air entered its phase of
withdrawal. However, as though it wanted to compensate for the loss of service
between HOU and DAL as a result of Muse Air's exit, Southwest' s strategy of boosting
the number of departures from 21 to 30 in the last two quarters before Muse Air's exit
paid-off handsomely because passengers responded favorably as can be seen by the
sharp increase in OD traffic from 200,000 in the second quarter of 1987 to just over
300,000 passengers in the second quarter of 1990.
The entry of Continental in the IAH-DFW market did little to annoy the other
four incumbents, all of which more or less occupied their own niche. Within the IAH-
DFW market alone, one notices that American, which maintained its frequency of eight
departures per day until the second quarter of 1986, was already carrying more then
twice the number of OD passengers as Continental even though Continental, which
launched the service with only five departures per day, eventually matched American's
frequency by the third quarter of 1985. By adding one more departure in the third
quarter of 1986, and two departures two years later, American was able to lure an
increasing pool of OD passengers within these two years. An interesting observation is
that while American's other service between HOU and DFW was very unpopular during
the earlier quarters despite its efforts at equalizing the frequency in both markets,
passengers were observed to be switching-over to the HOU-DFW services beginning in
mid-1988, so much so that by the second quarter of 1989, passengers were practically
indifferent between either service. In fact, after the second quarter of 1989, passengers
preferred the service between HOU and DFW even though there was one departure less
in this market. With American offering similar fares in both markets, passenger were
most likely choosing on the basis of accessibility. In the IAH-DFW market alone, only
Continental came close to American in terms of market share when Continental matched
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American's frequency in 1990; otherwise, Continental, which offered one or two
departures less than American, was the less preferred alternative.
Continental's other rival in the IAH-DFW market was Delta, an airline that, in
most quarters, offered one departure less than Continental, but secured more passengers
than Continental until the first quarter of 1988, after which a clear reversal of preference
was observed. By competing with itself, Delta's service between HOU and DFW
attracted fewer passengers when it offered two or three departures fewer than that
between IAH and DFW. However, passenger preference for the HOU-DFW services was
enhanced even though Delta had equalized the frequency in both market only between
the second quarter of 1988 and the first quarter of 1989. Thus, like the OD traffic curves
for American, the intersections of the OD traffic curves for the two parallel markets of
HOU-DFW and IAH-DFW for Delta indicate that passengers are sensitive to the
frequency of service.
Finally, the fact that Southwest reduced the number of departures from seven to
five in the monopoly market of IAH-DAL but continued to attract a stable share of OD
traffic perhaps indicates that passengers' preference for this service was quite
independent of available alternatives. In particular, as this pool of passengers did not
even consider the thirty departures per day between HOU and DAL as substitutes, one
could say that the IAH-DAL service may appeal to a specific group of travelers who
insist on using these two airports for one reason or another.
Airlines' Response To Challengers
As mentioned earlier, the Houston-Dallas market lacks the level of activity as
observed in the Chicago-Detroit market. However, the average load factors (Figure
6.425), which range between 40% and 80%, indicate that the airlines may have made
reasonable decisions with regard to the supply of services in each of the four parallel
markets. Further, the fact that the airlines in the Houston-Dallas market had hubs at one
of the four airports means that a certain level of support is provided by the presence of
a pool of non-OD traffic. For example, Southwest, which has sizable operations at DAL
and HOU, captured, almost in all quarters, the largest number of non-OD passengers -
in the vicinity of 150,000 passengers per quarter. Most impressive of all, Southwest was
consistently able to achieve average load factors that were in the 60s with its supply of
between 21 and 30 departures per day each way. On the other hand, Muse Air,
Southwest's direct competitor in the HOU-DAL market that offered 15 or fewer
departures and had a smaller pool of non-OD passengers because of its weaker route
network, had to contend with ailing average load factors that barely exceeded 60%.
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However, given that Southwest does not have extensive operations at IAH and that it
offered significantly fewer departures - between five and nine per day - in the IAH-DAL
market, Southwest could only sustain average load factors between 40% and 60% in the
smaller IAH-DAL market.
American, which offered about four departures more than Delta in both IAH-
DFW and HOU-DFW markets, and had a stronger hub at DFW than Delta, consistently
captured more non-OD traffic than Delta. In fact, since Figure 6.244 reveals that
American was better able to tap the non-OD traffic than the OD traffic, one may
conclude that it did not have to match Southwest's high frequency service between DAL
and HOU, a service which primarily aimed at the OD travelers. With the immense
support of the non-OD traffic, American's service between HOU and DFW enjoyed
excellent average load factors that were as high as the 70s before 1988 and at least 60%
then after. Even with more departures, American's service between IAH and DFW,
which did not seem quite a popular as the service between HOU and DFW until after
1988, could only boast of an average load factor that was mainly in the 50s most of the
time.
By offering two or three more departures in the IAH-DFW market, Delta's service
between IAH and DFW did capture more non-OD passengers than the services between
HOU and DFW, but average load factors in the IAH-DFW were generally a few
percentage points lower than those for the HOU-DFW market. However, relative to
American, Delta was, on the whole, less successful whether measured in terms of OD
traffic, non-OD traffic, or average load factors. Yet, Delta saw justification for
maintaining its service between the two cities even though load factors fluctuated
between 40% and 60%, perhaps because Houston was still an important spoke
emanating from its hub at DFW.
Lastly, Continental's challenge in the IAH-DFW market was considered
successful in that by exploiting its very southerly hub at IAH, it was well able to capture
a large pool of non-OD traffic that was usually at least thrice the size of its OD traffic.
With average load factors that were typically in the mid-50s, Continental could say that
its service between IAH and DFW was viable. In fact, Continental achieved about the
same average load factors as American, and consistently higher average load factors
than Delta in the same IAH-DFW market. The obvious difference, though, is that
Continental did not offer its passengers a choice of airports in the Houston area,
whereas American and Delta were able to do so.
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Concluding Remarks
With the exception of the HOU-DFW market, one can see, from Figure 6.246,
that total OD traffic was generally quite stable over the years examined. It is clear that
OD traffic was primarily between HOU and DAL, with IAH-DFW being the runner-up.
Initially, total OD traffic in the IAH-DAL market was larger than that in the IAH-DFW
market even though total frequency in the IAH-DFW exceeded that in the IAH-DAL
market. (Given that the total onboard passengers carried by Delta did not exceed
40,000, one can safely assume that OD traffic would be less than 40,000, and hence, the
total OD-traffic in the HOU-DFW would not exceed that in the IAH-DAL market in the
years prior to 1987.) Nevertheless, things took a different turn when Southwest reduced
services between IAH and DAL in the first quarter of 1988, and that Muse Air left the
market, since from then, service between HOU-DFW became increasingly popular such
that by the first quarter of 1989, the total OD traffic between HOU and DFW finally
surpassed that between IAH and DAL. However, one may conclude with some
confidence that frequency and accessibility are the major determinants of the
distribution of OD-traffic between the airport-pairs in the Houston-Dallas market.
Specifically, after the fourth quarter of 1988, the magnitude of the OD-traffic was
proportional to the frequency offered between the respective airport-pairs.
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Figure 6.421 Houston-Dallas: Smoothed Quarterly OD Traffic
350,000 -
300,000 -
250,000
200,000
150,000
100,000
50,000 -
0
cf) - CY) 1- CY) - Cr) ~- CY) '- Cr) T- CIF) T- CV) '- CV) T
LC) LO CD C( 00 00 - o O O T- - C\ C\ Cf)
S 00 0 00 00 00 00 00 00 CCO 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0)
Figure 6.422 Houston-Dallas: Average One-Way Fare ($)
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Figure 6.423 Houston-Dallas: Average Number Of Departures Per Day Each Way
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Figure 6.424 Houston-Dallas: Smoothed Quarterly Non-OD Traffic
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Figure 6.425 Houston-Dallas: Average Quarterly Load Factor (%)
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Figure 6.426 Houston-Dallas: Smoothed Quarterly Total Airport-To-Airport OD Traffic
600,000
500,000 -
400,000 TOTAL
-l -HOU-DAL
300,000 - HOU-DFW
--- IAH-DAL
200,000 -A- IAH-DFW
100,000 A
L0 LO CO 11, 0 C 0)0 O - - C\I C\[ CO0 00 CO CO C 00 CO CO CO CO CO C ) 0)0)0)0)0)0)
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
7.1 Summary Of Findings
The author had embarked on this research project with the intention of exploring
the dynamics of airline competition in a multiple airport environment in the hope that
the results would provide some guidance for those involved in the planning of multiple
airport systems in a deregulated airline environment. Although it may be premature to
put concrete recommendations at this point, one may still consider the following
observations that were made based on the anecdotal analysis of the 14 selected city-
pairs:
- The competitive behavior of airlines in a multiple airport system does not exhibit a
distinctly discernible trend; the complete pattern of service offered by a particular
competitor in the multiple airport system and this competitor's strategy strongly
determine the overall competitive situation that an airline is in. Additionally, the
competitive situation varies over time as the competitive environment changes.
Evidently, a challenge initiated by another airline, for whatever reason arising within
the airline's current efforts to market its services, elicits a variety of responses and it
is the disparity in the level of air service, particularly in terms of frequency, that
influences the distribution of passenger traffic amongst the multiple airports.
* Origin-destination (OD) passengers in a given market seem to be attracted by the
frequency of service offered by an airline at a particular airport in the multiple
airport system, particularly when there is a tendency for airlines to match fares.
Thus, for the same fare, accessibility may not be as critical a factor for the OD
passenger for the likely reason that a high frequency of service to and from an airport
in the multiple airport region would mask the costs associated with accessibility.
e The importance of non-OD traffic for a given market surfaced in all four competitive
scenarios. One could confidently infer that the size of the non-OD traffic seems to
justify the maintenance of the air service, particularly when the size of the OD traffic
is comparatively smaller. More specifically, the existence of a hub at one of the
airports in the system perpetuates competition between the airlines even if the local
OD market is well served by a new challenger at one of the other airports in the
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multiple airport system. Indeed, the airline that establishes a hub would generally
offer a high frequency of service between the hub and the spokes, an operational
feature that provides both the convenient connections for non-OD passengers as well
as a wide choice of departures for the local OD passengers.
* Airlines were observed to provide parallel services to and from airports in the
multiple airport system in competition with themselves for extended periods, but
such airlines eventually rationalize their parallel services in favor of the dominant
airport because of competitive pressures brought about by other airlines serving the
dominant airport.
* The four competitive scenarios examined involve secondary airports that offer more
convenient access to a large proportion of OD passengers, and these secondary
airports have maintained air service over the past 15 years despite changes in the
pattern of service, the entry and exit of airlines, and the level of intensity of the
competition. However, while such secondary airports continue to offer opportunities
for new services that challenge existing services at the dominant airport, it is not
clear whether service to a less accessible secondary airport will be viable.
- The shortage of runway capacity, slots, and gates at the major congested airport of
the multiple airport system may cause a diversion of service to secondary airports
within the multiple airport system. The secondary airport, though functioning as a
'reliever airport', could mean new business opportunities for the airline, thereby
giving the airline a chance to capture a larger share of the total OD traffic into and
out of the metropolitan region as a whole. In duplicating the service at the secondary
airport, the airline would then have to compete with itself.
e The introduction of a new service at the secondary airport often stimulates new OD
air travel even after the disappearance of low introductory fares. A possible reason
is that if the new service cannot match the frequency at the dominant airport, then
the other competitive variable that can make the difference in the minds of air
travelers is fares. Once air travelers respond to the new service and a sizable pool of
passengers has been captured, the airline may then offer higher fares and frequency
to better compete with airlines at the dominant airport.
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The above findings provide support for the complex, interdependent relationship
between airlines, airports and air travelers that was proposed in Chapter 1.
Nevertheless, to arrive at an effective plan for any multiple airport system, one must
grasp the dynamics of the competition between airlines, then integrate the ideas with
what is known about passenger choice and airport accessibility. Given that airlines
respond competitively in a myriad of ways, airport planners should be fully cognizant
of the fact that an airline may not promise long-term commitments on airport facilities.
In fact, a startling observation is that airlines seem to have little interest in helping an
airport grow; they are more pre-occupied with ousting competitors so that they can
selfishly dominate an airport, failing which the airlines would just abandon the airport.
However, it would be reasonable to say that modeling the competitive behavior of
airlines would be a difficult task to accomplish because of the ever-changing ensemble of
interdependent factors.
7.2 Some Implications Of The Research
The preliminary investigation of the competitive behavior of airlines in selected
dual multiple airport systems has revealed some unexpected results that should be
expounded upon as an attempt to incite further research efforts. The first implication
deals with the stimulative effects of the entry of low-fare airlines and their impact on
competition and fares in the market. The second implication is a general discussion
about the usefulness of the observations in helping airport planners better understand
how airlines use airports.
7.21 The Effect Of Low-Fare Entrants At Multiple Airport Systems
The importance of traffic stimulation at multiple airport systems, as brought
about by the presence of low-fare carriers such as Southwest Airlines and Midway
Airlines should not be overlooked. This observation is not entirely new in that de
Neufville had once recognized that secondary airports within multiple airport systems
may be viable if they are niche-players in the competitive game [11]. Thus, one should
not be surprised to learn that Midway and Hobby Airports, though overshadowed by
the main airports of O'Hare and Intercontinental respectively, do capture a certain share
of the overall market so long as some niche-carriers are willing to invest in resources to
set-up operations at such secondary airports. Yet, the whole idea of traffic stimulation
in multiple airport systems seems to violate the usual notion that the total market size
for a given urban area is fixed, and that in accordance with the economic concept of the
zero-sum-game [55], each additional division of the pie would only create a smaller
196
piece of the pie for each additional participant in the game. Nevertheless, evidence of
traffic stimulation at multiple airport systems may give airport planners and airline
managers a reason to exploit untapped opportunities; the airport planners may consider
building additional airports within a large metropolitan area in order to relieve
congestion at the established airports or even encourage the use of under-utilized
airports in the vicinity, while airline managers may seize the opportunity to develop a
differentiated air service at such secondary airports. '
To this end, Southwest Airlines may be cited as a fervent pursuer of less
congested airports in large urban areas that have sizable origin-destination traffic, this
being one of the elements of its strategy for success. In particular, Southwest firmly
believes that secondary airports are conducive for its high-frequency, quick-turnaround
operations, whereby busy slot-controlled airports would only thwart its efforts to
expand to satisfy the typically well-stimulated demand [56]. For example, in the
California-corridor service, where Southwest has been very successful with its services to
the airports of San Jose, Oakland, Burbank, and Orange County, passenger growth rates
in the Los Angeles-San Francisco market have exceeded 200%, with Southwest
dominating the corridor market [57]. Yet, Southwest cautions that it does not pursue
growth for the sake of growth, as can be seen by its avoidance of major hubs in favor of
close-in airports such as Hobby, Detroit City, Midway, and Love Field. Instead, Herbert
Kelleher, Chief Executive Officer of Southwest, believes that mass does not always mean
profitability, but Southwest's "critical mass is our presence on each route." [56]
Upholding its strategy year after year, Southwest has aggressively further developed its
network to cover the Pacific Northwest (with the acquisition of Salt Lake City-based
low-fare carrier, Morris Air Corp.) and the Midwest, and most recently, the network has
spread as far east as Baltimore, Maryland. Regardless, given its consistent stream of
profits over the years, Southwest sees every reason to abide by its principle that markets
can be grown by pricing air service low enough to entice people out of their automobiles,
and only using less congested airports.
Southwest's strategy did attract the attention of Irving Tague, a former Hughes
Airwest executive who founded Midway Airlines in 1976 [58]. Tague aspired to
accomplish at Midway Airport what Southwest had done at Love Field. However, quite
unlike Southwest, Midway Airlines was not as consistent with its product orientation.
Specifically, Midway launched no-frills service in 1979, but by 1983, in order to avoid a
costly fare war with the majors, it had decided to skim-off a segment of the passengers
by being a business class airline, offering four-abreast seating and special amenities [59].
Then, by 1987, Midway had changed its mission to provide "a good service for a
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reasonable price" [58] in that except for first class and hot meals, Midway offered all
the amenities associated with a full-service airline such as assigned seating and
interlining. Midway's success in the mid-80s did, however, attract competitors to its hub
at Midway Airport: Southwest, Continental, Northwest, America West, United Airlines,
and Midstates. Nevertheless, Midway welcomed competition because competition
added traffic and prestige to the airport. In any case, it reasoned that it could well
defend its turf since it had secured long-term leases on about 70% of Midway Airport's
limited facilities. Also, having captured 80% of the traffic at Midway by 1987, Midway
was confident that there would not be sufficient room for another airline to operate a
hub like its own at Midway Airport. However, by flirting with various strategies and
other reasons, Midway folded at the end of 1991, while Southwest continues to parade
its seemingly endless stream of profits even until today. Although Midway managed to
secure a fraction of the total traffic at Chicago, it was not as aggressive as Southwest in
that it never dominated any Chicago market.
One might well wonder, now that stimulation of OD traffic has been observed in
many of the markets analyzed, if air travelers have reaped benefits from the offer of a
different service at a different airport within the multiple airport system. If one can agree
that the entry of Southwest and Midway has brought about a general lowering of fares
and an additional choice of air service into and out of the urban area, then the
consumers have indeed gained from the competitive games played by the airlines at
multiple airport systems. The other question is: if the air travelers are paying lower fares,
are the airlines then providing commercially viable service? In short, one would hope
that the increase in traffic would more than compensate for the lowering of the fares so
that an overall increase in revenue is recorded. Yet, to determine the profitability of a
flight leg is perhaps elusive for an airline that has a network. Without detailed
information and statistics, the author may not adequately address whether the airlines
have reaped benefits from their operations at multiple airports. However, since the
anecdotal analysis reveals that airlines continue to offer services even though the pool of
OD traffic is smaller than that of the non-OD traffic, one may conclude that the non-OD
traffic plays a significant role in determining the viability of the service, however the
term "viability" may be defined. The fact that recent statistics reveal that low-fare
carriers' share of US Available Seat Miles in markets under 1,200 miles is now 12.7% or
double that of 5.7% in 1992 [60] may indicate that the power of low-fare entrants
should not be underestimated. In addition, other analysts who have closely studied the
trends in air fares for a representative number of O'Hare city-pair markets have claimed
that the low fares at Midway have "spilled over" to prices at O'Hare [61], and that this
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encouraging trend implies that airlines are now aware that business passengers and their
companies are taking advantage of lower fares as well. In response to the shift, affected
US majors have responded by reducing some fares and keeping others unchanged in
order to remain competitive.
7.22 Addressing Risks In Airport Planning
Inevitably, the activities of low-fare carriers, which are usually associated with
sudden increases in traffic at an airport, do raise concern amongst airport planners. John
J. Smith [62], a former economist with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
dwells on the idea that the maturity of the US domestic travel market and the fierce
competition in specific parts of the market jointly create uncertainty in airport planning.
Indeed, given the official FAA forecast of US domestic passenger traffic in Revenue
Passenger Miles of an annual rate of only 3.7% through 2005 [62], which is lackluster
compared to the double-digit growth in earlier years, airport planners may have to
contend with slower growth and hence a possible adverse impact on airport finances.
However, Smith believes the real uncertainty lies in the ability of these short-haul, low-
fare services to generate substantial increases in enplanements at certain airports. The
apparent contrary expectations of a mature air travel industry could confound airport
planners as to how much to invest in the expansion of facilities to embrace the sudden
growth, and whether the investment will pay-off in the long-run, especially if the success
of the airport is tied in some way to the success of the airline's operations at that
airport. Given that Southwest has been highly successful in the airports that it had
served, one would hope that the possible success of major carriers which are now
adopting a variant of the model (namely, United, USAir and Continental) should bring
good news to airports who may be keen to host such airlines. A subtle point to recognize
is that Southwest's strategy seems to work well in uncongested fair-weather airports; the
direct transferability of the model to congested airports could be questionable. While
Southwest has clearly avoided the slot-controlled airports of LaGuardia, John F.
Kennedy, Washington-National, and O'Hare, it has ventured to the secondary airports
of Baltimore-Washington and Midway. In particular, Baltimore-Washington
International, which had little low-fare service before the fall of 1993, had experienced a
significant growth in traffic of 48% from May 1993 to May 1994 [62]. Part of the growth
is attributed to Southwest, USAir and Continental's offer of low fares, which has
stimulated local traffic, while the other contributor is the diversion of traffic from nearby
Washington.
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Although Moody's Investors Services [62] published an analysis in April 1994
stating that airport and airline credit quality ratings may not be linked, others believe
that an airline's economic and financial status is of concern to airport planners in that an
airline's potential for success or failure does become part of the overall risk assessment
and financial planning processes that airports conduct. Even under the current
deregulated regime, one could say that certain airports have a better chance of winning
than others. Smith mentions that winners are airports that host strong carriers that fly
substantial origin-destination traffic, or those that have grown as a result of stable low-
fare services. On the other hand, potential losers could be airports which host high levels
of connecting traffic and financially weak carriers. In an environment where airports
compete to be connecting complexes for airlines, airports that do not have high origin-
destination traffic would run the risk of being empty once a hub-carrier decides to move
away. Thus, by understanding the competitive dynamics of airlines operating in multiple
airport environments, airport planners should then be able to anticipate the risks
inherent in the airport planning process.
Yet, to attract airlines to serve an under-used secondary airport that has already
been built is perhaps a tricky affair which may require ingenious airport marketing
efforts. While actively persuading an airline to start operations at an under-used
secondary airport seems rational, creating an overall awareness amongst the traveling
public and travel agents that convenient air service is available at the secondary airport
could be equally essential. The fact that Southwest has done wonders for the many
secondary airports in huge urban areas is an indicator that there is hope for multiple
airport systems to be viable. As always, perhaps the right dose of support from the
local politicians should also be instrumental in making multiple airport systems
successful, particularly if the politicians see developing the airport as a means of
boosting the local economy and employment opportunities [63].
7.3 Further Research
The current thesis has merely focused on the competitive behavior of airlines in
dual airport systems so as to initiate the research effort with something simple.
However, the study could be extended to that of, say, tri-airport systems. Although the
thesis has, so far, captured, qualitatively, the competitive dynamics of the airlines, the
author speculates that a quantitative model of the competitive behavior, if at all
conceivable, would be of value to airport planners. For now, grappling with the
complexity of the dynamics of airline competition in a deregulated environment would
be the first and toughest hurdle to overcome.
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